9/11: Al-Qaida's re-emergence in the Arab Spring

Eleven years ago, we all witnessed the tragedy that would define generations - landmarks of American economic and military power reduced to rubble, smoking from canyons of steel and collapsing on people who were our neighbors, friends and family.  Without a doubt, 9/11 changed American policy and created what many have declared "a war that can't be won", what was once a global war on terror structured around disrupting terrorism at its roots before it could hit U.S. targets again.  This aggressive campaign led to military posturing in areas where Al-Qaida (AQ) and its sympathizers operated with a new African command being built for U.S. operations on the continent as well as enhanced cooperation by Middle Eastern intelligence agencies.  The understanding was that terrorism was a global threat, that reduced regional stability wherever it was harbored.  

Partnerships emerged with intelligence offices in unlikely partners, Egypt and Jordan among them, increasing coordination and intelligence sharing.  It seemed as though terrorism was being disrupted in virtually every hemisphere and most assuredly, significant accomplishments were achieved with credit to be shared with these offices.  Under the present administration, the intensity of this war has continued and we have seen the campaign shift from manpower to technology with a heavy drone usage.  As Peter Bergen has written, it appears the drone is President Obama's weapon of choice, with more strikes occurring in Obama's first four years than his predecessor's two terms.  The group's leadership has been decimated, decapitated and is struggling.  However, I think we are beginning to see the new brand of AQ emerge.

Today, on this significant anniversary, in lieu of a terrorist attack we saw the U.S. embassy in Cairo and in Benghazi fall under attack by scores of "peaceful protesters."  A State Department employee appears to have been killed during the incident in Benghazi.  These two incidents seem to piggyback off of the Arab Spring uprisings, which were backed by the U.S. in both countries to overthrow both Qaddafi and Mubarak.  Simply put, AQ could have pulled off the same scale attacks it orchestrated in 1998 today, yet it would have been extremely selfish and yielded hardly any results to its cause.  Any excuse for a U.S. escalation, amidst a withdrawal in Iraq and Afghanistan, would backfire on not only AQ, but those who took to the streets to make these revolutions occur.  AQ would be the bad guy again in the Arab world.  By becoming mainstream and blending in with anti-U.S. protests, it identifies the up and coming radical sentiments in the youths that it can train a new mujahideen to replace its fallen ranks.  

The brand that makes up AQ is one that is merely in name at present, affected by the persistent U.S. campaign targeting its leadership and disrupting its fundraising and recruiting networks.  It has outsourced the terrorism to its franchises in Yemen (AQAP) and Africa (AQIM), leaving AQ central to tap into the opportune Arab Spring revolutions.  It is no coincidence that U.S. diplomatic sites were attacked in countries that the U.S. helped fuel the tide by removing support for the previous regimes.  The question is how does the U.S. respond to this escalation?

By failing to address the problems, we risk increased violence as AQ becomes a fixture in these movements.  By seemingly avoiding violence, it appears to become part of the Arab world without facing the problem of blowing up innocent civilians and losing support for killing more Muslims than Americans amongst its attacks like it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By blending in to the Arab Spring, the protests become indicative of a new strategy that takes to the cities, directly to streets rather than reclusive training camps isolated in vulnerable havens to a drone strategy.  AQ blends in amongst the youths, capable of exploiting them and instilling the anti-U.S. sentiment that first filled its ranks.  Simply put, we are seeing Al-Qaida adapt from a terrorist group to an ideology.  The risk with such an evolution puts at risk everything we have accomplished as it encourages the potential for lone-wolf or independent operations that require domestic surveillance as compared to merely looking for those people who travel to Pakistan every year.  

Make no mistake, despite what administration officials say, Al-Qaida is a component of the enemy we face but a defeat of AQ is not indicative that we are any safer.  With the group successfully transforming in the direction that Ayman al-Zawahiri seems to be steering it in, recruiting will be significantly easier.  This is a certain way to build up the ranks again, rally the troops and gain the momentum it lost after 9/11 in the Arab world.  Without responding, the U.S. opens doors for attacks on its sites abroad that will most certainly have greater bloodshed than today's incidents.  As we pause to remember the victims from those tragic events eleven years ago, let us commit that terrorism is a tactic that will not prevail or deter us from the freedoms we enjoy and the resilient spirit that our country shares.  

Playing politics with intelligence

On the date of the death of Al-Qaida's founder, Usama bin Laden, much ado about nothing has been made about the "woulda, coulda, shoulda" argument regarding the raid that terminated Al-Qaida's number one.  As the Obama administration and Mitt Romney's campaign spar over nonsense of whether or not a President Romney would approve of the Seal Team Six operation, the men and women on the front lines of the War on Terror continue their tasks seeking out any leads that may lead to other significant developments in this never ending war.  




Inside the beltway, this war is something that is taken for granted - the unsung heroes carry on with their tasks contributing to preserving the American way of life and insuring another 9/11 does not happen under their watch.  The many factors involved in delivering intelligence to the desk of the President, regardless of who is in office, are never taken lightly and ultimately that decision is dependent on the Chief Executive.  Whether that action is approved (as in President Obama's case) or ignored (as in the missed opportunities President Clinton had to take out UBL), these men and women continue their tasks without a doubt that the mission is clear. 




In an election year, everything is at stake for political parties, but it is an embarrassment to our government to take this issue to doubt a candidate's commitment to justice.  Fundamentally, I felt from 2003 until a year ago, Usama bin Laden's role inside Al-Qaida was one mainly left in the dust - incapable of operational capacity and isolated from the training camps he once so closely monitored.  Sure enough, UBL was abandoned by most of his group to his domain in Abbotabad where he would face his demise.  




It is my belief that when Mitt Romney made his statements from 2007, he was referring to not exhausting valuable assets in the military and intelligence communities on one figure.  Realistically, I think his statements make sense and should echo the sentiments realistically of all in the intel community, that terrorism is bigger than one figure and taking out a mouthpiece will not stop the mission to save lives.  I believe the intelligence mission of all those involved in the bin Laden raid was a responsible one, and resulted in the delivery of justice to punish a man who slaughtered Americans senselessly on the streets of New York, Washington, and in Pennsylvania.  




If it is doubtful that any candidate for Congress, much less President of the United States, would take the intelligence President Obama received and not act on it (whether it be with special operations or drones), why should they have any authority whatsoever?  Tactics aside, the bin Laden operation was an opportunity of justice and not to disrupt operations and recruiting (as in Al-Awlaki).  I remember many a press conference then-Governor Romney quoted vague threats targeted towards sites inside his state as credible and revealed limited intelligence as though it were a specific and targeted concern.  Just as Governor Davis of California created a great deal of concern over threats to the Golden Gate Bridge when intelligence evaluated by analysts suggested no significant concerns.  




Some things never change, politics as usual occurs on a daily basis on a variety of issues, but the successes made by the members of our nation's intelligence and military communities should never be one that comes down to a self-gratifying politician's posturing.  Amongst all the foiled plots, countless lives have been saved because of the dedication of these unnamed people.  Without the political nonsense, the mission will remain the same inside the counter terrorism community.  Take facts as they are, bin Laden's dead and it came down to a President to decide how to handle the situation.  Let's make sure that we have a President committed to preserving justice and life.  

Deaths of senior AQ leaders reported; where are we in the GWoT?

News broke yesterday morning stating that several AQAP leaders, including two U.S. citizens, had been killed in a Predator strike. Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were reported among the dead in a statement by Yemen's Defense Ministry. Also reported to have been killed was AQAP's top bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri, in a separate strike. These successes, if indeed fact, prove that the use of drones as assets in the GWoT are virtually invaluable in eliminating high-value targets. With the intensity of this tactic under President Obama, it appears that there is no hint of attempting to slow down anytime soon.

According to the Washington Post, the CIA is in the process of constructing four drone airstrip bases intended to strike AQ affiliates inside Yemen and Somalia. The enhancement of such a program should be welcomed by many, allowing the U.S. to fight this new-age war with new-age technology that does not risk our soldiers lives.

However, with such an intensity and fury coming from drones to target the leadership in faraway places, there is an underlying question. What is really being done here at home to enhance the U.S. in this War on Terror? When President Obama took office, critics questioned if he had the determination and ability to conduct a war. It appears that indeed he has skillfully handled the GWoT in regards to specifics, but like his predecessors, is unwilling to come to a full on confrontation with the pandemic of radicalism.

The real question is legally, are we enhancing our fight and clearly defining the legal abilities of law enforcement in confronting this war? I do not feel as though the outreach mission to incorporate the Muslim community has succeeded and quite honestly, has returned to the pre-9/11 days. Between the media and politicians, we have made this a war about names - similar to the Communist threat from nation states like the USSR. However, this is a war of ideals that has no boundaries or structural organization. Dare I say without OBL's pre-9/11 corporate structuring, Al-Qaeda as a whole will splinter off into the independent franchises based in the Northern Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and Kashmir/Pakistan.

Pakistan will always play host to a radical faction of jihadists, given its dispute with India, the alliances published most recently regarding the U.S. embassy strike in Kabul will always be an asset to the ISI. Inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. strategy is seen at odds with the tribal structuring and has done little to incorporate and facilitate a partnership. While most definitely easier said than done, a comprehensive approach to turn the dependence on Taliban and AQ, especially inside Pakistan, would drastically change the dynamics of this conflict that is about winning hearts and minds.

The fact of the matter is we can take out as many leaders as we want, but there will always be this radical jihadist element that will pose the primary national security threat to the U.S. Over the duration of the War on Terror, several major blows to terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Russia have been facilitated largely by U.S. cooperation in nearly almost every circumstance. We are taking this war to the terrorists doorsteps in, as Pres. George W. Bush stated was necessary so we would not have to fight them on our own streets as we felt on 9/11. While killing off bad guys is easy, defining the legal challenges and alliances in this war is where the real struggle lies.

Bin Laden's battle for relevance

This weekend saw the emergence of Al-Qaida figurehead Osama bin Laden and the continued redefinition of Al-Qaida's jihad against the U.S. amid reports of a growing threat faced in Europe. The normally reclusive leader, who releases a handful of audio tapes usually annually, released two tapes this weekend in a ploy to rally support among Muslims. The consecutive releases of tapes raise several concerns, specifically with the recent revelation that OBL was connected to the recent plot thwarted in Europe.


Al-Qaida's resources are dwindling, and the necessities to implement a large-scale plot like 9/11 does not exist. However, the ability to take individuals (such as Faisal Shahzad and Najibullah Zazi) who actively pursue training abroad and then commit to executing terrorist attacks remains the most relevant and difficult threat to counter. The operational war against terrorism is the easiest fight, but the ideological aspect remains difficult to address by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.


Bin Laden's latest tapes went back to an issue released in a recording from January this year - climate change. This issue perhaps gained insertion due to the floods that devastated Pakistan a couple months ago. Bin Laden faulted Arab governments, lending credit to the UN for its response and accusing the regimes around the Middle East for closing their eyes to the suffering. The plight of the Palestinian people is no longer an opportunity for recruitment apparently, as the focus has shifted and the tapes no longer mention the continued stalemate among Israel and the Palestinians. Instead, bin Laden again makes a subtle cry for Muslims to avoid the U.S. economy (perhaps to attempt to gain more finances for his group's diminishing finances) and identifies the significance of each Muslim's role in his battle with the West.


This latest tape continues the normal message of blaming Arab governments for turning a blind eye to the suffering of Muslims. The reality is bin Laden is struggling in the battle to remain relevant. The surge Al-Qaida experienced as the superpower of jihadist groups for 9/11 has diminished, replaced by groups seeking to instigate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict even more. Hizbullah's global dominance and established assets present the clearest threat to Israel and its allies, however the group understands the necessity of maintaining a covert threat. Bin Laden has constantly lost the recruiting power he once held, with his franchises operating in other groups like AQIM, AQAP, and now al-Shabaab. Recruits now are forced to independently travel abroad, in hopes of being considered trustworthy by al-Qaida and Taliban contacts inside Pakistan. Otherwise, they must travel to Yemen or Somalia with the same goal, but the ability to recruit from within the U.S. solely relies on the individual's radical leanings.


OBL now must utilize whatever global development he can, playing the role of the Muslim father trying to protect his suffering Muslim brothers and sisters. However, Sheikh Nasrallah has continuously been considered in poll after poll among Muslim nations that he and his group take up the Muslim fight best. Hizbullah's recruiting has not dwindled, nor its assets, unlike bin Laden. The desperation for OBL to continue to pursue his fight against the U.S. has made the group seem almost uninterested in the Israeli-Palestinian saga that seems almost too easy to utilize if Al-Qaida was interested in establishing legitimacy among Muslims. The dependence on individual's willing to pursue suicide or creating bombs will be the only thing that carries on the jihad when Al-Qaida is no more, with or without bin Laden. It is only when this is adequately addressed by Muslim nations, as well as Western nations, that the struggle to confront terrorism and its roots can begin.

Examining Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula

Since the failed attempt on Christmas day to bring down a Northwest Airlines flight, Yemen has continued to make mention in nearly every story of the incident and the country's links to terror are making headlines. It has been well-known that Al-Qaida has significant support and links inside the country, however the U.S. has not received a great deal of cooperation from the government which opts to let the already fragile security situation continue to deteriorate. President Saleh's sphere of influence reaches as far out as the capital, after that the country is filled with autonomous tribes and a government that is largely sympathetic to the jihadist sentiment that makes up Al-Qaida.


To those who have followed the development of Al-Qaida since the 2001 Afghanistan it is well-known that there are two major havens for the group now in which it can recruit and train freely - Northern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Both locations have reportedly witnessed an influx of Westerners who have received training, raising the concerns of intelligence. The advantages of both locations being they offer delicate governments who can not use the resources to fight the terrorists in their countries, which is conveniently where the U.S. steps in more times than none. Some countries take the fight seriously, such as President Bouteflika of Algeria. Others, like President Saleh in Yemen refuse to confront the jihadist threat coming from their country.


Following the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, the government in Yemen refused to respond and even had Parliament members call for jihad against the West as FBI investigators were arriving in the country. It has been reported that when agents requested to talk to any Yemenis believed to be involved in the attack, President Saleh's government denied any access. One of those individuals reportedly was a member of the President's family and a colonel in the Political Security Organization (PSO). There has been no justice inside Yemen against those who perpetrated the Cole bombing.

Nearly all of the individuals charged in Yemen have experienced their sentences being commuted from death to a matter of years, and the heaviest sentence delivered was fifteen years for the group's leader, Jamal Muhammad al-Badawi, who had his death sentence commuted. He managed to escape prison for the second time in 2006 along with 17 other accused terrorists and remains at large. Jaber Elbaneh, a Yemeni-American accused of being involved in the 2001 "Lackawanna Six" plot, has been living in Yemen and living under the protection of President Saleh while avoiding justice in the United States despite a $5 million reward.

Inside Yemen, Al-Qaida has a great deal of support from within the Saleh government and in the general public. The country is filled with anti-Western sentiment, fueled by the U.S. military action in Iraq. As the media looks at "Al-Qaida's new haven" inside his country, President Saleh is capitalizing off of this title to appeal and secure Western funds. He apparently will allow action in the tribal areas, but when it comes to the wanted terrorists like Elbaneh there is no cooperation. Terrorism is a business in Yemen, and it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to work cooperatively in the long-term to stop Al-Qaida's influence in the country.

India has been a sitting duck

After yesterday's attacks, many officials remain stunned as to how this breakthrough attack went virtually undetected until its implementation. The plotters of this attack had the significant benefit of India being in disarray when it comes to developing its internal security. Shortly after the July 26 blasts in Ahmedabad that killed 56 and injured over 200, India finally realized that its ability to counter terrorism was already ill-prepared. However, several suggestions by Indian government officials focused only on com batting the traditional remote-detonated devices used in most attacks this decade. The intent to take hostages and to actually use ground forces in such an assault has been one that seemed to have vanished from the scene in India.


Perhaps the greatest setback to Indian domestic security is that it has no nationwide intelligence network. With 28 states, each operating its own individual intelligence apparatus, the state is the ultimate head and is not required to share information with its neighbors. This was proved in the July attacks, when four of the cars used were stolen from Mumbai and then used in the attacks. The cars license plates were not completely altered, and would have found their way on a list by law-enforcement in a state here in the U.S.. However, in India such a network does not exist and the vehicles were able to pass multiple security checkpoints before their use in the blasts. In August, Gujarat province announced that it would create a special intelligence cell specifically to counter terrorism - yet it would only have an intelligence collecting purpose.


Furthermore, while India is quick to suggest Pakistani involvement in yesterday's attack, it acknowledged that it had seen substantial problems in its prison system. Cell phone SIM cards have frequently found their way into prisons that do not have a phone jamming system, allowing communication and other contacts from a supposed "secure" environment. Indian authorities had intercepted messages regarding terror plots being hatched from inside the country's prisons and were finally made aware of this vulnerability. The ability for domestic terrorism to thrive has extended well beyond Kashmir and into numerous systems in India, all of which has never been addressed or countered.


The country's intelligence collecting and sharing abilities are at best - deficient. It was only a matter of time until India felt the affects of an attack that may have been prevented, and yesterday was that point. The anti-terror squads have been tested by the most recent attack and it has proven that India has under equipped what is intended to be their elite services. This time, it will be necessary for the government there to not just talk about making changes and actually implements them in a rapid line. The components of the Mumbai assault leave a dangerous pattern among all countries concerned with international security, and all countries should evaluate the ability to coordinate and distribute emergency services across numerous areas and dealing with waves of militants. The patterns of this most recent attack have sent shock waves among the intelligence community, and it will be an incident that must be remembered for the lessons learned.

India's Mumbai terror attacks continue 24 hours later

The chaos in Mumbai continues nearly a day after the attacks began. With the head of the anti-terror squad killed along with several other senior commanders, the effectiveness of the ATS remains questionable as the army has taken responsibility of operations. As the casualty figures continue to remain sketchy, it will take time to clearly identify the situation as it appears the goal of spreading chaos throughout the city was achieved. It appears that the majority of the hostages have been released, yet reports of explosions at the Taj Hotel suggest that the situation remains tense.


The attack represents a new phase in the fight against terror, as the goal of essentially shutting down a city was achieved in the remarkably coordinated attacks. As the squads were able to hit at least 10 sites across Mumbai, the emergency services were clearly under equipped and ill-prepared for such massive attacks occurring simultaneously. It appears that these squads of gunmen are mostly in their 20s, suggesting a potential recruitment and alliance of the Indian youth mujahideens and larger groups. If yesterday's attacks were merely explosions, this incident would be no different from the Ahmedabad blasts in July in which 21 bombs were detonated across the city. However, the use of "foot soldiers" and the intent of hostage-taking is one that has not been seen in India for some time.


Ultimately, the investigation part of the phase has yet to begin as clues of the attackers are just now being discovered. With such a breakthrough attack the focus should be on outside elements support - specifically the ISI. As of now, the focus appears to be on SIMI and its offshoots. However, a report suggests that the perpetrators reached Mumbai using boats originally from Karachi. The intelligence trail for the preliminary setup for this operation could go as far back as six months ago, with the finding of a barge nearly four months ago. As police have reportedly found at least four boats laden with explosives outside the city, the investigation may have some fairly solid links to help establish the origin and trail of support that masterminded this operation.


The fight of what Walid Phares called "urban Jihad" has hit India and proven to the world that terror groups are capable of striking anywhere at any time. By all means, this attack is clearly a successful hit taking out various targets in nearly every major part of a hub. This type of tactic has yet to be seen in such a violent form, and many Western intelligence officials remain concerned that this could only be the beginning. Undoubtedly, information will be revealed in the coming days describing foreign terror connections once the situation is resolved. Until then, it is my hope that the anti-terror squads and Indian military are prepared to potentially deal with any further crises that could erupt.

Mumbai hit again by Indian terror in new wave of violence

Today India experienced a new chapter in its long history of terror attacks, with a series of coordinated attacks on multiple sites throughout the financial hub of Mumbai. Gunmen reportedly ambushed several famed hotels that are frequented by foreigners, taking hostages and lobbing grenades as well. Among the casualties of the attack are the head of Mumbai's "elite" anti-terror squad, as well as several other senior officers. Needless to say that several hours after the initial attack, the situation remains chaotic as casualty figures continue to climb and the fate of the hostages remains unknown.


Sadly, India continues to fall under violence due to jihadist groups thriving in Kashmir. With reported connections to Al-Qaida elements and support for them coming from Pakistan's ISI, these groups face little opposition and have the means to create massive amounts of damage. The perpetrators of today's attacks are yet to be confirmed, but it is reported that an unknown group calling itself Deccan Mujahideen has claimed responsibility. If this is true, it will be interesting to see how connections unravel and if there is a link to any pre-existing Kashmir militant groups.


Animesh Roul posted an article on the Jamestown Foundation's page on the revival of India's terror groups. Read it here:

"India's Troubled Northeast Region: The Resurgence of Ethno-Islamist Terrorism"

Lessons from a mujahid

"If you see your enemy modest, you must make it arrogant. You must appear weak in front of your enemy for some time to make it become arrogant."

These were the words remembered by Al-Qaida in honor of one of their great military planners, Shaykh Yousef al-Ayyirri. The commander of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula until his death in 2003, al-Ayyirri had begun his career in the ranks of the Afghan mujahideen of the 1980s against the Soviets. Following the mujahideen's success, he began what would be a lifelong career that began in those ranks at the age of 18.

Five years after his death by Saudi security forces, al-Ayyirri's words should caution the U.S. about the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As global leaders clamor in unison for a declaration of successes in Iraq, Afghanistan falls deeper into a state of turmoil.

Last week, Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) was officially declared as defeated by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The number of foreign fighters entering the country plummeted from the 110 at this time last year to about 20. The factor overlooked by many, is that the number of foreign fighters moving into Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan has spiked over the past 2-3 months. New recruits who would have gone to AQI are now moving into these regions, from either their native countries or departing Iraq. Does this mean such a success in Iraq is permanent? By all means no.

Based on how many times the blame has been pinned on Iran for insurgent activity in Iraq, saying that they are responsible for a situation in Afghanistan as well seems like a played-out card. The truth is, part of the blame does lie on lax border security along the border, but Afghanistan and President Hamid Karzai bear an equal share of blame. President Karzai has allowed his policies to be framed solely on domestic affairs, alienating the involvement of the neighbors to the east and west in particular. Karzai has not pushed through any security agreements mandating strict border enforcement and cooperation between his country and Pakistan and Iran in particular.

What does any of this have to do with Yousef al-Ayyirri?

Based on the report this week that even AQI commanders are fleeing Iraq for Afghanistan, the potential for the tides to change in Afghanistan and/or Iraq will remain vulnerable so long as the Iran-Afghanistan borders remain unchecked. The passage can ferry foreign fighters from either front to the other so long as there is foreign fighters to move. To declare AQI dead is by all means a baseless claim. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the group's leader following the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, is by no means an al-Ayyirri. His experience with Al-Qaida did not begin with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets, but rather in 1999.

If al-Masri has indeed fled with his commanders to Afghanistan, chances are he is no longer isolated from the Al-Qaida hierarchy consisting of experienced Soviet-era mujahideen commanders, but rather a puppet for such a group. Remember Zawahiri and bin Laden didn't favor Zarqawi for his inexperience and his conventional terror tactics. Perhaps Prime Min. Maliki should reconsider his arrogance and consider who he would rather battle - a wannabe mujahid al-Masri or an al-Ayyirri, who is worshiped as the hero for the mujahideen.