9-11-01

Showing posts with label taqiyya. Show all posts
Showing posts with label taqiyya. Show all posts

Thursday, June 23, 2011

Pulling out in Afghanistan: Remembering Musa Qala

It should have been expected that the day after President Obama announced a plan to gradually draw down troop numbers in Afghanistan, Capitol Hill would be filled with the partisan positions arguing in favor and against the President's plan. Campaigning as candidate Barack Obama, I was impressed with his position on Afghanistan, arguing for a withdrawal but pointing out the areas that NATO troops must target to leave the country while building the society we idealized after the Taliban. Needless to say, to this day we have yet to see the situation improve in Afghanistan, and if anything, get worse.


The job in Afghanistan has not been undermined by President Obama, or President Bush, but rather President Hamid Karzai. A man whose reign has promoted government corruption and the establishment of Taliban shadow courts and administrations in his country's provinces, Karzai rapidly showed he was not the capable leader touted by then President Bush in his 2001 address to Congress announcing the new face of Afghanistan. With a family plagued with ties to the illicit opium trade (a necessary evil to confront in order to win), Hamid Karzai has become a leader who dictates by indecision and response, rather than pioneering the democratic ideals he once said he'd represent.


The recent confirmation that allied forces were engaged in "integration" talks with Taliban intermediaries could not be any more of a mistake. Witness the result of talks in Pakistan with the group, which led to increased violence and casualties. Negotiating with the Taliban WILL NOT work. Plain and simple. The Taliban do not exist without Sharia, and their extreme interpretation is the only version they seek. In order to obtain the upper hand in government, they will use terrorism - the tactic we are at war against - and deception. Unless the Taliban renounce violence, their arms, and their hand in the opium trade any deal should be viewed as a complete fraud. After all, that is how Pakistan ended up in the position it is in.
Pakistan has recently suffered a string of attacks brought on by infiltration inside its military ranks. The May 22 attack on Naval Station Mehran was made possible by dedicated militants who utilized taqiyya (a practice allowing Muslims to deny their faith and beliefs in order to achieve their goals). This is something that took years, which is precisely what has been warned may have been happening for years in the ranks of the Afghan police and military. Take the April 4 killing of two U.S. soldiers providing security for a meeting between the deputy commander for the Afghan border police and U.S. officials. The shooter was an Afghan police officer.


Violence on Afghan police has increased, with the assassination of the police chiefs for Kandahar, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces in just a three month period. Hardly a figure that suggests stablility throughout the ranks of the forces that we should have trained to take over the counterinsurgency. Without experienced warriors, like Gen. Khan Mohammad Mujahid, assuming the role of confronting the groups perpetrating violence there is opportunity for Taliban fighters to yet again make a comeback and gain a following.


Last but not least, President Obama mentioned that Al-Qaida was in a weakened state following the death of Osama bin Laden. It is my belief, as well as several other experts, that Al-Qaida is and has been in a weakened operational state. There have been significant gains well before OBL's death, with several experienced Soviet-era mujahideen fighters who were AQ leaders and organizers falling victim to Predator strikes. Operationally, AQ is not and most probably will never be able to perpetrate another 9/11, but it can inspire individuals to recruit and establish their own attack plans. The trend of recent attacks coming from Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula speaks to the abilities of AQ central. Al-Qaida's leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan had no handling in the day-to-day operations of the group, but rather merely had the final say as to the direction they wanted their franchises (like AQAP and Shabaab) to take.


We can argue there are only 50-100 Al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, but the elephant in the room is how many there are in Pakistan. For years, it has been argued that in order to effectively fight in Afghanistan we must expand our focus to the groups operating from Pakistan (like the Haqqani network, the group that has killed the most U.S. troops). It was thought that the killing of OBL would set a precedent, but rather represents a climax in our campaign to root out those who utilize fear as a tactic to promote a radical agenda. The numbers of Taliban and AQ are most definitely not those touted by the Pentagon and CIA officials in media soundbites.


Time will tell whether or not Afghanistan is winnable. Most certainly, with the current policies and administrations in the U.S. and in Afghanistan, we will go down in history as abandoning the country in a state worse than we found it. Afghanistan has historically been a country plagued with violence, with a population that expects to never see peace and growth. History has made the population weary of how committed our troops are from the beginning. On that note, here's one nugget from that history:

"In September 2006, the British and the Taliban acknowledged an impasse by accepting a truce brokered by elders of Musa Qala: each side agreed to withdraw from the district center. The agreement, combined with reported British efforts to bribe Taliban commanders in Helmand, was met with harsh criticism from some coalition critics, who believed these actions projected weakness and empowered the Taliban. Within three months, claiming that a U.S. air strike violated the agreement, approximately 200 Taliban retook the district center and quickly moved to establish radical Islamist rule over the area. The withdrawal of British forces, coupled with the Taliban's eventual ability to reclaim the area, cemented Musa Qala as a proud symbol of insurgent resistance, analogous on a smaller scale to the cultural resonance Fallujah once held in Iraq"

Monday, June 14, 2010

Fighting a war for the right reasons

Afghanistan is failing. As the U.S. has been in the country since 2001, there has been very little return or signs of progress, the fight still continues. The country is caught in a complicated crisis where leadership has failed. It's as though everyone has forgotten about how life was prior to the U.S. invasion that ousted the Taliban, where a barbaric state of ancient law killed those suspected of petty crimes. While the U.S. entered the country, President George W. Bush spoke of how in Afghanistan, we would seek to make it a beacon for the region where the Taliban would be removed and the country would be in the hands of the people. Here we are in 2010, where the empty promises have been lost in the political system.


President Hamid Karzai seems like the choice if there was one to select a leader, bearing substantial ties throughout his family's lineage to Afghanistan's politics. Karzai himself fled the country from Taliban rule, his wife was a doctor at Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan - making it safe to assume that at some point, he was aware and was a witness to the Afghanistan he liberated. However, the debate over Afghanistan's future could place the group he once fought in a position where not only would they be recognized, but would have a say in the government.


Not enough has been done to engage the Afghan population on the tribal level. The ability to create a strong, centralized national government is not remotely possible without the commitment and allegiance of all the tribes. This simply can not be done without promising these people deliverance from the subversive shadow governments set up by the Taliban in order to act as a replacement to the failed reform that Karzai once promised. Without offering an alternative, the options on the table for these tribes simply all point back to the Taliban.


What has come out of Karzai's rule has been a gradual evolution of a man who sought to bring about change, but has been burdened with a task that travels through complicated tribal ties to figures who have undermined his role. It is said that after last summer's election, where the international community suggested that the vote for Karzai was illegitimate, accusing the U.S. of "stealing his legitimacy." It seems as though the future of Afghanistan rests on one man's personal dilemma, is he willing to set aside his ego?


There is no doubt the Afghan military and police forces are incompetent and juvenile at best. The fledgling ranks are easily infiltrated and once again, burdened by complicated alliances. However, this is a situation made by Karzai's micromanagement of coalition forces inside his country. His criticism of coalition forces when civilians are caught in the crossfire directly undermines NATO support amongst the populations he is dependent on. If there was ever more of a time to allow action and reform, it is now. As we look to a situation that is becoming increasingly desperate, the opportunity is now for President Karzai to prove he is a capable and competent leader. It is not the U.S. undermining him, it is the very people he has held meetings with to propose their integration into the "new" Afghanistan - the Taliban.


The Taliban massacres of innocent civilians is something that can not be endorsed by the international community. Have we honestly reached a society where we will face outcry over "enhanced interrogations" but will ignore a system where a 7-year old boy was killed for alleged spying or women for adultery or pursuing an education? Those offenses were constantly denounced by the international community, but now they seem to be forgotten. The alternative in Afghanistan simply can not be with the Taliban holding any power, there is too much at stake.

Tuesday, September 1, 2009

Al-Qaida's war against the royal family continues

For quite some time, it seemed as though Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had felt the heat of Saudi security operations and moved all its operations south to Yemen to use as a staging ground. The group had been dealt significant blows with sweeping raids netting hundreds of members over the last two years. Violence had escalated inside Yemen as the group sought refuge in border provinces to the Kingdom, however the Saudis had successfully foiled several series of plots on mostly oil interests.


On Monday, a suicide bomber targeted Dep. Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef at his palace during a Ramadan celebration. Nayef's capacity as Dep. Interior Minister places him in command over all counterterror operations. Al-Qaida was quick to declare its involvement in the attack, giving credit to Abdullah Hassan Taleh Aseri (alias "Abu al-Khayr"), who was listed in an INTERPOL orange notice for 85 individuals suspected of involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The list raised an eyebrow by many skeptics of the Kingdom's "War on Terror" as 14 of the suspects were released from Guantanamo Bay into the Saudi rehabilitation program for "deviants" (the label applied to Islamic terrorists by authorities). Now reports are providing insight into the targeting of such a prominent member of the royal family.


The Al-Qaida statement suggests that Aseri was flown aboard Nayef's private jet, allowed access to the Prince's palace and upon being searched by security, detonated an explosive device. It should be noted that it is standard for the royal family to open their palaces to the public for Ramadan events. The curious aspect to the story remains as to what brought Aseri into the Kingdom. It is suggested that he crossed into Saudi Arabia from Yemen with the expressed intent to surrender to authorities. It is reported that he had expressed interest to speak to his followers and negotiate their surrender as well.


This is undoubtedly disturbing news coming out of Saudi Arabia, that the security around the equivalent to CIA Director Leon Panetta placed a wanted individual on his private jet, with explosives, and allowed him access to the palace. As this story develops it appears this was to be a momentous development that went horribly wrong. This incident lowers the confidence in certain internal elements, namely Nayef's security detail. Despite the pretenses of surrender provided by Aseri, he should have been treated as the dangerous criminal that he was.


This attempt can be credited to the resourceful tactics of Al-Qaida, utilizing the Islamic principle of taqqiya. Walid Phares has written before on taqqiya, stating that as a jihadist concept it instructs "Combatants “in the path of Allah,” as instructed by ideologues to “fake” normalcy, and lie if needed, about their real beliefs so that the deception of the enemy is full." This incident acts as a stark warning that Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula is not under pressure and remains as resourceful as it ever was. The potential for renewed conflict inside the Kingdom is now on a brink as Al-Qaida appears to have its sights back inside the country.