9-11-01

Wednesday, November 11, 2009

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. II)

One such case is that of the Liberty City Seven in Miami, Florida. Public skepticism has plagued such a case since its beginning, where many have argued that the defendants were merely financially-troubled African-Americans seeking an opportunity to raise money. Critics accused the government of instigating and seducing the defendants into such a plot. However, by examining the sentiments of the individuals and their language in audio recordings, the sentiment does exist clearly.


The accused cell leader, Narseal Batiste, countered claims that he requested money from a confidential informant in order to create a nonprofit religious organization and community outreach program in Liberty City (Reuters.com). While this case bears many suspicious ties to finances, the sentiment on the nearly 15,000 audio and video tapes used in testimony shows a sentiment either of insanity or total disregard for the activity he was associating with. The case was brought before a jury three times, with two mistrials declared during the process. By its third time, two defendants had been found not guilty and five others were convicted for their involvement.

In the recordings with the FBI informant, who many have said was not a credible source due to a history of domestic violence and other criminal offenses, Batiste stated that with his history in the construction business, "If I can put up a building, I should definitely know how to take one down (NEFA)." While being under surveillance, he continuously stated of plans to be "just as good or greater than 9/11" and discussed expanding the target list to prisons which he hoped to use as a means to build up an army of soldiers loyal to his cause, presumably the violent jihad that the informant discussed.

During the court proceedings, many questioned how credible any of Batiste's statements were. The defense continuously pointed to the promised financial incentives made by the informant, suggesting Batiste sought to use it for his community. This case while in the minds of jurors may seem like a tangled web of misconceptions and role-playing by Batiste and his associates, actually provides a very important detail that should be examined when profiling the potential for extremism to find root in certain communities.

While the Liberty City Seven case was laced by a great deal of unfortunate setbacks that made prosecuting the individuals a lot more complicated than if they had been found to be in possession of dangerous weapons, it proved how opportune recruitment of individuals can be.

What occurred was the recruitment and establishment of a figurehead [Batiste] and his subsequent involvement to involve his associates. Through his own lawyer's defense, the motive that lured Batiste into the situation was the promise of $50,000. Despite many of the aspects of the plots that Batiste discussed seeming as though they were fantasies to even a well-trained terrorist, the fact remains that Batiste was willing to cooperate with an individual who identified himself as an extremist. It's reported that during the conversations, the FBI informant identified himself as a key figure in the development of the USS Cole attack in 2000 (Couwels), which killed 17 U.S. sailors. This clearly shows a lack of discretion on Batiste's part and begs at what point would he have withdrawn from the plot?

Whether it was the promise of finances or a genuine support for the violent jihad described in the recordings, the Liberty City Seven case proves under what circumstances an extremist group can find alliances. Indeed, in recent statements, groups such as Al-Qaida have announced a willingness to pursue partnering with other low-level groups (not linked to Islam) in order to perpetrate violence. In a recent forum in Bahrain, a known Al-Qaida recruiter – Abdullah al-Nafisi, discusses smuggling weapons and people into the United States via underground tunnels and also promotes white supremacist groups to commit violent acts against the American government ("Kuwaiti Professor Abdallah Nafisi Suggests about a Biological Attack at the White House"). The potential of allying with groups that already support violence and already have capabilities and resources makes detecting terrorists more complicated when they may already exist within the U.S. population. In this case, the complaints of placing individuals under surveillance for their religious or ethnic backgrounds do not factor at all. The social and economic backgrounds as well as an individual's behavior play relevant to the investigation.

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