Regarding Future U.S.-Pakistani Relations Post-bin Laden

As the joy of the demise of Osama bin Laden continues to be heard throughout the world, it is without a doubt a bittersweet victory in Pakistan for the administration of President Zardari and his Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Ironically, OBL joins the ranks of the AQ senior leaders who just so happened to find refuge within throwing distance of Pakistani military and intelligence bases (like KSM being captured in 2003 in Rawalpindi, host to Pakistan's army HQ). Now the real question finally gets asked of our "partner" in the war on terror how much they really knew about this compound.


Without a doubt, Pakistan walks away from this U.S. victory bathed in egg all over its face. The message it sends, especially after my favorite man in Pakistan - the always amusing Interior Minister Rehman Malik, adamantly denied for years that bin Laden could never be in his country and U.S. intelligence was flat out wrong. Perhaps this quote from Foreign Policy best represents the truth of the situation of this man's position and his ability to conduct his duties as Interior Minister.

"With great passion last year, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "I categorically deny the presence of Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and even Mullah Omar in any part of Pakistan."
Now, with the capture of bin Laden in Pakistan -- only 40 miles from Malik's office - it's more difficult than ever to consider his statements, and those of his civil and military counterparts, credible. Since 9/11, Pakistan's leaders have been lying to the United States, neighboring countries, their own people, and even to one another about fundamental elements of the war on terror."

It looks like after this operation, Pakistan is either at best incompetent at gathering intelligence directly outside of its own capital (heaven help it with intel in the provinces), or just flat out complicit in refuging senior Qaida leadership. Whether the Taliban is included in that statement is unknown, but seeing as Pakistan created them, there is no reason why they would not be offered the same amenity.


Minister Malik has repeatedly denounced U.S. drone strikes inside Pakistan, vowing that the WoT is in Pakistan's best interest and that OBL was responsible for more Pakistani killings than Americans. This logic was repeatedly used to justify how come Pakistan had taken no action on OBL, essentially stating that if they knew where he was they most assuredly would go after him and wanted a stake at the AQ leader before the U.S.. Not so fast.


This quote, taken from the Long War Journal, clearly shows that at least one Pakistani official has gone on the record saying that it was aware of the compound, was monitoring it, and the kicker: "IT KNEW WHERE HE WAS."

"A Pakistani official's statements on the raid make it clear that Pakistan knew where bin Laden was, but did not act. In an interview with CNN, Wajid Hasan, Pakistan's high commissioner to the Untied Kingdom, actually said that Pakistan was "monitoring" bin Laden's location but the US beat Pakistan to the punch and launched the raid.
"We were monitoring him and the Americans were monitoring him," Hasan said. "But the Americans got to knowing where he was first and that is why they struck at him precisely."
Later in the interview, Hasan said that "Pakistan had been keeping certain areas monitored, and it knew where he was."


The fact that this compound was constructed relatively recently, the design included several obvious security features, and the low amount of individuals coming and going should have almost definitively raised an eyebrow for local forces inside the country. In all fairness, I would presume that OBL had this as one of several secure options spread throughout the country should he be required to travel, and that he did not take residence in this type of environment until possibly 2008-09. We may never know how long the world's most wanted terrorist resided here, but that he was able to infiltrate the urban cities of Pakistan clearly shows a huge lapse in Pakistan's defense in its most vital areas.


However, now that OBL is off the list, I would expect the Pakistani leadership to become increasingly hostile and defensive to any scrutiny regarding its military and ISI complacency with the jihadist figures. It is highly probable that President Zardari did not know anything about OBL's abode outside the capital, but someone most definitely did and it was probably ISI. The two branches, separated from the presidency, have always been first and foremost focused on having options available against India. The Taliban and bin Laden's mujahideen represented this opportunity before, and most assuredly to this day remain a viable option that Pakistan's military would like to hide in the closet until they must bring them out.


In summary, Pakistan will no longer see the U.S. War on Terror as a legitimate fight within its boundaries. Expect cooperation to stall as President Zardari's advisers push for the War on Terror inside Pakistan to occur only by Pakistani troops and assets without any U.S. drones being authorized. The U.S. complained long enough that it couldn't get across to where OBL was, but we finally did taking it directly to his doorstep. Pakistan did not care then, and now has to recover from the disgrace and scrutiny of the international community. Rehman Malik has a lot of explaining to do, he might want to actually start reading intelligence reports before making claims that the U.S. is going after ghosts inside his country. We found the biggest fish so far, who knows what else is lurking right outside his door.