American Foreign Policy Post bin Laden

Post the death of Al-Qaida's most recognized leader, Osama bin Laden, the United States has had to adjust its mission in the War on Terror, recognizing that the threat is indeed broad and the enemy is persistent. Reports suggesting that the number of suspected terrorists has doubled within the last twelve months, that either suggests that the intelligence community has improved it reconnaissance on suspects or the TSA has been very busy. The reality is that terrorism without action, just like before 9/11, exists. Everyday, facilitators recruiting future suicide attackers and raising funds for terror operations exist and are hoping to develop the next big plot against our way of life.


Reports from the hearing on Capitol Hill yesterday suggested that America's most prominent adversary lays in the leadership of Iran. With reports suggesting that despite continued embargoes, Iran is willing and developing plots to attack American interests, both domestic and abroad (as evidenced by the willingness to attempt an assassination of the Saudi ambassador in a Washington D.C. restaurant) should alarm people. Iran's capabilities are unrivaled globally through its use of proxy networks. The question is how capable are its once strong partners, such as with Hizbullah, to instruct and coordinate an attack on American interests?


The reality is that Iran has long positioned itself within the Middle East region to be the most operational terror outfit. Its arsenal, recruitment numbers, and statements speak for itself. Despite setbacks in its leadership in Lebanon (which should raise concern of a splinter within the group that could develop into regional factions similar to Al-Qaida) the group has some of the most dedicated and persistent warriors within its ranks.


With the continued unrest in Syria, the certainty of one of Iran's closest partners in the Sunni-Shia divide is at stake and an opportunity to distract the international community is one of the most practical possibilities in this saga. Iran is in a difficult situation economically and is constantly looking for a way out, as evidenced by the previous reports of it seeking to increase oil exports and other strategic partnerships globally. It has laid a stake in various parts of Africa as well as in South America, particularly in Venezuela.


Strategically, without a unified voice to denounce the killings of protestors on the streets inside Syria, Bashar al-Assad will remain in power. The risks are too high for not only his regime, but also within the Iranian leadership which has aided Assad for years. The religious leadership of Iran, led by its Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomenei, views every struggle as part of a religious commitment to fulfill the coming of the Mahdi and bringing about the end of the world. This delusion/ambition destroys the probability of reasoning with the real deciders, Iran's Supreme Council, is null.


Iran is a ticking time bomb that poses a grave threat to Israel, the U.S. and its Western allies as well as the entire Middle East region. The capabilities of Iran, combined with its undeclared nuclear program and its global network of terrorists place an emphasis on U.S. foreign policy and its need to deal and address the issue now rather than procrastinate and allow further development. Iran's leadership is religiously motivated and dependent on the apocalyptic theology and the necessity to bring this scenario about.


With the death of Osama bin Laden, the War on Terror developed into a new phase that determined that the enemy is no longer just one man who we sought to bring to justice, but rather a collection of groups seeking to destroy the fundamental rights of humanity. The reality is Iran utilizes its networks for terrorism, as well as being complicit and involved in actions killing U.S. soldiers inside Afghanistan and within Iraq in the past. U.S. policy must address the lapses in its inability to adequately confront and halt Iran in its quest for what is assuredly for nuclear weapons. Consistently, the largest threat against the U.S. has been Hizbullah. Due to its global networking and capabilities, combined with its complacency in criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking, this group will remain the most extensive enemy against the West.

Committing to a resolution for Iran

2011 has been a whirlwind year, with the emergence of the "Arab Spring" throughout the Middle East and the recent death of North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, this is hardly a time for the U.S. to mull presidential candidates with little to no foreign policy backbone. While TIME magazine recognized "the Protester" as its person of the year, it clearly showed how strong an impact one person can have - for better or worse. Now as Syrian protesters continue to be massacred on the streets, the U.S. stays mum to the violence committed by President Bashar Assad. Whatever happens in Syria could be part of a larger trail that could ultimately lead to Iran, resulting in either a stronger Islamic republic under Khomenei or a new democracy. Now, more than ever is the time to act in Iran and to sustain all current actions.

To the West and especially Israel, the largest concern from Iran has been with the undeclared and unregulated nuclear pursuits of a country that seeks to control the region and the world. This is a country that is bigger than its borders, exploiting partnerships in various regions to expand and establish presence inside virtually every corner of the globe. For the time being, Iran's activities have been primarily centered around fundraising. However, recent reports show that the U.S. has effectively diminished the flow of funds from Iran to groups like Hizbollah by as much as 25%. Continued sanctions can help manage the world's largest exporter of terrorism, but it does little to end the threat posed by Iran's proxies. Furthermore, the apparent drying up of money has reportedly pushed Hizbollah operatives in Northern Lebanon to deal drugs in an attempt to make up for losses.

Strategically, now is perhaps one of the most opportune times for the U.S. to capitalize on the revolutionary movements emerging throughout the region as well as the insecurity of Iran's government. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has announced he will not run in the election in 2013, and the sanctions have proven disruptive to Iran's Revolutionary Guard and its funding of Hizbollah, which is reportedly in turmoil amid reports of internal corruption which reportedly had the group's investment manager having embezzled as much as $1.6 billion. That is how much money we are talking about. Consider Western intelligence having placed Hizbollah's leader Hassan Nasrallah to have a net worth of $250 million.

According to reports, Iran's Revolutionary Guard is growing increasingly frustrated with Hizbollah amid the corruption allegations. Hizbollah, regarded as "the A-team of terror" amid intelligence circles, has taken a serious hit and may be at a bypass with many of its senior leaders and the IRGC. With the tension between Iran and Hizbullah building, and an inability to deliver funds, Iran's biggest and most feared proxy is in a weakened state. Combined with upcoming elections in 2013 and the growing movement inside Syria, Iran's biggest assets are in a struggle that they can either emerge stronger or weakened.

Last week, Ahmadinejad announced that by 2013 his country will be a major gasoline exporter. This move is a direct affront to the threat and usage of sanctions in an effort for his country to establish independence similar to its establishment of a joint bank venture with Venezuela.

Opportunity exists for the U.S. to partner with Western countries and regional players in seeking a new Iran that eliminates the violent rhetoric and apocalyptic direction that Ayatollah Khomenei seeks, regardless of who the country's president is. As Rep. Ron Paul questions why the U.S. should be meddling in Iranian affairs, the fact remains that with or without U.S. surveillance, Iran has an undeclared nuclear program, has consistently been the largest state-sponsor of terrorism, and has backed attacks globally on U.S. assets via its network of proxies.

Iran's toughening stance and the Arab Spring conflict

With news forthcoming regarding a plot to murder Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Adel Al-Jubeir, it is clear as is to be expected that the Iranians continue to be up to no good. Perhaps, this plot best summarizes the state of the Middle East post-Arab Spring revolutions - a region conflicted by the interests of Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shia Iran. This power struggle by the two dominant powers of the region has taken form in various battles, mainly via subversive strategic episodes utilizing proxies. As the U.S. makes its case against the two Qods force linked operatives, it appears that Iran should indeed have a lot of explaining to do.

What is particularly significant in this case is the direct link between Manssor Arbabsiar and a DEA confidential informant (CI). Arbabsiar had been led to the CI because of his suspected narcotics trafficking contacts, which Gholam Shakuri advised utilizing because "people in that business are willing to undertake criminal activity in exchange for money." Douglas Farah and several others have written extensively on the risks of abandoning the War on Drugs faces when the various criminal enterprises collide with terrorist groups. Groups like Hezbollah and the Taliban have extensively utilized them as a method for fundraising and contract operations such as this one and keep their hands clean.

I believe the record speaks for itself, since 9/11 the U.S. has created and used an extensive network of CI's who have fortunately been helpful in providing information regarding plots both here and abroad. It is these individuals who help in making a case and disrupting plots like this.

However, there are a lot of questions that most assuredly are going through U.S. policymakers minds as well as within the Saudi circles. Iran's last linked attacks against a state were the bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, as well as a Jewish center in 1994 in the same city. Reports suggest that the recently disrupted plots indicated a renewed interest in striking the exact same city, which suggests a vast network by Qods force intermediaries in the Latin American region. Given the recent threats by Iran to deploy its navy along the U.S. Eastern seaboard, as well as this plot to for the first time conduct an operation against a U.S. ally on our soil, Iran is continuing to take an aggressive posturing that should be investigated.

The internal struggle in Iran is pressing for lame-duck President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now a political outcast by Ayatollah Khomenei for defying him in the appointment of the country's intelligence minister, Ahmadinejad is a lightweight for the country's affairs. That should be the scary part, is the theocracy now controls everything down to foreign affairs. Take into consideration that this theocracy calls for the end times and the coming of the Mahdi which they are supposed to govern in order to bring this momentous occasion about. This is a very dangerous concoction of delusional, religious dictators who see themselves in direct conflict with the West and now appear to be fixing to take a much more outward approach in reforming the globe and their region.

The U.S. should stand strictly by Saudi Arabia in this instance, and given the direct action of war this plot would have created if it had been successful, the strict interest of the world should be securing Iran's unchecked nuclear program and arsenal. As facts emerge as to how high up the totem pole this plot reached within Iran's government (which undoubtedly it would not be surprising for it to reach the upper echelons inside Qods Force, IRGC, and the Supreme Council on Natl. Security), it is necessary to keep the leadership of the country within confines and urge the Arab Spring revolutions to rise again inside this country. Iran's leadership can not be trusted and needs to be closely monitored. Undoubtedly, this incident has the Israelis and the Saudis doing just that.

Deaths of senior AQ leaders reported; where are we in the GWoT?

News broke yesterday morning stating that several AQAP leaders, including two U.S. citizens, had been killed in a Predator strike. Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were reported among the dead in a statement by Yemen's Defense Ministry. Also reported to have been killed was AQAP's top bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri, in a separate strike. These successes, if indeed fact, prove that the use of drones as assets in the GWoT are virtually invaluable in eliminating high-value targets. With the intensity of this tactic under President Obama, it appears that there is no hint of attempting to slow down anytime soon.

According to the Washington Post, the CIA is in the process of constructing four drone airstrip bases intended to strike AQ affiliates inside Yemen and Somalia. The enhancement of such a program should be welcomed by many, allowing the U.S. to fight this new-age war with new-age technology that does not risk our soldiers lives.

However, with such an intensity and fury coming from drones to target the leadership in faraway places, there is an underlying question. What is really being done here at home to enhance the U.S. in this War on Terror? When President Obama took office, critics questioned if he had the determination and ability to conduct a war. It appears that indeed he has skillfully handled the GWoT in regards to specifics, but like his predecessors, is unwilling to come to a full on confrontation with the pandemic of radicalism.

The real question is legally, are we enhancing our fight and clearly defining the legal abilities of law enforcement in confronting this war? I do not feel as though the outreach mission to incorporate the Muslim community has succeeded and quite honestly, has returned to the pre-9/11 days. Between the media and politicians, we have made this a war about names - similar to the Communist threat from nation states like the USSR. However, this is a war of ideals that has no boundaries or structural organization. Dare I say without OBL's pre-9/11 corporate structuring, Al-Qaeda as a whole will splinter off into the independent franchises based in the Northern Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and Kashmir/Pakistan.

Pakistan will always play host to a radical faction of jihadists, given its dispute with India, the alliances published most recently regarding the U.S. embassy strike in Kabul will always be an asset to the ISI. Inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. strategy is seen at odds with the tribal structuring and has done little to incorporate and facilitate a partnership. While most definitely easier said than done, a comprehensive approach to turn the dependence on Taliban and AQ, especially inside Pakistan, would drastically change the dynamics of this conflict that is about winning hearts and minds.

The fact of the matter is we can take out as many leaders as we want, but there will always be this radical jihadist element that will pose the primary national security threat to the U.S. Over the duration of the War on Terror, several major blows to terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Russia have been facilitated largely by U.S. cooperation in nearly almost every circumstance. We are taking this war to the terrorists doorsteps in, as Pres. George W. Bush stated was necessary so we would not have to fight them on our own streets as we felt on 9/11. While killing off bad guys is easy, defining the legal challenges and alliances in this war is where the real struggle lies.

Pulling out in Afghanistan: Remembering Musa Qala

It should have been expected that the day after President Obama announced a plan to gradually draw down troop numbers in Afghanistan, Capitol Hill would be filled with the partisan positions arguing in favor and against the President's plan. Campaigning as candidate Barack Obama, I was impressed with his position on Afghanistan, arguing for a withdrawal but pointing out the areas that NATO troops must target to leave the country while building the society we idealized after the Taliban. Needless to say, to this day we have yet to see the situation improve in Afghanistan, and if anything, get worse.

The job in Afghanistan has not been undermined by President Obama, or President Bush, but rather President Hamid Karzai. A man whose reign has promoted government corruption and the establishment of Taliban shadow courts and administrations in his country's provinces, Karzai rapidly showed he was not the capable leader touted by then President Bush in his 2001 address to Congress announcing the new face of Afghanistan. With a family plagued with ties to the illicit opium trade (a necessary evil to confront in order to win), Hamid Karzai has become a leader who dictates by indecision and response, rather than pioneering the democratic ideals he once said he'd represent.

The recent confirmation that allied forces were engaged in "integration" talks with Taliban intermediaries could not be any more of a mistake. Witness the result of talks in Pakistan with the group, which led to increased violence and casualties. Negotiating with the Taliban WILL NOT work. Plain and simple. The Taliban do not exist without Sharia, and their extreme interpretation is the only version they seek. In order to obtain the upper hand in government, they will use terrorism - the tactic we are at war against - and deception. Unless the Taliban renounce violence, their arms, and their hand in the opium trade any deal should be viewed as a complete fraud. After all, that is how Pakistan ended up in the position it is in.

Pakistan has recently suffered a string of attacks brought on by infiltration inside its military ranks. The May 22 attack on Naval Station Mehran was made possible by dedicated militants who utilized taqiyya (a practice allowing Muslims to deny their faith and beliefs in order to achieve their goals). This is something that took years, which is precisely what has been warned may have been happening for years in the ranks of the Afghan police and military. Take the April 4 killing of two U.S. soldiers providing security for a meeting between the deputy commander for the Afghan border police and U.S. officials. The shooter was an Afghan police officer.

Violence on Afghan police has increased, with the assassination of the police chiefs for Kandahar, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces in just a three month period. Hardly a figure that suggests stablility throughout the ranks of the forces that we should have trained to take over the counterinsurgency. Without experienced warriors, like Gen. Khan Mohammad Mujahid, assuming the role of confronting the groups perpetrating violence there is opportunity for Taliban fighters to yet again make a comeback and gain a following.

Last but not least, President Obama mentioned that Al-Qaida was in a weakened state following the death of Osama bin Laden. It is my belief, as well as several other experts, that Al-Qaida is and has been in a weakened operational state. There have been significant gains well before OBL's death, with several experienced Soviet-era mujahideen fighters who were AQ leaders and organizers falling victim to Predator strikes. Operationally, AQ is not and most probably will never be able to perpetrate another 9/11, but it can inspire individuals to recruit and establish their own attack plans. The trend of recent attacks coming from Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula speaks to the abilities of AQ central. Al-Qaida's leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan had no handling in the day-to-day operations of the group, but rather merely had the final say as to the direction they wanted their franchises (like AQAP and Shabaab) to take.

We can argue there are only 50-100 Al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, but the elephant in the room is how many there are in Pakistan. For years, it has been argued that in order to effectively fight in Afghanistan we must expand our focus to the groups operating from Pakistan (like the Haqqani network, the group that has killed the most U.S. troops). It was thought that the killing of OBL would set a precedent, but rather represents a climax in our campaign to root out those who utilize fear as a tactic to promote a radical agenda. The numbers of Taliban and AQ are most definitely not those touted by the Pentagon and CIA officials in media soundbites.

Time will tell whether or not Afghanistan is winnable. Most certainly, with the current policies and administrations in the U.S. and in Afghanistan, we will go down in history as abandoning the country in a state worse than we found it. Afghanistan has historically been a country plagued with violence, with a population that expects to never see peace and growth. History has made the population weary of how committed our troops are from the beginning. On that note, here's one nugget from that history:

"In September 2006, the British and the Taliban acknowledged an impasse by accepting a truce brokered by elders of Musa Qala: each side agreed to withdraw from the district center. The agreement, combined with reported British efforts to bribe Taliban commanders in Helmand, was met with harsh criticism from some coalition critics, who believed these actions projected weakness and empowered the Taliban. Within three months, claiming that a U.S. air strike violated the agreement, approximately 200 Taliban retook the district center and quickly moved to establish radical Islamist rule over the area. The withdrawal of British forces, coupled with the Taliban's eventual ability to reclaim the area, cemented Musa Qala as a proud symbol of insurgent resistance, analogous on a smaller scale to the cultural resonance Fallujah once held in Iraq"

The Arab Spring and the potential to be on the wrong side of history...again

As President Obama continues to push for the "democracies" emerging in Egypt and Tunisia, the question emerging is how much can we trust that the youths on the streets really know the answer to the question everyone seems to be asking once the established government leaders are unseated: "What now?" The fact remains, when the U.S. pulled its support for President Mubarak, shock waves echoed in the halls of the palaces of other U.S. regional partners who suddenly realized that the U.S. could and would redact its support in a heartbeat to accommodate a vision for the region, even at the expense of an uncertain future and potential anarchy.

This movement may have honest beginnings, it may be the legitimate outcry from suffering populations who have reached the breaking point and making Tahrir Square into the next Tiananman Square. However, without careful oversight, the potential for evil forces engaged in jihad and partnered with the global vision for an Islamic Caliphate. Many people have it wrong when using the term jihad, labeling it as solely a blood and guts war against society. There are three variants to jihad, all focusing on different components. Jihad is the term for "struggle," which can indeed relate to citizen/government relations, or a person's internal conflict. Either way, the ultimate goal in jihad is to construct a resilient Islamic mentality in either a Muslim, or society.

With jihad taking form against the Mubarak administration, time will tell how long it will after the elections for the new administration to establish its policies on the Christians that make up Egypt's minority. Mubarak took a great deal of pressure from Muslims worldwide for his acceptance of Christianity inside the country, refusing to bow to calls to establish a Muslim state. Now, with his protection out the window, the potential for sectarian violence (just like in Lebanon with Hizbullah forces in 2008) is on the rise. Just last week, in Cairo Christian-Muslim clashes killed 11 and injured 150.

It was for this very reason that the al-Qiddissin church in Alexandria was targeted in a brutal attack on New Year's Eve. In the weeks following the Mubarak administration rounded up over 50 terrorists suspected of being linked to the plot. Al-Qaida in Iraq had issued a warning that December suggesting the targeting of churches throughout the region, however it was not deemed to be responsible for the plot and it was pinned on the Palestinian Islamic Army.

In a unique twist, the new anti-Mubarak administration opened an investigation implicating the Interior Ministry in a plot to exacerbate sectarian tensions in the country and implicate Al-Qaida militants in a bid to receive increased aid from the U.S. Proclamation 1450 saw an internal affairs investigation that was one of many to follow as President Hosni Mubarak was forced from office. Who stands to gain from the coup that took place? It has been clear, most recently in Lebanon in 2008, that militant groups seeking government legitimacy play a significant role in these movements. Hizbullah was able to topple any internal resistance from within Lebanon, and force a government takeover, while appearing "democratic" in its manipulations. Who ultimately stood to gain from a Hizbullah-led Lebanon? Ask the Israelis and it will be a strong answer of Iran.

Now, as Bashar Assad faces the same domestic revolts that have undermined the governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, where is the global response? Rather than pointing all our resources at Qaddafi, the real ploy should be to aggressively aid the Syrian resistance and mandate Assad cease civilian attacks (essentially the same thing we did in Libya, but with more tact). In Syria, we can win a war with the Syrian people's cooperation, and win back our reputation in the region as a protector of human rights and democratic values. At the same time, to topple Assad would change the tables in Lebanon and possibly put the favor back in the hands of the elected officials that swiftly lost any government input at the hands of Hizbullah's 2008 civil war. We could free Lebanon and Syria at the same time, and make things extremely difficult for Assad's closest partner - Tehran.

For the most part, Tehran has sat silent. Now as the situation in Syria begins to make some recognition in the media, it is being forced to respond at a very embarrassing time for the country. The role of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been relegated to completely internal closed door meetings with Ayatollah Khomenei following a dispute over his dismissal of the Khomenei associate, Intelligence Director Heidar Moslehi. Ahmadinejad fired Moslehi on 4/17, then according to MEMRI, was forced to reinstate him under direct orders from Khomenei. For the week following, the usually outspoken and hate mongering Ahmadinejad was confined to his house as the regime leaders dictated the potential wrath for disobeying the Ayatollah.

As Iran's president is carefully monitored to insure he remains the puppet for Khomenei, now is the U.S. opportunity to shake up the region. However, we seem to be only imagining ways to sanction Assad and try and punish him utilizing tactics that are meant to bribe and attract someone to the bargaining table, not as a punishment. Sanctions, just like with Iran's nuclear program, should not be the only measure we take against someone who has so violently abused the power of the presidency. Assad's calculated pullback and then successful monitoring of Lebanon from just outside the mandated area has effectively rendered Lebanon and its Hizbullah-led government as Iran's proxy next door to Israel. With this lingering, how long will it take before the region erupts and we see the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict again? The only difference this time is we can have the support of Saudi Arabia and other anti-Iranian countries who will, as in times previous, arm Israel to confront the trouble.

Regarding Future U.S.-Pakistani Relations Post-bin Laden

As the joy of the demise of Osama bin Laden continues to be heard throughout the world, it is without a doubt a bittersweet victory in Pakistan for the administration of President Zardari and his Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Ironically, OBL joins the ranks of the AQ senior leaders who just so happened to find refuge within throwing distance of Pakistani military and intelligence bases (like KSM being captured in 2003 in Rawalpindi, host to Pakistan's army HQ). Now the real question finally gets asked of our "partner" in the war on terror how much they really knew about this compound.


Without a doubt, Pakistan walks away from this U.S. victory bathed in egg all over its face. The message it sends, especially after my favorite man in Pakistan - the always amusing Interior Minister Rehman Malik, adamantly denied for years that bin Laden could never be in his country and U.S. intelligence was flat out wrong. Perhaps this quote from Foreign Policy best represents the truth of the situation of this man's position and his ability to conduct his duties as Interior Minister.

"With great passion last year, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "I categorically deny the presence of Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and even Mullah Omar in any part of Pakistan."
Now, with the capture of bin Laden in Pakistan -- only 40 miles from Malik's office - it's more difficult than ever to consider his statements, and those of his civil and military counterparts, credible. Since 9/11, Pakistan's leaders have been lying to the United States, neighboring countries, their own people, and even to one another about fundamental elements of the war on terror."

It looks like after this operation, Pakistan is either at best incompetent at gathering intelligence directly outside of its own capital (heaven help it with intel in the provinces), or just flat out complicit in refuging senior Qaida leadership. Whether the Taliban is included in that statement is unknown, but seeing as Pakistan created them, there is no reason why they would not be offered the same amenity.


Minister Malik has repeatedly denounced U.S. drone strikes inside Pakistan, vowing that the WoT is in Pakistan's best interest and that OBL was responsible for more Pakistani killings than Americans. This logic was repeatedly used to justify how come Pakistan had taken no action on OBL, essentially stating that if they knew where he was they most assuredly would go after him and wanted a stake at the AQ leader before the U.S.. Not so fast.


This quote, taken from the Long War Journal, clearly shows that at least one Pakistani official has gone on the record saying that it was aware of the compound, was monitoring it, and the kicker: "IT KNEW WHERE HE WAS."

"A Pakistani official's statements on the raid make it clear that Pakistan knew where bin Laden was, but did not act. In an interview with CNN, Wajid Hasan, Pakistan's high commissioner to the Untied Kingdom, actually said that Pakistan was "monitoring" bin Laden's location but the US beat Pakistan to the punch and launched the raid.
"We were monitoring him and the Americans were monitoring him," Hasan said. "But the Americans got to knowing where he was first and that is why they struck at him precisely."
Later in the interview, Hasan said that "Pakistan had been keeping certain areas monitored, and it knew where he was."


The fact that this compound was constructed relatively recently, the design included several obvious security features, and the low amount of individuals coming and going should have almost definitively raised an eyebrow for local forces inside the country. In all fairness, I would presume that OBL had this as one of several secure options spread throughout the country should he be required to travel, and that he did not take residence in this type of environment until possibly 2008-09. We may never know how long the world's most wanted terrorist resided here, but that he was able to infiltrate the urban cities of Pakistan clearly shows a huge lapse in Pakistan's defense in its most vital areas.


However, now that OBL is off the list, I would expect the Pakistani leadership to become increasingly hostile and defensive to any scrutiny regarding its military and ISI complacency with the jihadist figures. It is highly probable that President Zardari did not know anything about OBL's abode outside the capital, but someone most definitely did and it was probably ISI. The two branches, separated from the presidency, have always been first and foremost focused on having options available against India. The Taliban and bin Laden's mujahideen represented this opportunity before, and most assuredly to this day remain a viable option that Pakistan's military would like to hide in the closet until they must bring them out.


In summary, Pakistan will no longer see the U.S. War on Terror as a legitimate fight within its boundaries. Expect cooperation to stall as President Zardari's advisers push for the War on Terror inside Pakistan to occur only by Pakistani troops and assets without any U.S. drones being authorized. The U.S. complained long enough that it couldn't get across to where OBL was, but we finally did taking it directly to his doorstep. Pakistan did not care then, and now has to recover from the disgrace and scrutiny of the international community. Rehman Malik has a lot of explaining to do, he might want to actually start reading intelligence reports before making claims that the U.S. is going after ghosts inside his country. We found the biggest fish so far, who knows what else is lurking right outside his door.