Pulling out in Afghanistan: Remembering Musa Qala

It should have been expected that the day after President Obama announced a plan to gradually draw down troop numbers in Afghanistan, Capitol Hill would be filled with the partisan positions arguing in favor and against the President's plan. Campaigning as candidate Barack Obama, I was impressed with his position on Afghanistan, arguing for a withdrawal but pointing out the areas that NATO troops must target to leave the country while building the society we idealized after the Taliban. Needless to say, to this day we have yet to see the situation improve in Afghanistan, and if anything, get worse.

The job in Afghanistan has not been undermined by President Obama, or President Bush, but rather President Hamid Karzai. A man whose reign has promoted government corruption and the establishment of Taliban shadow courts and administrations in his country's provinces, Karzai rapidly showed he was not the capable leader touted by then President Bush in his 2001 address to Congress announcing the new face of Afghanistan. With a family plagued with ties to the illicit opium trade (a necessary evil to confront in order to win), Hamid Karzai has become a leader who dictates by indecision and response, rather than pioneering the democratic ideals he once said he'd represent.

The recent confirmation that allied forces were engaged in "integration" talks with Taliban intermediaries could not be any more of a mistake. Witness the result of talks in Pakistan with the group, which led to increased violence and casualties. Negotiating with the Taliban WILL NOT work. Plain and simple. The Taliban do not exist without Sharia, and their extreme interpretation is the only version they seek. In order to obtain the upper hand in government, they will use terrorism - the tactic we are at war against - and deception. Unless the Taliban renounce violence, their arms, and their hand in the opium trade any deal should be viewed as a complete fraud. After all, that is how Pakistan ended up in the position it is in.

Pakistan has recently suffered a string of attacks brought on by infiltration inside its military ranks. The May 22 attack on Naval Station Mehran was made possible by dedicated militants who utilized taqiyya (a practice allowing Muslims to deny their faith and beliefs in order to achieve their goals). This is something that took years, which is precisely what has been warned may have been happening for years in the ranks of the Afghan police and military. Take the April 4 killing of two U.S. soldiers providing security for a meeting between the deputy commander for the Afghan border police and U.S. officials. The shooter was an Afghan police officer.

Violence on Afghan police has increased, with the assassination of the police chiefs for Kandahar, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces in just a three month period. Hardly a figure that suggests stablility throughout the ranks of the forces that we should have trained to take over the counterinsurgency. Without experienced warriors, like Gen. Khan Mohammad Mujahid, assuming the role of confronting the groups perpetrating violence there is opportunity for Taliban fighters to yet again make a comeback and gain a following.

Last but not least, President Obama mentioned that Al-Qaida was in a weakened state following the death of Osama bin Laden. It is my belief, as well as several other experts, that Al-Qaida is and has been in a weakened operational state. There have been significant gains well before OBL's death, with several experienced Soviet-era mujahideen fighters who were AQ leaders and organizers falling victim to Predator strikes. Operationally, AQ is not and most probably will never be able to perpetrate another 9/11, but it can inspire individuals to recruit and establish their own attack plans. The trend of recent attacks coming from Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula speaks to the abilities of AQ central. Al-Qaida's leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan had no handling in the day-to-day operations of the group, but rather merely had the final say as to the direction they wanted their franchises (like AQAP and Shabaab) to take.

We can argue there are only 50-100 Al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, but the elephant in the room is how many there are in Pakistan. For years, it has been argued that in order to effectively fight in Afghanistan we must expand our focus to the groups operating from Pakistan (like the Haqqani network, the group that has killed the most U.S. troops). It was thought that the killing of OBL would set a precedent, but rather represents a climax in our campaign to root out those who utilize fear as a tactic to promote a radical agenda. The numbers of Taliban and AQ are most definitely not those touted by the Pentagon and CIA officials in media soundbites.

Time will tell whether or not Afghanistan is winnable. Most certainly, with the current policies and administrations in the U.S. and in Afghanistan, we will go down in history as abandoning the country in a state worse than we found it. Afghanistan has historically been a country plagued with violence, with a population that expects to never see peace and growth. History has made the population weary of how committed our troops are from the beginning. On that note, here's one nugget from that history:

"In September 2006, the British and the Taliban acknowledged an impasse by accepting a truce brokered by elders of Musa Qala: each side agreed to withdraw from the district center. The agreement, combined with reported British efforts to bribe Taliban commanders in Helmand, was met with harsh criticism from some coalition critics, who believed these actions projected weakness and empowered the Taliban. Within three months, claiming that a U.S. air strike violated the agreement, approximately 200 Taliban retook the district center and quickly moved to establish radical Islamist rule over the area. The withdrawal of British forces, coupled with the Taliban's eventual ability to reclaim the area, cemented Musa Qala as a proud symbol of insurgent resistance, analogous on a smaller scale to the cultural resonance Fallujah once held in Iraq"

Fighting a war for the right reasons

Afghanistan is failing. As the U.S. has been in the country since 2001, there has been very little return or signs of progress, the fight still continues. The country is caught in a complicated crisis where leadership has failed. It's as though everyone has forgotten about how life was prior to the U.S. invasion that ousted the Taliban, where a barbaric state of ancient law killed those suspected of petty crimes. While the U.S. entered the country, President George W. Bush spoke of how in Afghanistan, we would seek to make it a beacon for the region where the Taliban would be removed and the country would be in the hands of the people. Here we are in 2010, where the empty promises have been lost in the political system.


President Hamid Karzai seems like the choice if there was one to select a leader, bearing substantial ties throughout his family's lineage to Afghanistan's politics. Karzai himself fled the country from Taliban rule, his wife was a doctor at Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan - making it safe to assume that at some point, he was aware and was a witness to the Afghanistan he liberated. However, the debate over Afghanistan's future could place the group he once fought in a position where not only would they be recognized, but would have a say in the government.


Not enough has been done to engage the Afghan population on the tribal level. The ability to create a strong, centralized national government is not remotely possible without the commitment and allegiance of all the tribes. This simply can not be done without promising these people deliverance from the subversive shadow governments set up by the Taliban in order to act as a replacement to the failed reform that Karzai once promised. Without offering an alternative, the options on the table for these tribes simply all point back to the Taliban.


What has come out of Karzai's rule has been a gradual evolution of a man who sought to bring about change, but has been burdened with a task that travels through complicated tribal ties to figures who have undermined his role. It is said that after last summer's election, where the international community suggested that the vote for Karzai was illegitimate, accusing the U.S. of "stealing his legitimacy." It seems as though the future of Afghanistan rests on one man's personal dilemma, is he willing to set aside his ego?


There is no doubt the Afghan military and police forces are incompetent and juvenile at best. The fledgling ranks are easily infiltrated and once again, burdened by complicated alliances. However, this is a situation made by Karzai's micromanagement of coalition forces inside his country. His criticism of coalition forces when civilians are caught in the crossfire directly undermines NATO support amongst the populations he is dependent on. If there was ever more of a time to allow action and reform, it is now. As we look to a situation that is becoming increasingly desperate, the opportunity is now for President Karzai to prove he is a capable and competent leader. It is not the U.S. undermining him, it is the very people he has held meetings with to propose their integration into the "new" Afghanistan - the Taliban.


The Taliban massacres of innocent civilians is something that can not be endorsed by the international community. Have we honestly reached a society where we will face outcry over "enhanced interrogations" but will ignore a system where a 7-year old boy was killed for alleged spying or women for adultery or pursuing an education? Those offenses were constantly denounced by the international community, but now they seem to be forgotten. The alternative in Afghanistan simply can not be with the Taliban holding any power, there is too much at stake.

Are we fighting in Afghanistan?

After President Obama issued his orders to increase the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan by an additional 30,000 troops, can we expect victory in Afghanistan? As Steve Schippert notes, the president has yet to express the U.S. ambitions as "victory" or "success", but rather stating that he seeks to "finish the job." As the speech mentioned a U.S. goal of beginning a withdrawal by 2011, this is hardly the type of language the Afghan people needed to hear as they endure the fragile security in their homes, towns, and provinces.



When we entered Afghanistan, we not only took on the task of removing the Taliban and Al-Qaida elements from the havens they once had, but made a pledge to the Afghan people. We're supposed to be the good guys, the ones fighting the good fight and confronting those who claim the lives of innocents. Our primary mission in Afghanistan should be to secure all provinces, not cede them over to Taliban control (as is reportedly being negotiated in the previous entry).


Afghanistan is winnable, but we need to work with the people who want to see change. The people on the ground who cast the votes and experience the threats of the Taliban everyday, not the false leadership of a Karzai administration. These are the people who have settled for the Taliban simply because they do not have the capabilities or resources to resist the Taliban's influence. They have turned to them as an alternative, not as an answer. Nobody - not a Karzai, not the U.S., nor NATO - has the ability to unite all the different groups present in the country under a government that actually functioned, much less the present administration.


This war is something that President Obama understands well, a grassroots war. Just as his presidential campaign went through many hardships, it was the fight that people had in small towns across states that propelled his election over a year ago. This can be applied to Afghanistan. Major Jim Gant, of the Special Forces that have fought in the country, has seen and interacted with the tribes that could very well win this war. He writes:

"Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. This includes a central government located in Kabul, which to them is a million miles away from their problems, a million miles away from their security."

In his report, One Tribe at a Time, Gant explains quite simply how we can fight the war in Afghanistan and still end up losing. Our mission is far more difficult than that of the Taliban, which he says is simply to not lose. The task of the U.S. and NATO is a difficult one, but by trying to unite the country behind a government similar to ours is a rather radical goal that Gant explains is not possible without the support of the tribes. While living among Malik Noorafzhal's tribe in Afghanistan, Gant witnessed the foremost responsibilities of any Afghan lie within their tribe.


Historically, Afghanistan has never found answers in a national government. Even with the most advanced military, our [the U.S.] soldiers can not achieve victory through technology alone. It was the spirit of the tribes that helped fight off the Soviets after all. Gant observes, after experiencing battle in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that "Afghanistan is by far the more difficult and brutal operational environment. The enemy there has never been defeated."


Quite simply the task at hand is hard. However, the U.S. needs to throw all its interest into training not only the members of the Afghan Army and National Police Force and focus on cooperating with the tribes. A military answer by itself is not possible, it will be the integration of our soldiers into the tribal networks that will propel the U.S.'s goals in the country and provide the security that the Afghanistan needs to become a functioning country.

U.S. talking with the Taliban?

Afghanistan is fallen. The cleanup the U.S. and NATO has to do in there is immensely difficult at this point. With President Obama continuing to mull over his options, now months after General McChrystal issued his report, what are we doing about this situation? According to the Saudi al-Watan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenbarry, has been discussing a ceasefire with Taliban elements as high as Foreign Minister Ahmad Mutawakil. Based on the report, the U.S. is offering Taliban control of 5 provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Kunar, and Nuristan) in return for a halt in attacks on U.S. bases.


The U.S. embassy in Riyadh has denied the claims, but sources in Afghanistan are saying that somebody is most definitely talking to the Taliban. Who can make such a call? Given the Taliban's continued threats of "absolute defeat" against the U.S. and NATO, I would venture to say that it isn't the Americans who are negotiating. Karzai has tried time and time again to make offers to the Taliban, only to end up bringing his country into escalated violence. Remember the April 2008 attack in Kabul on the Afghan Independence Day Parade that caused dignitaries and Karzai himself to flee the celebrations? That came shortly after Karzai had denounced the U.S. and NATO presence for civilian casualties.


Afghanistan remains winnable, if we start treating this like a war. We are seeking to make this a post-war situation when we have not won yet. The NATO forces need to pursue the elements creating chaos without restraint and seek to bring stability to the environment. Afghans have no confidence in their government, and just as the cartels that operated in Latin America or the gangs that operated in Chicago in the 1930s, the Taliban have risen as a parallel to a failed government. Negotiating with someone who is willing to recklessly target civilian lives simply because they do not adhere to Islam will be a failure. By allowing the possibility of the Taliban to operate in 5 provinces, or nearly 25% of the country, we only lend credibility to them and turn a blind eye to their acceptance of violence. That is just a reckless strategy.

Afghanistan - Why We're Losing

How do we win in Afghanistan? Eight years after the U.S. campaign that ousted the Taliban from power, the country remains a list of "to-dos" that have yet to be checked off. Since President Obama tasked Gen. Stanley McChrystal in charge of forces in Afghanistan, there has been talk of transforming the strategies that many have said made this war unwinnable. The dilemma remains, how can this war be turned around? There seems to a be a vague understanding of what makes this a winnable war - with critics like George Will joining the ranks of Vice President Joe Biden. The Veep has called for less troops on the ground in Afghanistan because he believes we should be pursuing Al-Qaida's havens in Pakistan instead.


I remain a skeptic of how useful Gen. McChrystal can be on the ground. This war has become a political tool for many, breeding lines of bureaucratic red-tape that puts restrictions on those who have fought in wars. While people like George Will and the Vice President sit in their lavish offices in Washington, the people of Afghanistan are waiting for this rhetoric to pan out to action. The attitude of your average Afghan looks back at the Soviet invasion and remembers how "committed" the U.S. was then. The country is used to corruption and being plagued by violence, it has become part of the culture and they do not seek to be used by anyone. At the first sign of their country becoming a means by a superpower, they are willing to confront it - just like the Soviets.


This war has become a failure because of those who were put in charge of the country. The Karzai administration has done nothing for the people in the country, it has bred corruption throughout every level and has enabled those who operate the trafficking of narcotics out of the country. With the contested results of the election that put him into office for another term, Hamid Karzai will continue to be a portrait of all that is wrong in his country.


President Karzai has opted to play both sides in this war, blaming NATO forces for violence in the country and civilian deaths. Meanwhile, he asks for the Taliban to sit around a table and talk about their involvement in a "post-Taliban" society. Mr. Karzai has repeatedly shown he does not have the attitude or motivation to confront the Taliban, seeing them as the coalition's problem.


However, this idea has been embraced by many in Washington who seek to use Lebanon's Hizbullah as a model for bringing a violent group into the political affairs of a country. Maybe it's time that the cubicle monkeys of Foggy Bottom examine the testimony over the years.


"Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team."
-former Dep. Sec. of State Richard Armitage

"Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives."
-former DHS Sec. Michael Chertoff


The belief that Hizbullah is a regional player is complete and total B.S. Hezbollah controls Lebanon, it does not fit into the political system of the country. It has killed to get where it is and possesses global capabilities to obtain resources and attack targets. Ask Saad Hariri how Hizbullah has fit into the political system of his father on the Feb. 14, 2006 car bombing that shook Beirut.


If we want to push Afghanistan into a society that is ass backwards, by all means put the Taliban in the "reformed" government. If we withdraw our forces or do not commit to rebuilding their society, they will turn on us even more. They remember the U.S. pullout after ousting the Soviets, the question is do we?

Al-Qaida over the past eight years

As the U.S. remembers the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centers, the question among many in the intelligence community question how to measure feats achieved in the Global War on Terror. The group behind 9/11, Al-Qaida, has yet to achieve any attacks that rival those which killed 3,000. Many commentators suggest that Al-Qaida is phasing out in its recruitment capabilities, faced with the fact that it has not lived up to the precedent set in the 2001 attacks. In TIME, Tony Karon writes a piece titled "Eight Years After 9/11: Why Osama bin Laden Failed," which suggests that bin Laden's quest to instigate global jihad through his group has not occurred.


I would question the legitimacy of such an argument, showing that Al-Qaida was forced to adapt to a situation that was largely unexpected. The 2001 campaign in Operation Enduring Freedom took the group by surprise, and the memories of the mujahideen against the Soviets throughout the 1980s had no place in a present-day conflict. Afghanistan was taken from the Taliban and Al-Qaida was forced to withdraw to secure compounds among tribal allies.


It is largely impractical to believe that Al-Qaida would be capable of creating 9/11-esque attacks everyday, as the international community largely remains persistent in its quest to limit the group. At its best throughout the 1990s, the group was developing numerous large-scale plots, but only capable of the 1993 WTC bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 USS Cole attack. Only one of those occurred inside the United States. In the overseas incidents, Al-Qaida would not have been successful without its regional voices. I firmly believe that when it comes to Al-Qaida in a regional environment, the group is thriving still.


Proof of this can be seen in the violence that the group has achieved through its allies. Nearly every notable attack inside India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Northern Africa and Indonesia has been from an Al-Qaida partner. The Al-Qaida and Taliban alliance I believe has been abandoned largely as the Taliban has developed its own partnerships to raise funding and become a movement inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. I believe that the Taliban are largely self-sufficient in maintaining their attack capabilities. Al-Qaida may not be the international movement it once aspired to be, however it plays a powerful role in regional affairs.


We have played this game before, allowing intelligence officials to declare Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (responsible for attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen) as struggling, as well as stating that progress in Northern Africa (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) meant that we were winning. However, one year after those statements were made, both Al-Qaida affiliates remain capable of the same attacks they were in the past. The Al-Qaida most people remember in America was the enemy that flew planes into towers, however the group's beginnings were a humble guerrilla resistance. Perhaps the group has turned back to what gave it a name, looking to develop a new infrastructure trained in the ways that have kept the group alive.

TTP leader Mehsud killed in airstrike

As news comes out of Pakistan that Baitullah Mehsud is believed to be among the casualties of Wednesday's air strike in Waziristan, many analysts are no doubt looking at what is next for Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There is no doubt that Baitullah wore the title of Taliban commander well, becoming the government's most fierce competition, but will his death yield any actual results in what Pakistan's struggle against militants?


When Baitullah first emerged, he brought a new face to the militancy that he inherited. Opting to be in the shadows, he stayed away from cameras and chose to live a life centered around a fear that he would be found. His paranoia was evidenced by his routine - traveling in convoys, sleeping in different locations every night. His predecessor had become a victim of too much media attention and it appeared Baitullah had taken note. However, shortly after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, he evolved into a militant who sought to go after the Pakistani government and create chaos.


The question stands does the death of Baitullah accomplish anything in both Pakistan's war on terror and the global war. In all likelihood, the violence in the country will remain and the attempts to destabilize the government will remain persistent. As Baitullah rose in status as Pakistan's key militant, he alienated a great deal of his commanders who became his competition. The one thing that Baitullah had going for him in the tribal region was his pledge that he gave to residents that he would protect them from foreign fighters - including Pakistan's military. Baitullah was a strong fighter for the independence of those regions, seeking to keep the military and government from interfering.


It is highly possible that as the TTP names Baitullah's successor, that it will seek to establish itself as a powerful force that is unified in its beliefs. The schism that was created by Baitullah can be healed by the regathering of the group and by no means is the TTP in a struggle to survive. Baitullah was an extremely capable leader who had a great deal of resources at his disposal. In a recent editorial, the capabilities of the TTP are reflected upon, giving credit to how the resistance has maintained its struggle:

"According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion (around $48 million US) to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and "protection money" in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory."

The death of Baitullah does not mean a shift in the Taliban's tactics. The Taliban have a momentum and an agenda, which means that the TTP is still one of the most potentially damaging networks to the region. With its ties and resources, the new leader of the group has an endless flow of ability to fight jihad without making the same errors that may have led to his predecessor's death. The Taliban can not be defeated by air strikes alone, but rather attacking the very things that sustain it. There is a desperate need for the government to establish itself as capable of protecting its people, not negotiating useless ceasefires with militants who have the upper hand. The government will have to pursue the very things that finance the groups - including logging and mining. These, along with extensive ties to the drug trade, helped make up the nearly $48 million that the TTP earned. Only by the government conducting an offensive on all levels, not just using foot soldiers, will it win any real successes against its enemies.


For now, there is the success of eliminating a man who had countless amounts of blood on his hands. However, at the end of the day terrorism does not start or end with just one man.

Pakistan Five-Star Hotel bombed

As the reports come in pertaining to the attack today on Peshawar's only five-star hotel, the Pearl Continental, this can be seen as a direct threat by Taliban militants to not only the Pakistani government, but to the U.S. as well. The attack will more than likely be traced back to Taliban groups, probably with links to TTP commander Baitullah Mehsud. Following the government's offensive on Taliban hideouts, threats were made to attack prominent locations as revenge. The attack is the latest in a trend of attacks since the November Mumbai attacks, which combines gunmen and bombs creating two waves of attacks inside and outside the target.


Perhaps most concerning should be that the hotel was a spot not only frequented by diplomats in the region, but was included in negotiations by the U.S. to purchase the hotel for use as a consulate. This was part of a nearly $756 million plan for improving the U.S.'s embassy and consulates inside the country, putting the costs for such second to the new embassy in Iraq. It should be noted that the Taliban and Al-Qaida hold the U.S. responsible for exerting influence on the Zardari administration to conduct the operations in the tribal region. Today's attack should be perceived as not only another affront to Pakistan's government, but also a shot across the bow to the U.S. More details will emerge soon I am sure.

Holding the key to Afghanistan

When the United States entered its War On Terror in 2001, it was to remove Al-Qaida from the havens offered to it by the Taliban. Nearly eight years later, Afghanistan now has become the focus again. After a meeting between Presidents Karzai and Zardari at the White House two weeks ago, followed by the lead U.S. commander in Afghanistan being removed by Defense Secretary Gates, it is clear that the White House is attempting to put a new face on a war that has its share of critics. From Karzai reinforcing the accusations of civilian targeting in U.S. air strikes as well as Zardari's persistent complaints of the lack of international involvement in his country, the war in Afghanistan is no longer a containable threat without regional cooperation.


At this time last year, NATO forces in Afghanistan were preparing for an expected massive Taliban offensive as the weather warmed up. At this time last year, Karzai was accusing the U.S. and NATO of targeting civilians in their air strikes and promoting talks with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Pakistan launched military operations into towns that were believed to be Taliban strongholds.


Presently, NATO is expecting another Taliban offensive. Karzai is making the same statements and Pakistan is in the middle of more "offensives." By any standard, to declare progress in Afghanistan over the last year should raise an eyebrow so long as the situation one year later remains identical to the previous.


Last summer saw the Taliban and Al-Qaida operate from the havens in Pakistan to execute an array of sophisticatedly coordinated attacks on significant targets. There was the attempted assassination of Karzai in April, the June attack on a prison in Kandahar that freed nearly 1200 inmates, and the July bombing of the Indian embassy in the country. Several attacks also occurred in Pakistan, including the September attack on a Marriott in Islamabad.


Pakistan is expected to launch another offensive in Baluchistan, specifically targeting Baitullah Mehsud's fighters. Mehsud was yet again listed in another Anti-Terrorism Court warrant for the Lahore police academy bombing.


Pakistan is the answer to stabilizing Afghanistan. The Taliban are no longer contained to controlling a government, but have become a regional factor that seeks to undermine any opposition. Ahmed Rashid wrote of this when discussing how delicate the situation in Pakistan is, stating:

"The myths about the Taliban need to be clarified. They are not an extension of an external threat; they are not being funded by Russia or India. In the 1990s, the Taliban in Afghanistan were fighting the Northern Alliance, and thousands of Pashtuns went to fight as foot soldiers on behalf of the Taliban. In 2001, the Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban, who previously had little clout, became hosts of the Afghan Taliban and earned much money for their assistance."

Rashid wrote that from 2001 to 2004, the Pakistani Taliban sought to establish a emirate in FATA and that the showdowns with the government now are their pursuit to expand that state.


However, the most threatening assessment comes from the statement that Pakistan's ISI sought to use Taliban fighters from Afghanistan to "maintain the jihadi nexus as a force against the Indians." Rashid writes about this in detail:

"The leadership of the Taliban is now in Pakistan, and they have stated their intention of overthrowing the government here. The Taliban are linking up with groups in Pakistan, and the Pakistani Taliban movement is turning into a multiethnic movement. Groups cultivated [by the Pakistani Army] to fight in Kashmir have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban, and include Punjabis, with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen. Now, some 40 groups in Pakistan are loosely affiliated.... For that reason, Pakistan faces a more dangerous situation than Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek fighters were not permitted to join the Afghan Taliban movement."

The above passage sheds just a small light into how complicated the connections in Pakistan lie. As the government begs for more aid money, it is likely that more and more refugee camps will be filled in areas already effected by failed military offensives in their areas. The already economically dismal situation in the country will only increase as a result of more operations, and Zardari will continue to plead for more aid relief from the international community. However, such operations have yet to prove beneficial in the long run and have yielded virtually no consistent results.


So long as groups are functioning inside Pakistan's borders, it remains almost certain that should the government continue to conduct offensives, the jihadists in Pakistan will seek to divert any concentration on themselves to Pakistan's signature enemy. It is highly likely that Indian targets will again fall victim to an attack, with the intent to exacerbate Pak-Indian relations. The question will then turn to just how capable Pakistan is of securing its own borders and whether India attempts to hold the government accountable for any terrorist action hatched inside that country. With India certain of Pakistan's involvement in the embassy bombing and the Mumbai attacks, time is running out.

How we lost Afghanistan

Seven years after invading Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban regime, the situation in Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worst. The idea that the Taliban had vanished after their 2001 retreat from Kabul was quickly gone after this year's spectacular attacks. There was the April assassination attempt on Pres. Hamid Karzai, followed by the jailbreak of nearly 1000 prisoners from the Kandahar prison in June. Both attacks brought a component that was relatively unprecedented by the group - organization. The insurgency in Afghanistan had previously appeared to be a collection of cells with no connection and means to coordinate, capable only of occasional IED attacks and mortar rounds here and there. After those two attacks, joined by the Indian embassy bombing in July, it was clear that the rosy assessments painted by diplomats on the ground was merely a fantasy lived out in their secure compounds.


In reality, the Taliban do not have the ability to establish control as a legitimate government in Afghanistan. However, their fight has been one that is emerging as a strategic threat to the reconstruction and development in the country. By the June prison break, attacks were up 40% from last year and symbols of development were increasingly being targeted.


Shortly thereafter, reports emerged of the Taliban's "shadow" government systems that supposedly exist in nearly every province. With their own courts based on Shari'a, the Taliban had infiltrated local tribes and had become an alternative to a flawed Afghan justice system vulnerable to bribes.


What happened over the last seven years is of extreme importance to winning back Afghanistan. While the U.S. and NATO declared victory, the Taliban opted to be patient with their efforts and allow the opportunity to strengthen their capabilities. Without state sponsorship any more, they needed to find a means to fund their insurgency and partnered with the international opium market as a replacement. With Afghanistan consistently being the number one supplier of the product, it was an unregulated criminal enterprise that the U.S. and NATO seldom touched.


Either out of fear of turning the impoverished locals that grew the poppies nearer to the Taliban or intervention by Hamid Karzai's opium-profiting governors, over the seven years in Afghanistan nobody has addressed and confronted the issue of poppies. With anywhere between 88-93% of the global opium supply coming from Afghanistan, the Taliban had their moneymaker. During the Taliban's rule in the country, they allowed the farmers to grow poppies until they banned it in 2000. This ban did not curb the amount of opium pouring out of the country onto nearly every street.


Last week, TIME magazine held an interesting report that alleges the Taliban have officially entered the global crime syndicate. The UN's Office on Drugs and Crime announced that over the last three years, anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of opium have vanished from the global market. Consider that annually, the world consumes around 4,500 tons of the drug. Nearly two years worth of the drug, which retails for around $464,000 a ton, has just disappeared off the market.


The UN Office has not made any official assessments, but theories are circulating as to where such a large stash may have ended up. Officials are skeptical that this was a mere instance of the stockpile being lost in the black market and not appearing, basing their opinion on the global market. With opium being a fairly consistent $70 per kg, such a significant portion of the crop would have lowered prices. That simply hasn't happened.


The concern now is that the Taliban may have spent up to 3 years collecting the crop, and now have a bundle worth anywhere between $2.8 and 3 billion in their possession. Needless to say, with that kind of potential income, the Taliban's tactics and weaponry should continue to increase at the expense of the U.S. and President Karzai's blind eye to the crop. With market manipulation and the Taliban's control on the safety of opium exports, they hold the potential to spike the price and reach record profits all due to their patience. Unfortunately, there is little the coalition can do to prevent this besides stumbling across the stash which could already be on the streets of Europe and the U.S..


Simply put, the U.S., NATO, and Hamid Karzai all made a doomsday mistake by not controlling the poppy situation. We have opted to see the issue as a black and white one, rather than offering an alternative to the farmers. The London-based think tank Senlis Council has advised that the coalition and the Karzai government allow the growth of poppies, however instead of flooding the black market and paying for the bombs that kill our troops, have them sold to pharmaceutical companies worldwide. Then, the hope is that the money will collectively go to the tribes in the area and help pay for the rebuilding of the infrastructure.


It is my hope that President-elect Obama and his administration focus on this problem before the Taliban are able to control it even more. However, only once during the whole presidential campaign season did a candidate mention "opium" and "Afghanistan" collectively. With such a massive supply coming from Afghanistan, not every gram of opium has to end up in the hands of an addict in the UK. By promoting a legal alternative that is internationally acceptable, we can utilize international companies and agencies involvement to win the hearts and minds of the people. By allowing farmers to provide funding for local projects such as their schools and roads, it will be the people of Afghanistan making up the infrastructure and not just international aid. With that type of invested interest, the Taliban can hopefully be seen as the obstacle towards peace in the country and their monopoly on the Afghan poppies can end.

Letting the next bin Laden go

Word comes out today that Pakistan is accusing the U.S. of a “missed opportunity” to eliminate Tehrik-e-Taliban (the Pakistani wing of the Taliban) commander Baitullah Mehsud. Pakistan suggests that they passed on “actionable intelligence” that on May 24, Mehsud would be traveling via Toyota Landcruiser to his Taliban stronghold in South Waziristan. Apparently, the information was disregarded and the CIA Hellfires that could have fired missiles on the target sat idle.

This claim is almost comical, considering the timing. As reports circulate that the ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence agency) is full of corrupt Taliban sympathizers, the country has sought to accuse the U.S. of not fighting the War On Terror for Pakistan - despite that Prime Minister Gilani said last week while in Washington that the War On Terror was his country’s “own war” and the repeated public claims that U.S. forces had no right to violate Pakistani territory. That’s right, despite the nearly $10 billion that Pakistan has received since the War’s beginning in 2001 (only topped by Israel and Egypt as the top recipient of U.S. aid), Pakistan wants the U.S. to go after it’s high value targets - such as the alleged mastermind of Benazir Bhutto’s assasination.

The intelligence that was passed on is in reality, almost laughable. The reason Mehsud, who doesn’t sleep in the same bed each night and is virtually paranoid, would emerge on that date was for none other than a press conference. Mehsud called nearly 30 journalists to his stronghold to discuss his group’s policies publicly. It is well-known that Mehsud’s tribe is spending substantial amounts (to the tune of $45 million, the NWFP governor declared) on fleets of Toyota and Nissan trucks, which Mehsud uses for convoy travel with an estimated 2-3 dozen armed guards. To place Mehsud in a Toyota in the middle of a region that spans the size of New Jersey is worthless. Without an asset on the ground to confirm Mehsud’s presence, the credibility of such claims would be questioned.

The real question that this whole blame game raises is a very important one. Where is that money going?

Money intended for strengthening the Frontier Corps and Pakistani army troops apparently isn’t doing anything, if they are too afraid to act independently against a terrorist wanted in their own country for the assassination of one of it’s most revered politicians. Perhaps Prime Minister Gilani should remind his ISI and its minions that Mehsud had a warrant issued for his arrest on April 17. The majority of that month was spent with Mehsud’s fighters and the government brokering ceasefires. If Pakistan wants Mehsud’s head on a platter, let U.S. forces enter the region and allow full authorization for air strikes. Otherwise, how about diverting some of those billions in aid to North African countries, who could actually use it?

Just to give you a brief idea of what Mehsud’s organization has been responsible for in Pakistan’s policy evolution, here’s a short list:
-assassinated over 200 tribal elders in region
-abduction of over 200 Pakistani soldiers in 2007, as well as several police attacks (one of which he is charged in the warrant for)
-attempted Oct. assassination of Bhutto, successful attack in Dec.
-group has expressed links to AQ Khan nuclear smuggling network
-has free border access to Afghanistan, where group is orchestrating attacks

When the enemy hates what you stand for...

Exactly one week ago, the "coalition of the just and willing" got a wake-up call. Apparently, President Karzai of Afghanistan isn't so keen on just or willing-at least not in election campaign season.

After almost 7 years of fighting Taliban elements in Afghanistan, the world got to see that the Taliban are still capable of slipping through the cracks of the fragile Afghan security forces and coordinating an elaborate attack. Karzai was celebrating the 16th anniversary of the fall of the Soviet-backed government, which gave creation to the mujahideen resistance now known as Al-Qaida. While he stood amongst dignitaries such as the NATO general and several ambassadors, an assassination attempt flew bullets from Kalashnikovs and a rocket was fired at the stand where Karzai observed the festivities. Fortunately, President Karzai survived and so did the foreign dignitaries.

What wasn't addressed is that this should be a pretty easy omen for President Karzai. On the Friday prior to the attack, Karzai told UK's The Guardian that U.S. and NATO forces were undermining his government. He called for an end to arrests of Taliban members, saying that "It has to happen. We have to make sure that when a Talib comes to Afghanistan ... he is safe from arrest by the coalition." Strong words from a man who would not be President if it had not been for the U.S.-led removal of the Taliban government. He also went on to criticize the forces for any civilian casualties in their operations.

So, I'm assuming President Karzai knows a good bit about pandering to the voters in his re-election bid, but he doesn't understand anything about his country's stability. Karzai is quite simply trying to have two dreams at one time. Just today, his government told Pakistan that they were concerned about Pakistan's negotiations with Taliban elements in the FATA and NWFP. I find Pakistan's negotiations absurd, because quite simply the ceasefires do not work. The Defense Minister of Afghanistan recalled a 2006 Pakistan-Taliban agreement which only allowed reorganization of the Taliban and an increase in violence in Afghanistan. President Karzai must fight the Taliban militants because they are the ones setting his government up for failure. Karzai should recognize as a matter of policy, he simply can not criticize someone for negotiations with a group that he seeks to grant legitimacy to.

How come the Taliban talks result in increased violence within months of their signing?

Ideally, they want their power back and want to see their hard-line Islamic law back in power. However, the Taliban realize that they can not rule Afghanistan again but do have the power to breed instability. They are not a political force, but rather a resistance movement. This acceptance has bred the Taliban's control over surrounding villages and towns through no means other than intimidation and terror. Just look at how farmers families in the provinces of Pakistan have been threatened with death by Taliban elements for violating Taliban Islamic codes.

Karzai needs to make a strategic push to achieve security inside his country before attempting to negotiate political unity. The only group that can provide that will be the Taliban, and the only way to push them into a stance of submission is to counter their militancy. He must emphasize that the Taliban will not be recognized politically until they adopt a stance that removes all elements of violence. Until then, there will be no acceptance of any political influence in the country's political system. It is in Afghanistan's best interest to keep the troops rooting out the Taliban and for Karzai to not allow any of the Taliban's quotations of "crusaders killing children and families" to not make it into any of his campaign speeches.