Pulling out in Afghanistan: Remembering Musa Qala

It should have been expected that the day after President Obama announced a plan to gradually draw down troop numbers in Afghanistan, Capitol Hill would be filled with the partisan positions arguing in favor and against the President's plan. Campaigning as candidate Barack Obama, I was impressed with his position on Afghanistan, arguing for a withdrawal but pointing out the areas that NATO troops must target to leave the country while building the society we idealized after the Taliban. Needless to say, to this day we have yet to see the situation improve in Afghanistan, and if anything, get worse.

The job in Afghanistan has not been undermined by President Obama, or President Bush, but rather President Hamid Karzai. A man whose reign has promoted government corruption and the establishment of Taliban shadow courts and administrations in his country's provinces, Karzai rapidly showed he was not the capable leader touted by then President Bush in his 2001 address to Congress announcing the new face of Afghanistan. With a family plagued with ties to the illicit opium trade (a necessary evil to confront in order to win), Hamid Karzai has become a leader who dictates by indecision and response, rather than pioneering the democratic ideals he once said he'd represent.

The recent confirmation that allied forces were engaged in "integration" talks with Taliban intermediaries could not be any more of a mistake. Witness the result of talks in Pakistan with the group, which led to increased violence and casualties. Negotiating with the Taliban WILL NOT work. Plain and simple. The Taliban do not exist without Sharia, and their extreme interpretation is the only version they seek. In order to obtain the upper hand in government, they will use terrorism - the tactic we are at war against - and deception. Unless the Taliban renounce violence, their arms, and their hand in the opium trade any deal should be viewed as a complete fraud. After all, that is how Pakistan ended up in the position it is in.

Pakistan has recently suffered a string of attacks brought on by infiltration inside its military ranks. The May 22 attack on Naval Station Mehran was made possible by dedicated militants who utilized taqiyya (a practice allowing Muslims to deny their faith and beliefs in order to achieve their goals). This is something that took years, which is precisely what has been warned may have been happening for years in the ranks of the Afghan police and military. Take the April 4 killing of two U.S. soldiers providing security for a meeting between the deputy commander for the Afghan border police and U.S. officials. The shooter was an Afghan police officer.

Violence on Afghan police has increased, with the assassination of the police chiefs for Kandahar, Takhar, and Kunduz provinces in just a three month period. Hardly a figure that suggests stablility throughout the ranks of the forces that we should have trained to take over the counterinsurgency. Without experienced warriors, like Gen. Khan Mohammad Mujahid, assuming the role of confronting the groups perpetrating violence there is opportunity for Taliban fighters to yet again make a comeback and gain a following.

Last but not least, President Obama mentioned that Al-Qaida was in a weakened state following the death of Osama bin Laden. It is my belief, as well as several other experts, that Al-Qaida is and has been in a weakened operational state. There have been significant gains well before OBL's death, with several experienced Soviet-era mujahideen fighters who were AQ leaders and organizers falling victim to Predator strikes. Operationally, AQ is not and most probably will never be able to perpetrate another 9/11, but it can inspire individuals to recruit and establish their own attack plans. The trend of recent attacks coming from Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula speaks to the abilities of AQ central. Al-Qaida's leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan had no handling in the day-to-day operations of the group, but rather merely had the final say as to the direction they wanted their franchises (like AQAP and Shabaab) to take.

We can argue there are only 50-100 Al-Qaida fighters in Afghanistan, but the elephant in the room is how many there are in Pakistan. For years, it has been argued that in order to effectively fight in Afghanistan we must expand our focus to the groups operating from Pakistan (like the Haqqani network, the group that has killed the most U.S. troops). It was thought that the killing of OBL would set a precedent, but rather represents a climax in our campaign to root out those who utilize fear as a tactic to promote a radical agenda. The numbers of Taliban and AQ are most definitely not those touted by the Pentagon and CIA officials in media soundbites.

Time will tell whether or not Afghanistan is winnable. Most certainly, with the current policies and administrations in the U.S. and in Afghanistan, we will go down in history as abandoning the country in a state worse than we found it. Afghanistan has historically been a country plagued with violence, with a population that expects to never see peace and growth. History has made the population weary of how committed our troops are from the beginning. On that note, here's one nugget from that history:

"In September 2006, the British and the Taliban acknowledged an impasse by accepting a truce brokered by elders of Musa Qala: each side agreed to withdraw from the district center. The agreement, combined with reported British efforts to bribe Taliban commanders in Helmand, was met with harsh criticism from some coalition critics, who believed these actions projected weakness and empowered the Taliban. Within three months, claiming that a U.S. air strike violated the agreement, approximately 200 Taliban retook the district center and quickly moved to establish radical Islamist rule over the area. The withdrawal of British forces, coupled with the Taliban's eventual ability to reclaim the area, cemented Musa Qala as a proud symbol of insurgent resistance, analogous on a smaller scale to the cultural resonance Fallujah once held in Iraq"

Fighting a war for the right reasons

Afghanistan is failing. As the U.S. has been in the country since 2001, there has been very little return or signs of progress, the fight still continues. The country is caught in a complicated crisis where leadership has failed. It's as though everyone has forgotten about how life was prior to the U.S. invasion that ousted the Taliban, where a barbaric state of ancient law killed those suspected of petty crimes. While the U.S. entered the country, President George W. Bush spoke of how in Afghanistan, we would seek to make it a beacon for the region where the Taliban would be removed and the country would be in the hands of the people. Here we are in 2010, where the empty promises have been lost in the political system.


President Hamid Karzai seems like the choice if there was one to select a leader, bearing substantial ties throughout his family's lineage to Afghanistan's politics. Karzai himself fled the country from Taliban rule, his wife was a doctor at Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan - making it safe to assume that at some point, he was aware and was a witness to the Afghanistan he liberated. However, the debate over Afghanistan's future could place the group he once fought in a position where not only would they be recognized, but would have a say in the government.


Not enough has been done to engage the Afghan population on the tribal level. The ability to create a strong, centralized national government is not remotely possible without the commitment and allegiance of all the tribes. This simply can not be done without promising these people deliverance from the subversive shadow governments set up by the Taliban in order to act as a replacement to the failed reform that Karzai once promised. Without offering an alternative, the options on the table for these tribes simply all point back to the Taliban.


What has come out of Karzai's rule has been a gradual evolution of a man who sought to bring about change, but has been burdened with a task that travels through complicated tribal ties to figures who have undermined his role. It is said that after last summer's election, where the international community suggested that the vote for Karzai was illegitimate, accusing the U.S. of "stealing his legitimacy." It seems as though the future of Afghanistan rests on one man's personal dilemma, is he willing to set aside his ego?


There is no doubt the Afghan military and police forces are incompetent and juvenile at best. The fledgling ranks are easily infiltrated and once again, burdened by complicated alliances. However, this is a situation made by Karzai's micromanagement of coalition forces inside his country. His criticism of coalition forces when civilians are caught in the crossfire directly undermines NATO support amongst the populations he is dependent on. If there was ever more of a time to allow action and reform, it is now. As we look to a situation that is becoming increasingly desperate, the opportunity is now for President Karzai to prove he is a capable and competent leader. It is not the U.S. undermining him, it is the very people he has held meetings with to propose their integration into the "new" Afghanistan - the Taliban.


The Taliban massacres of innocent civilians is something that can not be endorsed by the international community. Have we honestly reached a society where we will face outcry over "enhanced interrogations" but will ignore a system where a 7-year old boy was killed for alleged spying or women for adultery or pursuing an education? Those offenses were constantly denounced by the international community, but now they seem to be forgotten. The alternative in Afghanistan simply can not be with the Taliban holding any power, there is too much at stake.

Afghanistan - Why We're Losing

How do we win in Afghanistan? Eight years after the U.S. campaign that ousted the Taliban from power, the country remains a list of "to-dos" that have yet to be checked off. Since President Obama tasked Gen. Stanley McChrystal in charge of forces in Afghanistan, there has been talk of transforming the strategies that many have said made this war unwinnable. The dilemma remains, how can this war be turned around? There seems to a be a vague understanding of what makes this a winnable war - with critics like George Will joining the ranks of Vice President Joe Biden. The Veep has called for less troops on the ground in Afghanistan because he believes we should be pursuing Al-Qaida's havens in Pakistan instead.


I remain a skeptic of how useful Gen. McChrystal can be on the ground. This war has become a political tool for many, breeding lines of bureaucratic red-tape that puts restrictions on those who have fought in wars. While people like George Will and the Vice President sit in their lavish offices in Washington, the people of Afghanistan are waiting for this rhetoric to pan out to action. The attitude of your average Afghan looks back at the Soviet invasion and remembers how "committed" the U.S. was then. The country is used to corruption and being plagued by violence, it has become part of the culture and they do not seek to be used by anyone. At the first sign of their country becoming a means by a superpower, they are willing to confront it - just like the Soviets.


This war has become a failure because of those who were put in charge of the country. The Karzai administration has done nothing for the people in the country, it has bred corruption throughout every level and has enabled those who operate the trafficking of narcotics out of the country. With the contested results of the election that put him into office for another term, Hamid Karzai will continue to be a portrait of all that is wrong in his country.


President Karzai has opted to play both sides in this war, blaming NATO forces for violence in the country and civilian deaths. Meanwhile, he asks for the Taliban to sit around a table and talk about their involvement in a "post-Taliban" society. Mr. Karzai has repeatedly shown he does not have the attitude or motivation to confront the Taliban, seeing them as the coalition's problem.


However, this idea has been embraced by many in Washington who seek to use Lebanon's Hizbullah as a model for bringing a violent group into the political affairs of a country. Maybe it's time that the cubicle monkeys of Foggy Bottom examine the testimony over the years.


"Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team."
-former Dep. Sec. of State Richard Armitage

"Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives."
-former DHS Sec. Michael Chertoff


The belief that Hizbullah is a regional player is complete and total B.S. Hezbollah controls Lebanon, it does not fit into the political system of the country. It has killed to get where it is and possesses global capabilities to obtain resources and attack targets. Ask Saad Hariri how Hizbullah has fit into the political system of his father on the Feb. 14, 2006 car bombing that shook Beirut.


If we want to push Afghanistan into a society that is ass backwards, by all means put the Taliban in the "reformed" government. If we withdraw our forces or do not commit to rebuilding their society, they will turn on us even more. They remember the U.S. pullout after ousting the Soviets, the question is do we?

Holding the key to Afghanistan

When the United States entered its War On Terror in 2001, it was to remove Al-Qaida from the havens offered to it by the Taliban. Nearly eight years later, Afghanistan now has become the focus again. After a meeting between Presidents Karzai and Zardari at the White House two weeks ago, followed by the lead U.S. commander in Afghanistan being removed by Defense Secretary Gates, it is clear that the White House is attempting to put a new face on a war that has its share of critics. From Karzai reinforcing the accusations of civilian targeting in U.S. air strikes as well as Zardari's persistent complaints of the lack of international involvement in his country, the war in Afghanistan is no longer a containable threat without regional cooperation.


At this time last year, NATO forces in Afghanistan were preparing for an expected massive Taliban offensive as the weather warmed up. At this time last year, Karzai was accusing the U.S. and NATO of targeting civilians in their air strikes and promoting talks with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Pakistan launched military operations into towns that were believed to be Taliban strongholds.


Presently, NATO is expecting another Taliban offensive. Karzai is making the same statements and Pakistan is in the middle of more "offensives." By any standard, to declare progress in Afghanistan over the last year should raise an eyebrow so long as the situation one year later remains identical to the previous.


Last summer saw the Taliban and Al-Qaida operate from the havens in Pakistan to execute an array of sophisticatedly coordinated attacks on significant targets. There was the attempted assassination of Karzai in April, the June attack on a prison in Kandahar that freed nearly 1200 inmates, and the July bombing of the Indian embassy in the country. Several attacks also occurred in Pakistan, including the September attack on a Marriott in Islamabad.


Pakistan is expected to launch another offensive in Baluchistan, specifically targeting Baitullah Mehsud's fighters. Mehsud was yet again listed in another Anti-Terrorism Court warrant for the Lahore police academy bombing.


Pakistan is the answer to stabilizing Afghanistan. The Taliban are no longer contained to controlling a government, but have become a regional factor that seeks to undermine any opposition. Ahmed Rashid wrote of this when discussing how delicate the situation in Pakistan is, stating:

"The myths about the Taliban need to be clarified. They are not an extension of an external threat; they are not being funded by Russia or India. In the 1990s, the Taliban in Afghanistan were fighting the Northern Alliance, and thousands of Pashtuns went to fight as foot soldiers on behalf of the Taliban. In 2001, the Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban, who previously had little clout, became hosts of the Afghan Taliban and earned much money for their assistance."

Rashid wrote that from 2001 to 2004, the Pakistani Taliban sought to establish a emirate in FATA and that the showdowns with the government now are their pursuit to expand that state.


However, the most threatening assessment comes from the statement that Pakistan's ISI sought to use Taliban fighters from Afghanistan to "maintain the jihadi nexus as a force against the Indians." Rashid writes about this in detail:

"The leadership of the Taliban is now in Pakistan, and they have stated their intention of overthrowing the government here. The Taliban are linking up with groups in Pakistan, and the Pakistani Taliban movement is turning into a multiethnic movement. Groups cultivated [by the Pakistani Army] to fight in Kashmir have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban, and include Punjabis, with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen. Now, some 40 groups in Pakistan are loosely affiliated.... For that reason, Pakistan faces a more dangerous situation than Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek fighters were not permitted to join the Afghan Taliban movement."

The above passage sheds just a small light into how complicated the connections in Pakistan lie. As the government begs for more aid money, it is likely that more and more refugee camps will be filled in areas already effected by failed military offensives in their areas. The already economically dismal situation in the country will only increase as a result of more operations, and Zardari will continue to plead for more aid relief from the international community. However, such operations have yet to prove beneficial in the long run and have yielded virtually no consistent results.


So long as groups are functioning inside Pakistan's borders, it remains almost certain that should the government continue to conduct offensives, the jihadists in Pakistan will seek to divert any concentration on themselves to Pakistan's signature enemy. It is highly likely that Indian targets will again fall victim to an attack, with the intent to exacerbate Pak-Indian relations. The question will then turn to just how capable Pakistan is of securing its own borders and whether India attempts to hold the government accountable for any terrorist action hatched inside that country. With India certain of Pakistan's involvement in the embassy bombing and the Mumbai attacks, time is running out.

How we lost Afghanistan

Seven years after invading Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban regime, the situation in Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worst. The idea that the Taliban had vanished after their 2001 retreat from Kabul was quickly gone after this year's spectacular attacks. There was the April assassination attempt on Pres. Hamid Karzai, followed by the jailbreak of nearly 1000 prisoners from the Kandahar prison in June. Both attacks brought a component that was relatively unprecedented by the group - organization. The insurgency in Afghanistan had previously appeared to be a collection of cells with no connection and means to coordinate, capable only of occasional IED attacks and mortar rounds here and there. After those two attacks, joined by the Indian embassy bombing in July, it was clear that the rosy assessments painted by diplomats on the ground was merely a fantasy lived out in their secure compounds.


In reality, the Taliban do not have the ability to establish control as a legitimate government in Afghanistan. However, their fight has been one that is emerging as a strategic threat to the reconstruction and development in the country. By the June prison break, attacks were up 40% from last year and symbols of development were increasingly being targeted.


Shortly thereafter, reports emerged of the Taliban's "shadow" government systems that supposedly exist in nearly every province. With their own courts based on Shari'a, the Taliban had infiltrated local tribes and had become an alternative to a flawed Afghan justice system vulnerable to bribes.


What happened over the last seven years is of extreme importance to winning back Afghanistan. While the U.S. and NATO declared victory, the Taliban opted to be patient with their efforts and allow the opportunity to strengthen their capabilities. Without state sponsorship any more, they needed to find a means to fund their insurgency and partnered with the international opium market as a replacement. With Afghanistan consistently being the number one supplier of the product, it was an unregulated criminal enterprise that the U.S. and NATO seldom touched.


Either out of fear of turning the impoverished locals that grew the poppies nearer to the Taliban or intervention by Hamid Karzai's opium-profiting governors, over the seven years in Afghanistan nobody has addressed and confronted the issue of poppies. With anywhere between 88-93% of the global opium supply coming from Afghanistan, the Taliban had their moneymaker. During the Taliban's rule in the country, they allowed the farmers to grow poppies until they banned it in 2000. This ban did not curb the amount of opium pouring out of the country onto nearly every street.


Last week, TIME magazine held an interesting report that alleges the Taliban have officially entered the global crime syndicate. The UN's Office on Drugs and Crime announced that over the last three years, anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of opium have vanished from the global market. Consider that annually, the world consumes around 4,500 tons of the drug. Nearly two years worth of the drug, which retails for around $464,000 a ton, has just disappeared off the market.


The UN Office has not made any official assessments, but theories are circulating as to where such a large stash may have ended up. Officials are skeptical that this was a mere instance of the stockpile being lost in the black market and not appearing, basing their opinion on the global market. With opium being a fairly consistent $70 per kg, such a significant portion of the crop would have lowered prices. That simply hasn't happened.


The concern now is that the Taliban may have spent up to 3 years collecting the crop, and now have a bundle worth anywhere between $2.8 and 3 billion in their possession. Needless to say, with that kind of potential income, the Taliban's tactics and weaponry should continue to increase at the expense of the U.S. and President Karzai's blind eye to the crop. With market manipulation and the Taliban's control on the safety of opium exports, they hold the potential to spike the price and reach record profits all due to their patience. Unfortunately, there is little the coalition can do to prevent this besides stumbling across the stash which could already be on the streets of Europe and the U.S..


Simply put, the U.S., NATO, and Hamid Karzai all made a doomsday mistake by not controlling the poppy situation. We have opted to see the issue as a black and white one, rather than offering an alternative to the farmers. The London-based think tank Senlis Council has advised that the coalition and the Karzai government allow the growth of poppies, however instead of flooding the black market and paying for the bombs that kill our troops, have them sold to pharmaceutical companies worldwide. Then, the hope is that the money will collectively go to the tribes in the area and help pay for the rebuilding of the infrastructure.


It is my hope that President-elect Obama and his administration focus on this problem before the Taliban are able to control it even more. However, only once during the whole presidential campaign season did a candidate mention "opium" and "Afghanistan" collectively. With such a massive supply coming from Afghanistan, not every gram of opium has to end up in the hands of an addict in the UK. By promoting a legal alternative that is internationally acceptable, we can utilize international companies and agencies involvement to win the hearts and minds of the people. By allowing farmers to provide funding for local projects such as their schools and roads, it will be the people of Afghanistan making up the infrastructure and not just international aid. With that type of invested interest, the Taliban can hopefully be seen as the obstacle towards peace in the country and their monopoly on the Afghan poppies can end.