Libya: Al-Qaida's rebirth

As weeks have passed since the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that killed 4 Americans, including the U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens, answers regarding the exact details of the plot seem to be nonexistent.  I believe that within the hours following the attack, just by assessing the predominate groups operating in the region that would select a U.S. target, AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) would be placed as a prime suspect in the attack.  While Ambassador Susan Rice explained that she believed the attack was a spontaneous assault by elements loyal to Qaddafi, the basis for the target selection just doesn't add up.  Such groups are largely disorganized and lack the firepower to select a target such as a U.S. Consulate, that would undeniably get a response utilizing American firepower, the likes of which they could not withstand.  It would, to say the least, have been a suicide mission.


If this had been a pro-Qaddafi outfit responsible, it would have been more than likely that you would have seen something similar to the likes of Al-Shabaab in the targeting of Somalian and Ethiopian forces as well as the attempted assassination of the new Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahamud.  That attack came the day following the Libyan and Egyptian incidents.  Shabaab's template is one that seeks to largely destabilize the region and complicate interactions between Ethiopia and Somalia, which have mutually agreed to hunt down the group's fighters and have offered ceasefires.


What is particularly alarming is that with AQIM's involvement in this attack, the group has signaled they are willing to target Americans similar to Al-Qaida's 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.  The group had remained silent since the failed 1993 World Trade Center attack, utilizing the time to organize and equip its fighters for missions.  Now, after 11 years since the attack that killed 3,031, Al-Qaida is continuing a familiar pattern.  Without a doubt the group lacks the ability to perpetrate a large-scale attack like 9/11/01, but it can enhance its ability by perpetrating small-scale attacks on targets that are outside of U.S. borders and largely vulnerable like embassies or consulates.  Make no mistake, the point of surveillance is to find weaknesses and our embassies no matter how fortified we attempt to make them will always have a soft spot without the cooperation of foreign governments to protect the outer perimeters.  If such protection existed in places like Egypt, our embassy there would not have encountered such a threatening scenario as it did had Egyptian police responded and immediately attempted to disperse the crowds.


For instance, the 2008 attempted attack on the U.S. Consulate is an example of how the system should work.  When the attackers approached the compound, Turkish police immediately returned fire killing all three.  Three police officers were killed and one injured during the attempted attack but those officers did their jobs to do what is Turkey's responsibility - insuring that the threat did not make it inside the Consulate's walls.


This situation should ask the real question, and this is not the issue that most seem to make out about the attack in Benghazi.  That rocket was fired from outside the compound on Libyan soil.  The real question we should be asking is how did protesters encounter almost no resistance in storming our embassy in Egypt?  What does this signal as to how safe our facility is if police are either ordered to not intervene or allow such a threat to continue?  Had the groups outside been armed, it would have been exactly like August 7, 1998 when two U.S. installations in Africa were attacked.  However, those attacks were truck bombs blending into traffic and not part of a targeted assault from a mob.  It is incomprehensible to me how Egyptian police could have let people scale our walls, climb our building and yet they seemed to have done nothing to disperse the crowd outside.


It is my belief that the protests were an attempt by either Al-Qaida itself or pro-Qaida groups to utilize unarmed people and provoke a U.S. response once the embassy's territory was breached that would result in what would undoubtedly be labeled a massacre of unarmed martyrs - an undeniable win for Qaida recruiting.  However, I believe that the Libyan attack was the work of AQIM in what either was a concerted effort with regional partners and minimal AQ Central involvement.  This means I do not believe that the leaders of AQ were involved in the details of any of these incidents.  I believe what you are seeing is Al-Qaida's involvement in taking its fights rather from a global jihad, or "glocal terrorism" which mixes local and global, traditional and imported practices, as well as high and low technologies.  The pioneer for this template is Hizbullah, considered the A-team in terrorism by experts.


Despite the opening in 2008 of Africom, the Central command for U.S. operations in Africa, the continent houses what has always been a vulnerable host for terrorism.  Recruiting, financing, laundering, whatever criminal operations that need to take place to promote jihadism all comes from this continent.  Iran and Hizbullah have massive networks in the country, as well as Al-Qaida's previous involvement in the Blood Diamond trade that was journaled in Doug Farah's book "Blood from Stones".  The political instability and lawlessness that comes with it, as well as the Muslim population, make Africa a prime host for the jihad envisioned by Al-Qaida.  Undoubtedly, breaking this mold is something that requires international cooperation and partnerships that will require years to even attempt to tap into and reverse the networks which have been rooted for decades now.  It is my hope that both presidential candidates will take the threats emerging in Africa seriously, as well as AQAP (Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula) in Yemen and recognize the development of the glocal trend.  

9/11: Al-Qaida's re-emergence in the Arab Spring

Eleven years ago, we all witnessed the tragedy that would define generations - landmarks of American economic and military power reduced to rubble, smoking from canyons of steel and collapsing on people who were our neighbors, friends and family.  Without a doubt, 9/11 changed American policy and created what many have declared "a war that can't be won", what was once a global war on terror structured around disrupting terrorism at its roots before it could hit U.S. targets again.  This aggressive campaign led to military posturing in areas where Al-Qaida (AQ) and its sympathizers operated with a new African command being built for U.S. operations on the continent as well as enhanced cooperation by Middle Eastern intelligence agencies.  The understanding was that terrorism was a global threat, that reduced regional stability wherever it was harbored.  

Partnerships emerged with intelligence offices in unlikely partners, Egypt and Jordan among them, increasing coordination and intelligence sharing.  It seemed as though terrorism was being disrupted in virtually every hemisphere and most assuredly, significant accomplishments were achieved with credit to be shared with these offices.  Under the present administration, the intensity of this war has continued and we have seen the campaign shift from manpower to technology with a heavy drone usage.  As Peter Bergen has written, it appears the drone is President Obama's weapon of choice, with more strikes occurring in Obama's first four years than his predecessor's two terms.  The group's leadership has been decimated, decapitated and is struggling.  However, I think we are beginning to see the new brand of AQ emerge.

Today, on this significant anniversary, in lieu of a terrorist attack we saw the U.S. embassy in Cairo and in Benghazi fall under attack by scores of "peaceful protesters."  A State Department employee appears to have been killed during the incident in Benghazi.  These two incidents seem to piggyback off of the Arab Spring uprisings, which were backed by the U.S. in both countries to overthrow both Qaddafi and Mubarak.  Simply put, AQ could have pulled off the same scale attacks it orchestrated in 1998 today, yet it would have been extremely selfish and yielded hardly any results to its cause.  Any excuse for a U.S. escalation, amidst a withdrawal in Iraq and Afghanistan, would backfire on not only AQ, but those who took to the streets to make these revolutions occur.  AQ would be the bad guy again in the Arab world.  By becoming mainstream and blending in with anti-U.S. protests, it identifies the up and coming radical sentiments in the youths that it can train a new mujahideen to replace its fallen ranks.  

The brand that makes up AQ is one that is merely in name at present, affected by the persistent U.S. campaign targeting its leadership and disrupting its fundraising and recruiting networks.  It has outsourced the terrorism to its franchises in Yemen (AQAP) and Africa (AQIM), leaving AQ central to tap into the opportune Arab Spring revolutions.  It is no coincidence that U.S. diplomatic sites were attacked in countries that the U.S. helped fuel the tide by removing support for the previous regimes.  The question is how does the U.S. respond to this escalation?

By failing to address the problems, we risk increased violence as AQ becomes a fixture in these movements.  By seemingly avoiding violence, it appears to become part of the Arab world without facing the problem of blowing up innocent civilians and losing support for killing more Muslims than Americans amongst its attacks like it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By blending in to the Arab Spring, the protests become indicative of a new strategy that takes to the cities, directly to streets rather than reclusive training camps isolated in vulnerable havens to a drone strategy.  AQ blends in amongst the youths, capable of exploiting them and instilling the anti-U.S. sentiment that first filled its ranks.  Simply put, we are seeing Al-Qaida adapt from a terrorist group to an ideology.  The risk with such an evolution puts at risk everything we have accomplished as it encourages the potential for lone-wolf or independent operations that require domestic surveillance as compared to merely looking for those people who travel to Pakistan every year.  

Make no mistake, despite what administration officials say, Al-Qaida is a component of the enemy we face but a defeat of AQ is not indicative that we are any safer.  With the group successfully transforming in the direction that Ayman al-Zawahiri seems to be steering it in, recruiting will be significantly easier.  This is a certain way to build up the ranks again, rally the troops and gain the momentum it lost after 9/11 in the Arab world.  Without responding, the U.S. opens doors for attacks on its sites abroad that will most certainly have greater bloodshed than today's incidents.  As we pause to remember the victims from those tragic events eleven years ago, let us commit that terrorism is a tactic that will not prevail or deter us from the freedoms we enjoy and the resilient spirit that our country shares.  

Iran's toughening stance and the Arab Spring conflict

With news forthcoming regarding a plot to murder Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Adel Al-Jubeir, it is clear as is to be expected that the Iranians continue to be up to no good. Perhaps, this plot best summarizes the state of the Middle East post-Arab Spring revolutions - a region conflicted by the interests of Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shia Iran. This power struggle by the two dominant powers of the region has taken form in various battles, mainly via subversive strategic episodes utilizing proxies. As the U.S. makes its case against the two Qods force linked operatives, it appears that Iran should indeed have a lot of explaining to do.

What is particularly significant in this case is the direct link between Manssor Arbabsiar and a DEA confidential informant (CI). Arbabsiar had been led to the CI because of his suspected narcotics trafficking contacts, which Gholam Shakuri advised utilizing because "people in that business are willing to undertake criminal activity in exchange for money." Douglas Farah and several others have written extensively on the risks of abandoning the War on Drugs faces when the various criminal enterprises collide with terrorist groups. Groups like Hezbollah and the Taliban have extensively utilized them as a method for fundraising and contract operations such as this one and keep their hands clean.

I believe the record speaks for itself, since 9/11 the U.S. has created and used an extensive network of CI's who have fortunately been helpful in providing information regarding plots both here and abroad. It is these individuals who help in making a case and disrupting plots like this.

However, there are a lot of questions that most assuredly are going through U.S. policymakers minds as well as within the Saudi circles. Iran's last linked attacks against a state were the bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, as well as a Jewish center in 1994 in the same city. Reports suggest that the recently disrupted plots indicated a renewed interest in striking the exact same city, which suggests a vast network by Qods force intermediaries in the Latin American region. Given the recent threats by Iran to deploy its navy along the U.S. Eastern seaboard, as well as this plot to for the first time conduct an operation against a U.S. ally on our soil, Iran is continuing to take an aggressive posturing that should be investigated.

The internal struggle in Iran is pressing for lame-duck President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now a political outcast by Ayatollah Khomenei for defying him in the appointment of the country's intelligence minister, Ahmadinejad is a lightweight for the country's affairs. That should be the scary part, is the theocracy now controls everything down to foreign affairs. Take into consideration that this theocracy calls for the end times and the coming of the Mahdi which they are supposed to govern in order to bring this momentous occasion about. This is a very dangerous concoction of delusional, religious dictators who see themselves in direct conflict with the West and now appear to be fixing to take a much more outward approach in reforming the globe and their region.

The U.S. should stand strictly by Saudi Arabia in this instance, and given the direct action of war this plot would have created if it had been successful, the strict interest of the world should be securing Iran's unchecked nuclear program and arsenal. As facts emerge as to how high up the totem pole this plot reached within Iran's government (which undoubtedly it would not be surprising for it to reach the upper echelons inside Qods Force, IRGC, and the Supreme Council on Natl. Security), it is necessary to keep the leadership of the country within confines and urge the Arab Spring revolutions to rise again inside this country. Iran's leadership can not be trusted and needs to be closely monitored. Undoubtedly, this incident has the Israelis and the Saudis doing just that.

Mumbai in London? Assessing AQ target selection

Al-Qaida is making its push to remain relevant, and news reports today suggest that the group was seeking to conduct an operation similar to the attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. The success of that operation, which killed 166 people and made the crowded city almost paralyzed in fear, clearly had an impact on Al-Qaida's leadership which is now battling a constant jihad for its own relevancy.


The 9/11 terror attacks were the most effective form of terrorism contrived by any group. The reality that our transportation system could be penetrated and literally hijacked against us as a missile shocked the entire world. However, the ability to conduct such a plot remains extremely difficult currently. Despite vulnerabilities remaining in the aviation industry, so much effort and time has been put into insuring that a hijacked plane will not occur or be used again in the same form.


However, the vulnerability of soft targets remains. Al-Qaida knows that it is not capable of another 9/11, placing casualties in the thousands is a difficult feat without CBRN weapons. However, the ability to conduct operations similar to those used in Madrid, London, Mumbai, and in Moscow since 9/11 remains a legitimate concern. In my opinion, the ability to produce any chemical or biological agents is a feat that is difficult now that U.S. airstrikes are conducted routinely in regions that house Al-Qaida experts.


This latest piece of news suggesting that the siege/assault tactics used in Mumbai would be utilized again should be of no surprise. For those two days, the news was controlled by the standoff that developed following the takeover by Lashkar-e-Taiba gunmen. Mumbai was shut down. The inadequacy and the outdated tactics of Indian anti-terror police contributed significantly to the success, but could such an operation be conducted in a Western metropolitan city like London.


Al-Qaida promoted Mohamad Ilyas Kashmiri, the mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, as its operations chief. With experience fighting in the mujahideen against the Soviets in Afghanistan as well as being a former member of Pakistan's military, serving in special operations, Kashmiri brings a unique perspective encouraging direct assault and engagement. In 2009, Kashmiri said that he believed that more Mumbais would emerge,

"..I am not a traditional jihadi cleric who is involved in sloganeering. As a military commander, I would say every target has a specific time and reasons, and the responses will be forthcoming accordingly."

My concern rests in the fact that soft target defense is extremely inadequate. Most people here in the U.S. do not recall Beslan, where 777 schoolchildren were taken hostage at a school. 300 people were killed, many of them children. Law enforcement here has never had to engage in such a situation, but if it were to happen are we ready? Kashmiri has made it clear he plans on bringing military expertise, separating himself from the ideological concerns of previous Al-Qaida leadership. He is a formidable foe, making Khalid Sheikh Mohammed seem amateur in his experience. It is without a doubt that Kashmiri will seek to find a vulnerability and utilize it to his gain. The question is where and when he will emerge and demonstrate his capabilities.

Pakistan's dilemma

Yesterday's bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, could not have come at a worse time for Pakistan. The Afghans were uncomfortably quick to point the finger at militants from across the Afghan-Pakistan border, even going so far as to accuse elements of Pakistani intelligence-the ISI. Considering just statements last week, PM Gilani may suffer the demise of a new hope at the expense of an old threat.

Just look at what an Indian general said just days before the blast. On July 3, Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor said that he believed that 48% of militants in Kashmir were foreigners. Couple that statement with his assessment that said Pakistan's biggest challenge is "moderating its radical sections" and it sends a pretty clear message that India is aware and concerned of Pakistan's terrorist elements. All of that was just four days before India would lose key figures to the blast that would kill 40.

India's public recognition of Pakistan's militant activity came around the same time as the first admission by a Pakistani official of terrorist training camps existing in the country. Benazir Bhutto's widow, Asif Ali Zardari, for the first time stated that there were training camps that may have been responsible for his wife's assassination. Nothing new, but the forum which he choose to make the comments might not assist the situation. His words were spoken at a summit entitled "India & Pakistan-Designing a Future." He chose to specify that terrorism inside Pakistan's borders posed a threat to a peaceful resolution between the two countries, which the summit was to advance. The summit that may have promoted a peaceful cooperation between the two nations only had a week and a half to help.

In summary, Pakistan may be dooming itself as a result of its peace talks with militants. The only people that are seeing a result (and a very weak one, at that) are the Pakistanis. Has the violence in Pakistan even decreased? Consider that the capital is on an almost weekly basis raised to "high alert." Remember that Islamabad was attacked on Sunday on the anniversary of the Red Mosque incident last year and Karachi was rocked by multiple explosions the very next day. The problem with the Gilani administration is that it's domestic policies have no impact on foreign policy issues. As Afghanistan threatened military troops into the tribal areas last month, Pakistan may want to assess India's possible responses if there is any ISI connection to yesterday's blast.

The threat to Indian targets is probably not over. As I wrote on my post on July 3 (see Pakistan a key ally in the War on Terror?, see reason #5), Al-Qaida's provoking of a Pakistan-India conflict would be a winning situation for the group. It would detract Pakistan's military forces (which were built up primarily for an Indian conflict), allowing the group to act inside the country with little to no resistance. Through this, Al-Qaida would be capable of dictating the domestic situation of Pakistan through attacks. In short, Al-Qaida might be taking the reins for Pakistan's lack of a foreign policy. It's up to PM Gilani, should he decide to cooperate with Musharraf rather than isolate him.