Examining Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula

Since the failed attempt on Christmas day to bring down a Northwest Airlines flight, Yemen has continued to make mention in nearly every story of the incident and the country's links to terror are making headlines. It has been well-known that Al-Qaida has significant support and links inside the country, however the U.S. has not received a great deal of cooperation from the government which opts to let the already fragile security situation continue to deteriorate. President Saleh's sphere of influence reaches as far out as the capital, after that the country is filled with autonomous tribes and a government that is largely sympathetic to the jihadist sentiment that makes up Al-Qaida.


To those who have followed the development of Al-Qaida since the 2001 Afghanistan it is well-known that there are two major havens for the group now in which it can recruit and train freely - Northern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Both locations have reportedly witnessed an influx of Westerners who have received training, raising the concerns of intelligence. The advantages of both locations being they offer delicate governments who can not use the resources to fight the terrorists in their countries, which is conveniently where the U.S. steps in more times than none. Some countries take the fight seriously, such as President Bouteflika of Algeria. Others, like President Saleh in Yemen refuse to confront the jihadist threat coming from their country.


Following the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, the government in Yemen refused to respond and even had Parliament members call for jihad against the West as FBI investigators were arriving in the country. It has been reported that when agents requested to talk to any Yemenis believed to be involved in the attack, President Saleh's government denied any access. One of those individuals reportedly was a member of the President's family and a colonel in the Political Security Organization (PSO). There has been no justice inside Yemen against those who perpetrated the Cole bombing.

Nearly all of the individuals charged in Yemen have experienced their sentences being commuted from death to a matter of years, and the heaviest sentence delivered was fifteen years for the group's leader, Jamal Muhammad al-Badawi, who had his death sentence commuted. He managed to escape prison for the second time in 2006 along with 17 other accused terrorists and remains at large. Jaber Elbaneh, a Yemeni-American accused of being involved in the 2001 "Lackawanna Six" plot, has been living in Yemen and living under the protection of President Saleh while avoiding justice in the United States despite a $5 million reward.

Inside Yemen, Al-Qaida has a great deal of support from within the Saleh government and in the general public. The country is filled with anti-Western sentiment, fueled by the U.S. military action in Iraq. As the media looks at "Al-Qaida's new haven" inside his country, President Saleh is capitalizing off of this title to appeal and secure Western funds. He apparently will allow action in the tribal areas, but when it comes to the wanted terrorists like Elbaneh there is no cooperation. Terrorism is a business in Yemen, and it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to work cooperatively in the long-term to stop Al-Qaida's influence in the country.

What should be noted about the failed Christmas Day attack

As the media continues into day three of its coverage of trying to find somebody to blame for the Christmas Day attempt on the Northwest Airlines flight, this finally has showed us how vulnerable we still are. This is not something that was a result of a new administration over the next twelve months, but rather an exploitation of where our Homeland Security Department is lacking. Had the bomb worked and passengers not been able to bring down Abdulmutallab, this attack would have been successful. Nowhere in that equation did the Homeland Security Department factor into stopping it until the pilot landed the plane.


What should be shown is just like with the Fort Hood shootings, the databases that we have are not serving any real purchase by placing suspect individuals into three categories. Major Hasan was disqualified because he exceeded the age parameters set by DHS that is based from the 20-30 year-old age range of the 9/11 attackers. In the case of Abdulmutallab, he was in one of the databases for possibly having suspect contacts, but apparently was not investigated further.


Ironically the highest threat level category is for those who travel to Pakistan or other countries where they could potentially receive training. In the age of Youtube and self-indoctrination, our classification system with these databases is outdated and as with all of our security measures, created as a reaction and not a preemptive intervention. If these are two individuals who can slip past our intelligence, how many more are out there?


The other factor in this attack is how Abdulmutallab was treated at the airport. With DHS money flowing to big cities like New York and Los Angeles, smaller cities are sometimes the last to receive advanced training and funding in DHS programs. Abdulmutallab had significant aspects of concern that should have been recognized beginning at the ticket counter. Why should a person making a nearly 8,000 mile trip travel with only a carry-on bag? The TSA has trained individuals who are meant to blend in at airports and spot potential red flags, however this did not factor in at all with this international flight.


Furthermore, the suspect's father voluntarily came into the U.S. embassy to warn that his son had been out of touch with him and he feared his connections. Apparently, this information did not get used to further investigate Abdulmutallab's travels and contacts and discern whether he was indeed a threat. Ultimately, his visa status was never questioned and he obviously was allowed to get on a plane to enter the U.S.


What the media is finally beginning to discuss is Abdulmutallab's background. The son of a wealthy Nigerian family, he lived a very privileged life. He had generous aspects to him, reportedly giving money to an orphanage rather than buy souvenirs on a class field trip to London. This incident verifies that economic status does not drive someone to jihad. It is their hatred for a way of life that the West believes in, where there are freedoms afforded in every aspect of life.


The enemy we are fighting should be taken seriously, it is not a group of insane schizophrenics. They are skilled fighters who train similar to militaries and are prepared to fight for their religion. The Islam they fight for they have perverted and it is essential that we understand that Muslims are not violent, but there are those present who seek to do harm. Examining a person with suspect ties is not a crime, and we need to be more aggressive in pushing the DHS out of the era of political correctness. Whenever anyone comes forward with information regarding terrorism, they should be taken seriously just as any local police force would take involving a criminal investigation. Greater standards need to be in place to categorize the individuals inside the present database system and make sure that information is continuously collected to either exonerate or elevate a person's presence on such a list.

A glance at the Christmas Day Northwest Airlines incident

As the media continues to fact check the reports surrounding the Northwest Airlines flight that made an emergency landing after a passenger attempted to detonate an explosive during landing, there are many questions that remain about the incident being described as an "Al-Qaida linked terrorist plot." According to the latest reports, the perpetrator was 23-year old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian student at the University of London. It has been broadcast that he acquired the device from Yemen. This plot, if indeed Al-Qaida derived, could hold a great deal of information for the future of forecasting terror plots.


It is unknown whether or not the device did indeed originate in Yemen, however if it did and is traced to Al-Qaida it is unlikely the leadership for the group was involved in such a seemingly small-scale, traditional attack. This did not involve any new techniques, and is almost identical to the Richard Reid attempt almost exactly eight years ago. However, the use of a Nigerian by Al-Qaida is interesting as Africans have continued to be involved with recent Al-Qaida operations since 9/11.


The question remains whether or not this was an individual acting independently and is sympathetic to the jihadist movement or indeed took orders from Al-Qaida leadership. If he did and the plot is traced back to Yemen, the next question is was this plot created by Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula, which has traditionally stuck to attacking Saudi Arabia and Yemen but has expressed goals to perpetrate attacks in the West. If this is the group's first attempt to attack the U.S., acting independent of Al-Qaida central in Pakistan, this is a bold move made from what used to be an Al-Qaida franchise.


The question being if that this individual was in a database, is this another failure similar to the Fort Hood disaster of "rating" the threat level of individuals based on limited surveillance? While not on the "no fly list", Abdulmutallab was in a federal database. It would be safe to assume that he was being monitored by British authorities as well. How he got what was reportedly a liquid explosive device aboard despite restrictions after the 2006 transAtlantic bomb plot proves that we are still vulnerable.


In my opinion, this was not the next Al-Qaida attack. After being significantly weakened as the global jihadist movement due to a hiatus after the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaida needs a powerful attack to reinforce its image in the Muslim world. Why would a terrorist detonate the explosive in the final stages of a nearly 4,000 mile flight? My concern rests in the ability to perpetrate attacks similar to Mumbai, which provided the terrorists with nearly 2 days of nonstop international coverage as they held hostages and killed people indiscriminately. I do believe that not enough safeguards have been taken to prevent such an attack, and that it could be achieved in another major city with relative ease. We are still vulnerable and this attempt proves that one breach is all it takes for another tragedy.

Are we fighting in Afghanistan?

After President Obama issued his orders to increase the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan by an additional 30,000 troops, can we expect victory in Afghanistan? As Steve Schippert notes, the president has yet to express the U.S. ambitions as "victory" or "success", but rather stating that he seeks to "finish the job." As the speech mentioned a U.S. goal of beginning a withdrawal by 2011, this is hardly the type of language the Afghan people needed to hear as they endure the fragile security in their homes, towns, and provinces.



When we entered Afghanistan, we not only took on the task of removing the Taliban and Al-Qaida elements from the havens they once had, but made a pledge to the Afghan people. We're supposed to be the good guys, the ones fighting the good fight and confronting those who claim the lives of innocents. Our primary mission in Afghanistan should be to secure all provinces, not cede them over to Taliban control (as is reportedly being negotiated in the previous entry).


Afghanistan is winnable, but we need to work with the people who want to see change. The people on the ground who cast the votes and experience the threats of the Taliban everyday, not the false leadership of a Karzai administration. These are the people who have settled for the Taliban simply because they do not have the capabilities or resources to resist the Taliban's influence. They have turned to them as an alternative, not as an answer. Nobody - not a Karzai, not the U.S., nor NATO - has the ability to unite all the different groups present in the country under a government that actually functioned, much less the present administration.


This war is something that President Obama understands well, a grassroots war. Just as his presidential campaign went through many hardships, it was the fight that people had in small towns across states that propelled his election over a year ago. This can be applied to Afghanistan. Major Jim Gant, of the Special Forces that have fought in the country, has seen and interacted with the tribes that could very well win this war. He writes:

"Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. This includes a central government located in Kabul, which to them is a million miles away from their problems, a million miles away from their security."

In his report, One Tribe at a Time, Gant explains quite simply how we can fight the war in Afghanistan and still end up losing. Our mission is far more difficult than that of the Taliban, which he says is simply to not lose. The task of the U.S. and NATO is a difficult one, but by trying to unite the country behind a government similar to ours is a rather radical goal that Gant explains is not possible without the support of the tribes. While living among Malik Noorafzhal's tribe in Afghanistan, Gant witnessed the foremost responsibilities of any Afghan lie within their tribe.


Historically, Afghanistan has never found answers in a national government. Even with the most advanced military, our [the U.S.] soldiers can not achieve victory through technology alone. It was the spirit of the tribes that helped fight off the Soviets after all. Gant observes, after experiencing battle in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that "Afghanistan is by far the more difficult and brutal operational environment. The enemy there has never been defeated."


Quite simply the task at hand is hard. However, the U.S. needs to throw all its interest into training not only the members of the Afghan Army and National Police Force and focus on cooperating with the tribes. A military answer by itself is not possible, it will be the integration of our soldiers into the tribal networks that will propel the U.S.'s goals in the country and provide the security that the Afghanistan needs to become a functioning country.

U.S. talking with the Taliban?

Afghanistan is fallen. The cleanup the U.S. and NATO has to do in there is immensely difficult at this point. With President Obama continuing to mull over his options, now months after General McChrystal issued his report, what are we doing about this situation? According to the Saudi al-Watan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenbarry, has been discussing a ceasefire with Taliban elements as high as Foreign Minister Ahmad Mutawakil. Based on the report, the U.S. is offering Taliban control of 5 provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Kunar, and Nuristan) in return for a halt in attacks on U.S. bases.


The U.S. embassy in Riyadh has denied the claims, but sources in Afghanistan are saying that somebody is most definitely talking to the Taliban. Who can make such a call? Given the Taliban's continued threats of "absolute defeat" against the U.S. and NATO, I would venture to say that it isn't the Americans who are negotiating. Karzai has tried time and time again to make offers to the Taliban, only to end up bringing his country into escalated violence. Remember the April 2008 attack in Kabul on the Afghan Independence Day Parade that caused dignitaries and Karzai himself to flee the celebrations? That came shortly after Karzai had denounced the U.S. and NATO presence for civilian casualties.


Afghanistan remains winnable, if we start treating this like a war. We are seeking to make this a post-war situation when we have not won yet. The NATO forces need to pursue the elements creating chaos without restraint and seek to bring stability to the environment. Afghans have no confidence in their government, and just as the cartels that operated in Latin America or the gangs that operated in Chicago in the 1930s, the Taliban have risen as a parallel to a failed government. Negotiating with someone who is willing to recklessly target civilian lives simply because they do not adhere to Islam will be a failure. By allowing the possibility of the Taliban to operate in 5 provinces, or nearly 25% of the country, we only lend credibility to them and turn a blind eye to their acceptance of violence. That is just a reckless strategy.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. III)

However, the most recent case brought to the public attention is that of Najibullah Zazi. Zazi, who was arrested on September 19, 2009, for his involvement in a New York City terror plot. Details surrounding the plot continue to remain sealed by prosecutors, but a timeline of events places Zazi as a more mainstream radical jihadist subscribing to Al-Qaida's theology.

This case puts all traditional profiling into play – a 24-year old Afghan national who became a legal resident in the U.S. after immigrating in 1999. Zazi got married in 2006 to his cousin, who resides in Pakistan. He then reportedly began traveling to visit her and their two children annually. It was in the years following his visits where his customers at his coffee stand in New York noticed a change. He was said to have "grown a beard, wore traditional Islamic clothing, and was less friendly to his customers" (Gruen). A rather noticeable change from a boy who as a child enjoyed wearing stylish clothes and playing video games. The question remains where did Zazi embrace violent jihadist tactics as part of his beliefs – was it during his travels to Pakistan or could it have occurred at his home mosque in Flushing, New York? The mosque he and his family attended since immigrating to the U.S., Masjid Hazrat Abu Bakr, reportedly was split on support for the Taliban and Al-Qaida after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The split reportedly pushed the imam out at the time, who disapproved of the violence (Gruen).

It did not take long after Zazi's arrest, despite the evidence the government had, for Muslim groups to decry the police's tactics. Law enforcement officials in the days following Zazi's initial arrest were not sure as to how many more suspects there were and feared that the plot may still be in motion. Reportedly, Muslims in the Flushing, New York neighborhood that Zazi visited were subject to intensified questioning by police patrols on the ground. Immediately their fears of racial profiling were broadcast via blogs and media outlets.

The question remains how much did his ethnicity and religion play in the investigation process of Najibullah Zazi? According to a report, Zazi had contact with members of Al-Qaida's leadership overseas, which came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA then requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assume a domestic investigation.

The Zazi case proves a very important characteristic about profiling: that it can be a valuable tool to affirm suspicions about an individual. When partnered properly with various pieces of intelligence, profiling is a very useful tool for law enforcement in the fight to help identify those who seek to perpetrate violent acts. There is no doubt that had there been a profile before the 9/11 hijackers, we could have probably saved thousands of lives. By recognizing who was receiving training in the Al-Qaida camps of Sudan and Afghanistan during the 1990s, law enforcement would have been more vigilant to potential warning signs and red flags. Targeting an individual for their race or beliefs is wrong and counterproductive to the mission of this war. Community cooperation is essential, and risking the alienation of Muslims or other groups only hinders investigations. Every investigation should pursue what will be accepted in a court of law. Profiling is not a form of evidence that will prosecute an individual, however it assists law enforcement in the identification of security risks and how best to approach them.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. II)

One such case is that of the Liberty City Seven in Miami, Florida. Public skepticism has plagued such a case since its beginning, where many have argued that the defendants were merely financially-troubled African-Americans seeking an opportunity to raise money. Critics accused the government of instigating and seducing the defendants into such a plot. However, by examining the sentiments of the individuals and their language in audio recordings, the sentiment does exist clearly.

The accused cell leader, Narseal Batiste, countered claims that he requested money from a confidential informant in order to create a nonprofit religious organization and community outreach program in Liberty City (Reuters.com). While this case bears many suspicious ties to finances, the sentiment on the nearly 15,000 audio and video tapes used in testimony shows a sentiment either of insanity or total disregard for the activity he was associating with. The case was brought before a jury three times, with two mistrials declared during the process. By its third time, two defendants had been found not guilty and five others were convicted for their involvement.

In the recordings with the FBI informant, who many have said was not a credible source due to a history of domestic violence and other criminal offenses, Batiste stated that with his history in the construction business, "If I can put up a building, I should definitely know how to take one down (NEFA)." While being under surveillance, he continuously stated of plans to be "just as good or greater than 9/11" and discussed expanding the target list to prisons which he hoped to use as a means to build up an army of soldiers loyal to his cause, presumably the violent jihad that the informant discussed.

During the court proceedings, many questioned how credible any of Batiste's statements were. The defense continuously pointed to the promised financial incentives made by the informant, suggesting Batiste sought to use it for his community. This case while in the minds of jurors may seem like a tangled web of misconceptions and role-playing by Batiste and his associates, actually provides a very important detail that should be examined when profiling the potential for extremism to find root in certain communities.

While the Liberty City Seven case was laced by a great deal of unfortunate setbacks that made prosecuting the individuals a lot more complicated than if they had been found to be in possession of dangerous weapons, it proved how opportune recruitment of individuals can be.

What occurred was the recruitment and establishment of a figurehead [Batiste] and his subsequent involvement to involve his associates. Through his own lawyer's defense, the motive that lured Batiste into the situation was the promise of $50,000. Despite many of the aspects of the plots that Batiste discussed seeming as though they were fantasies to even a well-trained terrorist, the fact remains that Batiste was willing to cooperate with an individual who identified himself as an extremist. It's reported that during the conversations, the FBI informant identified himself as a key figure in the development of the USS Cole attack in 2000 (Couwels), which killed 17 U.S. sailors. This clearly shows a lack of discretion on Batiste's part and begs at what point would he have withdrawn from the plot?

Whether it was the promise of finances or a genuine support for the violent jihad described in the recordings, the Liberty City Seven case proves under what circumstances an extremist group can find alliances. Indeed, in recent statements, groups such as Al-Qaida have announced a willingness to pursue partnering with other low-level groups (not linked to Islam) in order to perpetrate violence. In a recent forum in Bahrain, a known Al-Qaida recruiter – Abdullah al-Nafisi, discusses smuggling weapons and people into the United States via underground tunnels and also promotes white supremacist groups to commit violent acts against the American government ("Kuwaiti Professor Abdallah Nafisi Suggests about a Biological Attack at the White House"). The potential of allying with groups that already support violence and already have capabilities and resources makes detecting terrorists more complicated when they may already exist within the U.S. population. In this case, the complaints of placing individuals under surveillance for their religious or ethnic backgrounds do not factor at all. The social and economic backgrounds as well as an individual's behavior play relevant to the investigation.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, a massive debate emerged as to what methods and instruments could be made available to law enforcement to prevent any future incidents. Media and the general public continuously aired details related to the hijackers, designating 15 of the 19 hijackers as being of Saudi descent. This fact continues to be one of the most prominent details when it comes to the debate as to where radical Islam begins. This clearly begs the question, can extremism be linked to a common religious or ethnic group and can that be used as a tool for the law enforcement community?

Since its beginning, profiling has come under the constant scrutiny of those who believe that it is a method that promotes unfair discrimination by police. Profiling is defined as the "the use of specific characteristics, as race or age, to make generalizations about a person, as whether he or she may be engaged in illegal activity (dictionary.com)." Profiling as a tool became available and was used by law enforcement in the 1980s, under Operation Pipeline – started by the Drug Enforcement Administration as the United States declared its "War on Drugs." Police used profiling, aided by other techniques such as recognizing suspicious behavior and the possible concealment of contraband when making traffic stops in order to intercept drug shipments.

It was during this time period that in some states, such as California, minorities began to feel as though they were being unfairly targeted due to their race. The terms "Driving While Black" or "Driving While Brown" originated in response to such stops (Jrank.org).

In present day, it may seem as though there is a racial bias against minorities for criminal offenses. As of June 30, 2007, data indicated that the incarceration rate for white men was 773 per 100,000, black men was 4,618 per 100,000, and Hispanics was 1,747 per 100,000 (Sabol 7). However, these statistics are reflective of a potential bias in the judicial system, not necessarily in the policing aspect of law enforcement. This paper's intended purpose is to assess the capabilities of the investigations process and will not address any potential discrimination in the court system.

Following the September 11 attacks, a new debate emerged over the use of racial profiling by a relatively new group, the Arab-American community. Consisting of a large number of Muslims, this group specifically feared a wave of reciprocal violence on its members. While such concerns are justifiable, they have been given significant allowances so as not to provide any potentially conflicting links to terrorist organizations that use religion as a justification, such as Al-Qaida. In 2008, the State Department and Department of Justice, along with several other government agencies, issued memos providing a proper lexicon of appropriate terms when speaking of radical Muslim groups. So as not to confuse mainstream Islam with that of the radical beliefs of Al-Qaida, the memo requested that Islamic terms such as "jihad," "mujahidin," or "Islamist" not be used when discussing groups (Msnbc.com).

However, can providing such safeguards while ignoring what these groups portray themselves as create a conflict that encourages an atmosphere of political correctness rather than accuracy? Radical groups do exist representing an array of causes – whether they be religious, political, social, or economic. The common link that gives way to terrorism and extremist violence is that not the cause that these groups identify with, but rather the acceptance of violence as a means to lobby the public. The beginnings of those who represent such groups normally do bear similar characteristics that can aid in detecting tendencies to resort to violence. Several recent terror cases all share various aspects that should be observed and should be noted when debating whether profiling can be an accurate tool in law enforcement.

Afghanistan - Why We're Losing

How do we win in Afghanistan? Eight years after the U.S. campaign that ousted the Taliban from power, the country remains a list of "to-dos" that have yet to be checked off. Since President Obama tasked Gen. Stanley McChrystal in charge of forces in Afghanistan, there has been talk of transforming the strategies that many have said made this war unwinnable. The dilemma remains, how can this war be turned around? There seems to a be a vague understanding of what makes this a winnable war - with critics like George Will joining the ranks of Vice President Joe Biden. The Veep has called for less troops on the ground in Afghanistan because he believes we should be pursuing Al-Qaida's havens in Pakistan instead.


I remain a skeptic of how useful Gen. McChrystal can be on the ground. This war has become a political tool for many, breeding lines of bureaucratic red-tape that puts restrictions on those who have fought in wars. While people like George Will and the Vice President sit in their lavish offices in Washington, the people of Afghanistan are waiting for this rhetoric to pan out to action. The attitude of your average Afghan looks back at the Soviet invasion and remembers how "committed" the U.S. was then. The country is used to corruption and being plagued by violence, it has become part of the culture and they do not seek to be used by anyone. At the first sign of their country becoming a means by a superpower, they are willing to confront it - just like the Soviets.


This war has become a failure because of those who were put in charge of the country. The Karzai administration has done nothing for the people in the country, it has bred corruption throughout every level and has enabled those who operate the trafficking of narcotics out of the country. With the contested results of the election that put him into office for another term, Hamid Karzai will continue to be a portrait of all that is wrong in his country.


President Karzai has opted to play both sides in this war, blaming NATO forces for violence in the country and civilian deaths. Meanwhile, he asks for the Taliban to sit around a table and talk about their involvement in a "post-Taliban" society. Mr. Karzai has repeatedly shown he does not have the attitude or motivation to confront the Taliban, seeing them as the coalition's problem.


However, this idea has been embraced by many in Washington who seek to use Lebanon's Hizbullah as a model for bringing a violent group into the political affairs of a country. Maybe it's time that the cubicle monkeys of Foggy Bottom examine the testimony over the years.


"Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team."
-former Dep. Sec. of State Richard Armitage

"Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives."
-former DHS Sec. Michael Chertoff


The belief that Hizbullah is a regional player is complete and total B.S. Hezbollah controls Lebanon, it does not fit into the political system of the country. It has killed to get where it is and possesses global capabilities to obtain resources and attack targets. Ask Saad Hariri how Hizbullah has fit into the political system of his father on the Feb. 14, 2006 car bombing that shook Beirut.


If we want to push Afghanistan into a society that is ass backwards, by all means put the Taliban in the "reformed" government. If we withdraw our forces or do not commit to rebuilding their society, they will turn on us even more. They remember the U.S. pullout after ousting the Soviets, the question is do we?

Feds investigate Denver man in most recent terror probe

It's been one week since news reports began to circulate around a series of terror raids in Queens, New York. Details surrounding the investigation seem to be rather tight-lipped and the tone of the officials willing to discuss the case suggest that this plot was hot and the members were active. The level of the plot has been paralleled to that of another 9/11, but the intended target remains unknown to the general public. Security has been beefed up at airports and transit hubs surrounding New York.


The investigation is centered on Najibullah Zazi, a 25 year-old male reportedly of Afghan descent. Many terror officials are intrigued by the use of an Afghan as opposed to the preference of Arabs, Pakistanis, and Africans by Al-Qaida. More than a dozen individuals have been linked to this cell and are being monitored by authorities.


As the news reports come out, it is difficult to determine who decided that now was the necessary time to intervene. While this was reportedly a FBI investigation, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly is believed to have pressed for the raid after Zazi's weekend visit to Queens. It is interesting to note that terror investigations have evolved a long way since pre-9/11, when the feds rushed to accuse a suspect rather than use them as a means of obtaining information. The level of surveillance on Zazi most undoubtedly developed a substantial amount of good information on the network and could pay off if the plot was disrupted.

Al-Qaida over the past eight years

As the U.S. remembers the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centers, the question among many in the intelligence community question how to measure feats achieved in the Global War on Terror. The group behind 9/11, Al-Qaida, has yet to achieve any attacks that rival those which killed 3,000. Many commentators suggest that Al-Qaida is phasing out in its recruitment capabilities, faced with the fact that it has not lived up to the precedent set in the 2001 attacks. In TIME, Tony Karon writes a piece titled "Eight Years After 9/11: Why Osama bin Laden Failed," which suggests that bin Laden's quest to instigate global jihad through his group has not occurred.


I would question the legitimacy of such an argument, showing that Al-Qaida was forced to adapt to a situation that was largely unexpected. The 2001 campaign in Operation Enduring Freedom took the group by surprise, and the memories of the mujahideen against the Soviets throughout the 1980s had no place in a present-day conflict. Afghanistan was taken from the Taliban and Al-Qaida was forced to withdraw to secure compounds among tribal allies.


It is largely impractical to believe that Al-Qaida would be capable of creating 9/11-esque attacks everyday, as the international community largely remains persistent in its quest to limit the group. At its best throughout the 1990s, the group was developing numerous large-scale plots, but only capable of the 1993 WTC bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 USS Cole attack. Only one of those occurred inside the United States. In the overseas incidents, Al-Qaida would not have been successful without its regional voices. I firmly believe that when it comes to Al-Qaida in a regional environment, the group is thriving still.


Proof of this can be seen in the violence that the group has achieved through its allies. Nearly every notable attack inside India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Northern Africa and Indonesia has been from an Al-Qaida partner. The Al-Qaida and Taliban alliance I believe has been abandoned largely as the Taliban has developed its own partnerships to raise funding and become a movement inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. I believe that the Taliban are largely self-sufficient in maintaining their attack capabilities. Al-Qaida may not be the international movement it once aspired to be, however it plays a powerful role in regional affairs.


We have played this game before, allowing intelligence officials to declare Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (responsible for attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen) as struggling, as well as stating that progress in Northern Africa (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) meant that we were winning. However, one year after those statements were made, both Al-Qaida affiliates remain capable of the same attacks they were in the past. The Al-Qaida most people remember in America was the enemy that flew planes into towers, however the group's beginnings were a humble guerrilla resistance. Perhaps the group has turned back to what gave it a name, looking to develop a new infrastructure trained in the ways that have kept the group alive.

Al-Qaida's war against the royal family continues

For quite some time, it seemed as though Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had felt the heat of Saudi security operations and moved all its operations south to Yemen to use as a staging ground. The group had been dealt significant blows with sweeping raids netting hundreds of members over the last two years. Violence had escalated inside Yemen as the group sought refuge in border provinces to the Kingdom, however the Saudis had successfully foiled several series of plots on mostly oil interests.


On Monday, a suicide bomber targeted Dep. Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef at his palace during a Ramadan celebration. Nayef's capacity as Dep. Interior Minister places him in command over all counterterror operations. Al-Qaida was quick to declare its involvement in the attack, giving credit to Abdullah Hassan Taleh Aseri (alias "Abu al-Khayr"), who was listed in an INTERPOL orange notice for 85 individuals suspected of involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The list raised an eyebrow by many skeptics of the Kingdom's "War on Terror" as 14 of the suspects were released from Guantanamo Bay into the Saudi rehabilitation program for "deviants" (the label applied to Islamic terrorists by authorities). Now reports are providing insight into the targeting of such a prominent member of the royal family.


The Al-Qaida statement suggests that Aseri was flown aboard Nayef's private jet, allowed access to the Prince's palace and upon being searched by security, detonated an explosive device. It should be noted that it is standard for the royal family to open their palaces to the public for Ramadan events. The curious aspect to the story remains as to what brought Aseri into the Kingdom. It is suggested that he crossed into Saudi Arabia from Yemen with the expressed intent to surrender to authorities. It is reported that he had expressed interest to speak to his followers and negotiate their surrender as well.


This is undoubtedly disturbing news coming out of Saudi Arabia, that the security around the equivalent to CIA Director Leon Panetta placed a wanted individual on his private jet, with explosives, and allowed him access to the palace. As this story develops it appears this was to be a momentous development that went horribly wrong. This incident lowers the confidence in certain internal elements, namely Nayef's security detail. Despite the pretenses of surrender provided by Aseri, he should have been treated as the dangerous criminal that he was.


This attempt can be credited to the resourceful tactics of Al-Qaida, utilizing the Islamic principle of taqqiya. Walid Phares has written before on taqqiya, stating that as a jihadist concept it instructs "Combatants “in the path of Allah,” as instructed by ideologues to “fake” normalcy, and lie if needed, about their real beliefs so that the deception of the enemy is full." This incident acts as a stark warning that Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula is not under pressure and remains as resourceful as it ever was. The potential for renewed conflict inside the Kingdom is now on a brink as Al-Qaida appears to have its sights back inside the country.

TTP leader Mehsud killed in airstrike

As news comes out of Pakistan that Baitullah Mehsud is believed to be among the casualties of Wednesday's air strike in Waziristan, many analysts are no doubt looking at what is next for Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There is no doubt that Baitullah wore the title of Taliban commander well, becoming the government's most fierce competition, but will his death yield any actual results in what Pakistan's struggle against militants?


When Baitullah first emerged, he brought a new face to the militancy that he inherited. Opting to be in the shadows, he stayed away from cameras and chose to live a life centered around a fear that he would be found. His paranoia was evidenced by his routine - traveling in convoys, sleeping in different locations every night. His predecessor had become a victim of too much media attention and it appeared Baitullah had taken note. However, shortly after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, he evolved into a militant who sought to go after the Pakistani government and create chaos.


The question stands does the death of Baitullah accomplish anything in both Pakistan's war on terror and the global war. In all likelihood, the violence in the country will remain and the attempts to destabilize the government will remain persistent. As Baitullah rose in status as Pakistan's key militant, he alienated a great deal of his commanders who became his competition. The one thing that Baitullah had going for him in the tribal region was his pledge that he gave to residents that he would protect them from foreign fighters - including Pakistan's military. Baitullah was a strong fighter for the independence of those regions, seeking to keep the military and government from interfering.


It is highly possible that as the TTP names Baitullah's successor, that it will seek to establish itself as a powerful force that is unified in its beliefs. The schism that was created by Baitullah can be healed by the regathering of the group and by no means is the TTP in a struggle to survive. Baitullah was an extremely capable leader who had a great deal of resources at his disposal. In a recent editorial, the capabilities of the TTP are reflected upon, giving credit to how the resistance has maintained its struggle:

"According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion (around $48 million US) to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and "protection money" in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory."

The death of Baitullah does not mean a shift in the Taliban's tactics. The Taliban have a momentum and an agenda, which means that the TTP is still one of the most potentially damaging networks to the region. With its ties and resources, the new leader of the group has an endless flow of ability to fight jihad without making the same errors that may have led to his predecessor's death. The Taliban can not be defeated by air strikes alone, but rather attacking the very things that sustain it. There is a desperate need for the government to establish itself as capable of protecting its people, not negotiating useless ceasefires with militants who have the upper hand. The government will have to pursue the very things that finance the groups - including logging and mining. These, along with extensive ties to the drug trade, helped make up the nearly $48 million that the TTP earned. Only by the government conducting an offensive on all levels, not just using foot soldiers, will it win any real successes against its enemies.


For now, there is the success of eliminating a man who had countless amounts of blood on his hands. However, at the end of the day terrorism does not start or end with just one man.

Pakistan Five-Star Hotel bombed

As the reports come in pertaining to the attack today on Peshawar's only five-star hotel, the Pearl Continental, this can be seen as a direct threat by Taliban militants to not only the Pakistani government, but to the U.S. as well. The attack will more than likely be traced back to Taliban groups, probably with links to TTP commander Baitullah Mehsud. Following the government's offensive on Taliban hideouts, threats were made to attack prominent locations as revenge. The attack is the latest in a trend of attacks since the November Mumbai attacks, which combines gunmen and bombs creating two waves of attacks inside and outside the target.


Perhaps most concerning should be that the hotel was a spot not only frequented by diplomats in the region, but was included in negotiations by the U.S. to purchase the hotel for use as a consulate. This was part of a nearly $756 million plan for improving the U.S.'s embassy and consulates inside the country, putting the costs for such second to the new embassy in Iraq. It should be noted that the Taliban and Al-Qaida hold the U.S. responsible for exerting influence on the Zardari administration to conduct the operations in the tribal region. Today's attack should be perceived as not only another affront to Pakistan's government, but also a shot across the bow to the U.S. More details will emerge soon I am sure.

Another case of jihad in the U.S.

As the recent arrests of four individuals in New York demonstrate, nearly eight years after 9/11 the intent to attack Americans inside the United States remains strong not overseas but within the United States itself. Yet again, the countless hours of investigation by law enforcement agencies can be attributed to saving lives. The arrests mark yet again, similar to several cases such as the Liberty City 7 and the Fort Dix Six, a new era of law enforcing that involves intervening and disrupting a plot prior to its actual execution. The involvement of FBI informants has been instrumental to these operations.


However, it is yet again a strong reminder that there are individuals amongst us seeking to damage the freedoms we enjoy. Media reports have already indicated that this latest plot was a mere dream by men who oppose American policies. It is necessary for us to be reminded that forces operating for the jihadist networks are seeking actively to exploit the sufferings of individuals and utilize them in plots within our country. There is little doubt that given the resources of groups like Al-Qaida and Hizbullah, these men would have been capable and likely executed attacks inside the U.S..


Jihadist plots have diminished coming from the Al-Qaida hierarchy inside Pakistan, but that does not mean that the mentality that deems jihad necessary has been erased. There are still individuals seeking to advance this using violence across the world, and it is essential that our law enforcement have the tools to intercept and act on any and all intelligence deemed threatening. Thanks to these tools, our agencies have been involved in preventing attacks within the United States and abroad, saving countless lives.

Holding the key to Afghanistan

When the United States entered its War On Terror in 2001, it was to remove Al-Qaida from the havens offered to it by the Taliban. Nearly eight years later, Afghanistan now has become the focus again. After a meeting between Presidents Karzai and Zardari at the White House two weeks ago, followed by the lead U.S. commander in Afghanistan being removed by Defense Secretary Gates, it is clear that the White House is attempting to put a new face on a war that has its share of critics. From Karzai reinforcing the accusations of civilian targeting in U.S. air strikes as well as Zardari's persistent complaints of the lack of international involvement in his country, the war in Afghanistan is no longer a containable threat without regional cooperation.


At this time last year, NATO forces in Afghanistan were preparing for an expected massive Taliban offensive as the weather warmed up. At this time last year, Karzai was accusing the U.S. and NATO of targeting civilians in their air strikes and promoting talks with Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Pakistan launched military operations into towns that were believed to be Taliban strongholds.


Presently, NATO is expecting another Taliban offensive. Karzai is making the same statements and Pakistan is in the middle of more "offensives." By any standard, to declare progress in Afghanistan over the last year should raise an eyebrow so long as the situation one year later remains identical to the previous.


Last summer saw the Taliban and Al-Qaida operate from the havens in Pakistan to execute an array of sophisticatedly coordinated attacks on significant targets. There was the attempted assassination of Karzai in April, the June attack on a prison in Kandahar that freed nearly 1200 inmates, and the July bombing of the Indian embassy in the country. Several attacks also occurred in Pakistan, including the September attack on a Marriott in Islamabad.


Pakistan is expected to launch another offensive in Baluchistan, specifically targeting Baitullah Mehsud's fighters. Mehsud was yet again listed in another Anti-Terrorism Court warrant for the Lahore police academy bombing.


Pakistan is the answer to stabilizing Afghanistan. The Taliban are no longer contained to controlling a government, but have become a regional factor that seeks to undermine any opposition. Ahmed Rashid wrote of this when discussing how delicate the situation in Pakistan is, stating:

"The myths about the Taliban need to be clarified. They are not an extension of an external threat; they are not being funded by Russia or India. In the 1990s, the Taliban in Afghanistan were fighting the Northern Alliance, and thousands of Pashtuns went to fight as foot soldiers on behalf of the Taliban. In 2001, the Afghan Taliban fled to Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban, who previously had little clout, became hosts of the Afghan Taliban and earned much money for their assistance."

Rashid wrote that from 2001 to 2004, the Pakistani Taliban sought to establish a emirate in FATA and that the showdowns with the government now are their pursuit to expand that state.


However, the most threatening assessment comes from the statement that Pakistan's ISI sought to use Taliban fighters from Afghanistan to "maintain the jihadi nexus as a force against the Indians." Rashid writes about this in detail:

"The leadership of the Taliban is now in Pakistan, and they have stated their intention of overthrowing the government here. The Taliban are linking up with groups in Pakistan, and the Pakistani Taliban movement is turning into a multiethnic movement. Groups cultivated [by the Pakistani Army] to fight in Kashmir have joined up with the Pakistani Taliban, and include Punjabis, with organizations such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkatul Mujahideen. Now, some 40 groups in Pakistan are loosely affiliated.... For that reason, Pakistan faces a more dangerous situation than Afghanistan, where Tajik and Uzbek fighters were not permitted to join the Afghan Taliban movement."

The above passage sheds just a small light into how complicated the connections in Pakistan lie. As the government begs for more aid money, it is likely that more and more refugee camps will be filled in areas already effected by failed military offensives in their areas. The already economically dismal situation in the country will only increase as a result of more operations, and Zardari will continue to plead for more aid relief from the international community. However, such operations have yet to prove beneficial in the long run and have yielded virtually no consistent results.


So long as groups are functioning inside Pakistan's borders, it remains almost certain that should the government continue to conduct offensives, the jihadists in Pakistan will seek to divert any concentration on themselves to Pakistan's signature enemy. It is highly likely that Indian targets will again fall victim to an attack, with the intent to exacerbate Pak-Indian relations. The question will then turn to just how capable Pakistan is of securing its own borders and whether India attempts to hold the government accountable for any terrorist action hatched inside that country. With India certain of Pakistan's involvement in the embassy bombing and the Mumbai attacks, time is running out.

The future of Saudi Arabia in the War on Terror

Buried in a one-sentence statement by the Saudi Press Agency on March 27 was the surprise announcement that Prince Nayef had been appointed second deputy prime minister of the Kingdom. The move places a man with strong opposition to Western initiatives as the potential successor to King Abdullah, only led by the ailing Prince Sultan. At a crucial time where the U.S.-Saudi partnership is necessary for the region, it is expected that a King Nayef would deal a significant blow to any of the reformist potential that King Abdullah has embraced.



Since King Fahd's death in 2005, Abdullah has at least taken steps to pander to the West and presented a possibility of a Saudi Arabia that can fit into a modern world. Last July, King Abdullah opened the World Conference for Dialogue in Spain, which was held after his meeting in November 2007 with the Pope at the Vatican. Despite the meetings being a great deal of extravagant media/public relations "fluff", Abdullah opened himself up to criticism from his Muslim critics. Al-Qaida has shown King Abdullah and the Pope walking together in its propaganda, however it should be noted that while the meetings occurred, Saudi Arabia remains an Islamic state that forbids the public practice of any religions other than Islam. The Sunni-Shi'a divide still remains strong in the country, so the likelihood of imminent religious reforms remains unlikely.


Freedom of religion is just one aspect of what a democratic Saudi Arabia would look like. While it remains in doubt that Abdullah will commit to any reform as King, it is virtually nonexistent that a King Nayef would further any potential democratic changes.


Just prior to the March announcement, Nayef was quoted as saying that Saudi Arabia did not need women serving in Parliament or elections. In short, how undemocratic can you be to oppose women's rights and elections universally? Progress regarding either aspect on any level would have been an encouraging sign that Saudi Arabia is looking to develop its role in the global community, rather than pull itself into obscurity. With the Iranian influence expanding on a global scale, Saudi Arabia has failed to increase its influence on a regional and global scale at a rate proportionate to Iran. One would assume that King Abdullah would see that in the long-term, Iran will eclipse Saudi Arabia for the once heated battle over who has the most influence over the Middle East. In short, Prince Nayef has experience over ruling the Kingdom as Interior Minister, but is ill-equipped to the dealings on a global scale.


Furthermore, as the War on Terrorism remains a vital aspect for Middle East policy in the near future, the U.S.-Saudi partnership must be upheld by any Saudi monarch. There is no doubt that the Interior Ministry remains the most significant branch of the government to confront terrorism in the Kingdom, but Prince Nayef is plagued by extreme doubt over his effectiveness overseeing such operations. In a June 22, 2004 hearing, Sen. Charles Schumer (NY-D) urged then Secretary of State Colin Powell to demand that Prince Nayef be replaced with "with someone more credible and committed to fighting terrorism." These calls came after reports surfaced that Prince Nayef's Interior Ministry security forces assisted in the kidnapping and murder of Paul Johnson-an U.S. contractor residing in the Kingdom. Sen. Schumer's demand cited Prince Nayef's lengthy history of aiding terrorists and interference of investigations.

"Prince Nayef Ibn Abd Al-Aziz is the supervisor general of the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifadah, an organization that has provided families of Palestinian suicide bombers with millions of dollars through specially designated bank accounts. In 2002, a single Saudi Arabian telethon raised about $112 million for this purpose.


In November of 2002, Prince Nayef told Ain-Al-Yageen, another Saudi newspaper, that Zionists were responsible for the 9-11 attacks despite that fact that Saudi Arabia has admitted that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis. In addition, Prince Nayef [deletion] single-handedly prevented the trial of 13 Saudis indicted for killing 19 Americans in the bombing of the Khobar Towers by refusing to turn the men over to the United States. More recently Prince Nayef claimed that Zionists were behind the murder of six western contractors in Saudi Arabia and stated that "Al Qaeda is backed by Israel and Zionism."

In short, there is no person more ill-fit to govern Saudi Arabia then Prince Nayef. Given that a government report last year found that Saudi Arabia remains the leading sponsor of terrorism, there should be no expectation of any enhanced measures under Nayef's rule. If he has failed to crack down on it under his position as Interior Minister (held since 1975), it is likely that any existing measures would be scaled back. With his history of "blame the Jews" and his strong held Wahhabist views, Saudi Arabia will withdraw from global initiatives and lose any reformist views. Perhaps there is no better way to summarize what Saudi Arabia will look like than to quote Prince Nayef himself from a 2006 speech.


"Unless we face reality with truth, courage, and evidence, and if we do not stop all the transgressors who are trying to distort Islam with their claims of reform and their corrupt progress - this will be dangerous. These people have been tempted by the West, and have been employed in its service. We are familiar with their relations with foreign elements. We are fighting them and will continue to fight them, and we will cut off their tongues."

Pakistan's role in regional stability

As President Obama laid out his plan for Afghanistan last week, the potential for regional violence originating from Pakistan continued to remain a defining issue in the War on Terror. Inside its borders, Pakistan remains a breeding ground and haven for jihadist groups as the government has lost any legitimacy in "the battle for Pakistan's soul" that President Zardari wrote about last September. Pakistan's military has failed to crackdown on militant activities, and with the effective breakaway of parts of the tribal areas to Taliban sympathizers, the Zardari administration has failed the world.


Monday's attack targeting a police academy in Lahore was the second major attack in the country within days, following the bombing of a mosque along the Khyber Pass, and reminded the world of how volatile the situation remains. The attack revealed the vulnerabilities of the forces expected to conduct counter terror operations, yet also served as a reminder of how the War on Terror in Pakistan has become a lazy slogan for President Zardari to beg the West for money.


The simple fact remains that Monday's attack should not have happened, and Pakistani intelligence was more than likely either complicit or unaware of any plot. Baitullah Mehsud's Tehrik-e-Taliban has claimed responsibility for the attack. Mehsud has been sought since an arrest warrant was issued exactly one year ago for his masterminding of the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Her assassination left the PPP in search of a presidential candidate, eventually namingZardari, her widower.


Upon the PPP's election into power, the new government sought to negotiate with groups spreading violence in the country, including Mehsud's. The results of such talks can now clearly be seen on the countless casualty lists from domestic attacks. No peace has been achieved, and the handover of the Swat valley to Taliban sympathizer Sufi Mohammad will yet again serve as a reminder that terrorism is simply whatjihadists see as a means to gain their authority.


Pakistan remains in denial of its role for spreading violence. The first finger pointed for any major attacks within Pakistan comes from Interior Minister Rehman Malik to "foreign elements." See this article after the police academy siege. Hours later, the commander of Pakistan's Tehrik-e-Taliban Baitullah Mehsud claimed responsibility and Malik, as usual, was forced to correct his misstatement. The empty hand begging for Western "aid" continues to remain extended, with no formidable successes to provide examples that Pakistani forces are willing, or even capable, of fighting terrorism. Prior to Monday's attack, President Zardari opted to take the typical politician route and make excuses for his administration's failure:


"In a rare interview with Sky.com, Zardari vowed to make Pakistan a better and stronger country in the near future, and adding it can still win its struggle against terrorism.
He announced that the battle to counter terrorism is now Pakistan’’s war.

Zardari however, said it would require more help from the United States and Britain to overcome the menace.Putting side the international community's claims that Islamabad has been poured-in with aid and assistance, Zardari said: We haven”t received a dollar. Until then, we don”t have the tools to fight."


Perhaps President Zardari is referring to the U.S. announcement in January that it was cutting money from the Coalition Support Fund. The U.S. deducted nearly $55 million from the previous $156 million figure provided. After the Obama administration laid out its plan for economic aid in Pakistan being linked to the country's performance in fighting terrorism, Prime Minister Gilani whined that "Pakistan has already done enough." The War on Terror will not be won through military strength alone, but blank checks will not contain the ideas that jihadist groups seek to implement.


As politicians throughout the world question the war on terror, people are dying. It is time for Pakistan to quit outsourcing this struggle and adopt it as its own. U.S. drone strikes should not be the only War on Terror that President Zardari can speak of, yet they are the only forcescombating terrorism inside Pakistan. How many people will have to die before it is seen that terrorist groups are not just crazed maniacs seeking to kill people, but they have an agenda that they seek to establish through fear and bloodshed? Terrorism is a means to an end, and so long as that end is out of reach, this cycle of violence will continue to plague everyone in Pakistan.



-----
Just a brief side note, I wish this was an April Fool's joke. U.S. envoy Richard Holbrookeannounced today that the State Dept. intended to surge counter terror funding for Pakistan.

"He said the administration backed a measure sponsored in the House that would create economic opportunity zones along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.Another bill – sponsored by House Foreign Relations Committee Chairman HowardBerman and top two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee – would triple aid for Pakistan to $1.5 billion annually for five years."