NSA Surveillance and the decline of the War on Terror

Without a doubt we are seeing the Global War on Terror decreasing overseas, and in many ways at home as well.  As President Obama attempted to calm the storm by calling for greater transparency and opening up aspects of surveillance techniques to public debate, many Americans still fear that we are living in an Orwellian novel of 1984.  The reality simply is that such a move would counter and defeat the premise of surveillance at its most basic level - that good surveillance should go unnoticed until it demands a response by the entity conducting it.  Basically, until there is actionable and operational intelligence, surveillance is a tool to aid in building  enough information to prosecute a case.  Much of the hyped up cases discussed by the media are framed by a bunch of "what ifs" that simply have no backing. 


The programs in question are not some randomly concocted fantasy by power-hungry tyrants in a cubicle.  Despite what liberals and conservatives think of our president, previous and present, the "big government" portrayals of both President Obama and his predecessor have no basis in this argument.  Neither one of them has been a federal agent, or an analyst, or may not even speak another language.  The men and women who fill these positions in our government have taken a sworn oath to protect and defend our country and Constitution.  With the exception of one, Edward Snowden, their work sits protected by a layer of oversight and personal accountability to protect all of the information that they collect and receive until such a case can be made to act on it. 


The NSA surveillance program is simply a means to an end.  That being said, no criminal case has ever been built off of such a technique.  This is similar to let's just say, license plate readers on local law enforcement vehicles or a polygraph.  These are tools that can trigger and help determine the path an officer takes in the merits of an investigation, but if taken to court with the data either one of those tools delivers, has absolutely no basis and will get laughed out of court.  A person can be driving a stolen vehicle, but if it's an old lady who bought it from a shady car dealer, she can't go to jail.  You can pass a polygraph but still be guilty of a crime in question.  Unless there is evidence for the crime in question though, there is no case. 


Government surveillance is in place for a reason.  It works.  There have been no known instances where anyone has complained that the government has collected too much information and gone on a dumbfounded witch-hunt.  Is that because the programs our so secretive?  Or is it because the government has properly separated actionable and useful intelligence amongst the millions of intercepts that are conducted annually?  In the coming weeks as we assess government's responsibility with personal information, it is my hope that the critics will have an open mind to understand how useful most, if not all the developed programs, have been in keeping the U.S. safe. 


Just a side note, our enemy is constantly developing strategies to bypass having communications filtered through by the in question programs.  Take into consideration that the Mumbai attacks that occurred in November 2008 were planned by individuals who corresponded through a single e-mail account and would not send e-mails, but rather save them as a draft.  Through one user name and one password, the cell was able to communicate and avoid triggering a red flag in a means of communication that may have been monitored.  One must wonder with the information Edward Snowden revealed, how many people may die in a future attack due to him revealing information.  Without a doubt, our enemies are presently, if not already revamping techniques to avoid detection. 

Iran's toughening stance and the Arab Spring conflict

With news forthcoming regarding a plot to murder Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. Adel Al-Jubeir, it is clear as is to be expected that the Iranians continue to be up to no good. Perhaps, this plot best summarizes the state of the Middle East post-Arab Spring revolutions - a region conflicted by the interests of Sunni Saudi Arabia and the Shia Iran. This power struggle by the two dominant powers of the region has taken form in various battles, mainly via subversive strategic episodes utilizing proxies. As the U.S. makes its case against the two Qods force linked operatives, it appears that Iran should indeed have a lot of explaining to do.

What is particularly significant in this case is the direct link between Manssor Arbabsiar and a DEA confidential informant (CI). Arbabsiar had been led to the CI because of his suspected narcotics trafficking contacts, which Gholam Shakuri advised utilizing because "people in that business are willing to undertake criminal activity in exchange for money." Douglas Farah and several others have written extensively on the risks of abandoning the War on Drugs faces when the various criminal enterprises collide with terrorist groups. Groups like Hezbollah and the Taliban have extensively utilized them as a method for fundraising and contract operations such as this one and keep their hands clean.

I believe the record speaks for itself, since 9/11 the U.S. has created and used an extensive network of CI's who have fortunately been helpful in providing information regarding plots both here and abroad. It is these individuals who help in making a case and disrupting plots like this.

However, there are a lot of questions that most assuredly are going through U.S. policymakers minds as well as within the Saudi circles. Iran's last linked attacks against a state were the bombings of the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992, as well as a Jewish center in 1994 in the same city. Reports suggest that the recently disrupted plots indicated a renewed interest in striking the exact same city, which suggests a vast network by Qods force intermediaries in the Latin American region. Given the recent threats by Iran to deploy its navy along the U.S. Eastern seaboard, as well as this plot to for the first time conduct an operation against a U.S. ally on our soil, Iran is continuing to take an aggressive posturing that should be investigated.

The internal struggle in Iran is pressing for lame-duck President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now a political outcast by Ayatollah Khomenei for defying him in the appointment of the country's intelligence minister, Ahmadinejad is a lightweight for the country's affairs. That should be the scary part, is the theocracy now controls everything down to foreign affairs. Take into consideration that this theocracy calls for the end times and the coming of the Mahdi which they are supposed to govern in order to bring this momentous occasion about. This is a very dangerous concoction of delusional, religious dictators who see themselves in direct conflict with the West and now appear to be fixing to take a much more outward approach in reforming the globe and their region.

The U.S. should stand strictly by Saudi Arabia in this instance, and given the direct action of war this plot would have created if it had been successful, the strict interest of the world should be securing Iran's unchecked nuclear program and arsenal. As facts emerge as to how high up the totem pole this plot reached within Iran's government (which undoubtedly it would not be surprising for it to reach the upper echelons inside Qods Force, IRGC, and the Supreme Council on Natl. Security), it is necessary to keep the leadership of the country within confines and urge the Arab Spring revolutions to rise again inside this country. Iran's leadership can not be trusted and needs to be closely monitored. Undoubtedly, this incident has the Israelis and the Saudis doing just that.

Deaths of senior AQ leaders reported; where are we in the GWoT?

News broke yesterday morning stating that several AQAP leaders, including two U.S. citizens, had been killed in a Predator strike. Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were reported among the dead in a statement by Yemen's Defense Ministry. Also reported to have been killed was AQAP's top bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri, in a separate strike. These successes, if indeed fact, prove that the use of drones as assets in the GWoT are virtually invaluable in eliminating high-value targets. With the intensity of this tactic under President Obama, it appears that there is no hint of attempting to slow down anytime soon.

According to the Washington Post, the CIA is in the process of constructing four drone airstrip bases intended to strike AQ affiliates inside Yemen and Somalia. The enhancement of such a program should be welcomed by many, allowing the U.S. to fight this new-age war with new-age technology that does not risk our soldiers lives.

However, with such an intensity and fury coming from drones to target the leadership in faraway places, there is an underlying question. What is really being done here at home to enhance the U.S. in this War on Terror? When President Obama took office, critics questioned if he had the determination and ability to conduct a war. It appears that indeed he has skillfully handled the GWoT in regards to specifics, but like his predecessors, is unwilling to come to a full on confrontation with the pandemic of radicalism.

The real question is legally, are we enhancing our fight and clearly defining the legal abilities of law enforcement in confronting this war? I do not feel as though the outreach mission to incorporate the Muslim community has succeeded and quite honestly, has returned to the pre-9/11 days. Between the media and politicians, we have made this a war about names - similar to the Communist threat from nation states like the USSR. However, this is a war of ideals that has no boundaries or structural organization. Dare I say without OBL's pre-9/11 corporate structuring, Al-Qaeda as a whole will splinter off into the independent franchises based in the Northern Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and Kashmir/Pakistan.

Pakistan will always play host to a radical faction of jihadists, given its dispute with India, the alliances published most recently regarding the U.S. embassy strike in Kabul will always be an asset to the ISI. Inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. strategy is seen at odds with the tribal structuring and has done little to incorporate and facilitate a partnership. While most definitely easier said than done, a comprehensive approach to turn the dependence on Taliban and AQ, especially inside Pakistan, would drastically change the dynamics of this conflict that is about winning hearts and minds.

The fact of the matter is we can take out as many leaders as we want, but there will always be this radical jihadist element that will pose the primary national security threat to the U.S. Over the duration of the War on Terror, several major blows to terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Russia have been facilitated largely by U.S. cooperation in nearly almost every circumstance. We are taking this war to the terrorists doorsteps in, as Pres. George W. Bush stated was necessary so we would not have to fight them on our own streets as we felt on 9/11. While killing off bad guys is easy, defining the legal challenges and alliances in this war is where the real struggle lies.

The Arab Spring and the potential to be on the wrong side of history...again

As President Obama continues to push for the "democracies" emerging in Egypt and Tunisia, the question emerging is how much can we trust that the youths on the streets really know the answer to the question everyone seems to be asking once the established government leaders are unseated: "What now?" The fact remains, when the U.S. pulled its support for President Mubarak, shock waves echoed in the halls of the palaces of other U.S. regional partners who suddenly realized that the U.S. could and would redact its support in a heartbeat to accommodate a vision for the region, even at the expense of an uncertain future and potential anarchy.

This movement may have honest beginnings, it may be the legitimate outcry from suffering populations who have reached the breaking point and making Tahrir Square into the next Tiananman Square. However, without careful oversight, the potential for evil forces engaged in jihad and partnered with the global vision for an Islamic Caliphate. Many people have it wrong when using the term jihad, labeling it as solely a blood and guts war against society. There are three variants to jihad, all focusing on different components. Jihad is the term for "struggle," which can indeed relate to citizen/government relations, or a person's internal conflict. Either way, the ultimate goal in jihad is to construct a resilient Islamic mentality in either a Muslim, or society.

With jihad taking form against the Mubarak administration, time will tell how long it will after the elections for the new administration to establish its policies on the Christians that make up Egypt's minority. Mubarak took a great deal of pressure from Muslims worldwide for his acceptance of Christianity inside the country, refusing to bow to calls to establish a Muslim state. Now, with his protection out the window, the potential for sectarian violence (just like in Lebanon with Hizbullah forces in 2008) is on the rise. Just last week, in Cairo Christian-Muslim clashes killed 11 and injured 150.

It was for this very reason that the al-Qiddissin church in Alexandria was targeted in a brutal attack on New Year's Eve. In the weeks following the Mubarak administration rounded up over 50 terrorists suspected of being linked to the plot. Al-Qaida in Iraq had issued a warning that December suggesting the targeting of churches throughout the region, however it was not deemed to be responsible for the plot and it was pinned on the Palestinian Islamic Army.

In a unique twist, the new anti-Mubarak administration opened an investigation implicating the Interior Ministry in a plot to exacerbate sectarian tensions in the country and implicate Al-Qaida militants in a bid to receive increased aid from the U.S. Proclamation 1450 saw an internal affairs investigation that was one of many to follow as President Hosni Mubarak was forced from office. Who stands to gain from the coup that took place? It has been clear, most recently in Lebanon in 2008, that militant groups seeking government legitimacy play a significant role in these movements. Hizbullah was able to topple any internal resistance from within Lebanon, and force a government takeover, while appearing "democratic" in its manipulations. Who ultimately stood to gain from a Hizbullah-led Lebanon? Ask the Israelis and it will be a strong answer of Iran.

Now, as Bashar Assad faces the same domestic revolts that have undermined the governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, where is the global response? Rather than pointing all our resources at Qaddafi, the real ploy should be to aggressively aid the Syrian resistance and mandate Assad cease civilian attacks (essentially the same thing we did in Libya, but with more tact). In Syria, we can win a war with the Syrian people's cooperation, and win back our reputation in the region as a protector of human rights and democratic values. At the same time, to topple Assad would change the tables in Lebanon and possibly put the favor back in the hands of the elected officials that swiftly lost any government input at the hands of Hizbullah's 2008 civil war. We could free Lebanon and Syria at the same time, and make things extremely difficult for Assad's closest partner - Tehran.

For the most part, Tehran has sat silent. Now as the situation in Syria begins to make some recognition in the media, it is being forced to respond at a very embarrassing time for the country. The role of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been relegated to completely internal closed door meetings with Ayatollah Khomenei following a dispute over his dismissal of the Khomenei associate, Intelligence Director Heidar Moslehi. Ahmadinejad fired Moslehi on 4/17, then according to MEMRI, was forced to reinstate him under direct orders from Khomenei. For the week following, the usually outspoken and hate mongering Ahmadinejad was confined to his house as the regime leaders dictated the potential wrath for disobeying the Ayatollah.

As Iran's president is carefully monitored to insure he remains the puppet for Khomenei, now is the U.S. opportunity to shake up the region. However, we seem to be only imagining ways to sanction Assad and try and punish him utilizing tactics that are meant to bribe and attract someone to the bargaining table, not as a punishment. Sanctions, just like with Iran's nuclear program, should not be the only measure we take against someone who has so violently abused the power of the presidency. Assad's calculated pullback and then successful monitoring of Lebanon from just outside the mandated area has effectively rendered Lebanon and its Hizbullah-led government as Iran's proxy next door to Israel. With this lingering, how long will it take before the region erupts and we see the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict again? The only difference this time is we can have the support of Saudi Arabia and other anti-Iranian countries who will, as in times previous, arm Israel to confront the trouble.

Regarding Future U.S.-Pakistani Relations Post-bin Laden

As the joy of the demise of Osama bin Laden continues to be heard throughout the world, it is without a doubt a bittersweet victory in Pakistan for the administration of President Zardari and his Interior Minister Rehman Malik. Ironically, OBL joins the ranks of the AQ senior leaders who just so happened to find refuge within throwing distance of Pakistani military and intelligence bases (like KSM being captured in 2003 in Rawalpindi, host to Pakistan's army HQ). Now the real question finally gets asked of our "partner" in the war on terror how much they really knew about this compound.


Without a doubt, Pakistan walks away from this U.S. victory bathed in egg all over its face. The message it sends, especially after my favorite man in Pakistan - the always amusing Interior Minister Rehman Malik, adamantly denied for years that bin Laden could never be in his country and U.S. intelligence was flat out wrong. Perhaps this quote from Foreign Policy best represents the truth of the situation of this man's position and his ability to conduct his duties as Interior Minister.

"With great passion last year, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "I categorically deny the presence of Osama bin Laden, his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri, and even Mullah Omar in any part of Pakistan."
Now, with the capture of bin Laden in Pakistan -- only 40 miles from Malik's office - it's more difficult than ever to consider his statements, and those of his civil and military counterparts, credible. Since 9/11, Pakistan's leaders have been lying to the United States, neighboring countries, their own people, and even to one another about fundamental elements of the war on terror."

It looks like after this operation, Pakistan is either at best incompetent at gathering intelligence directly outside of its own capital (heaven help it with intel in the provinces), or just flat out complicit in refuging senior Qaida leadership. Whether the Taliban is included in that statement is unknown, but seeing as Pakistan created them, there is no reason why they would not be offered the same amenity.


Minister Malik has repeatedly denounced U.S. drone strikes inside Pakistan, vowing that the WoT is in Pakistan's best interest and that OBL was responsible for more Pakistani killings than Americans. This logic was repeatedly used to justify how come Pakistan had taken no action on OBL, essentially stating that if they knew where he was they most assuredly would go after him and wanted a stake at the AQ leader before the U.S.. Not so fast.


This quote, taken from the Long War Journal, clearly shows that at least one Pakistani official has gone on the record saying that it was aware of the compound, was monitoring it, and the kicker: "IT KNEW WHERE HE WAS."

"A Pakistani official's statements on the raid make it clear that Pakistan knew where bin Laden was, but did not act. In an interview with CNN, Wajid Hasan, Pakistan's high commissioner to the Untied Kingdom, actually said that Pakistan was "monitoring" bin Laden's location but the US beat Pakistan to the punch and launched the raid.
"We were monitoring him and the Americans were monitoring him," Hasan said. "But the Americans got to knowing where he was first and that is why they struck at him precisely."
Later in the interview, Hasan said that "Pakistan had been keeping certain areas monitored, and it knew where he was."


The fact that this compound was constructed relatively recently, the design included several obvious security features, and the low amount of individuals coming and going should have almost definitively raised an eyebrow for local forces inside the country. In all fairness, I would presume that OBL had this as one of several secure options spread throughout the country should he be required to travel, and that he did not take residence in this type of environment until possibly 2008-09. We may never know how long the world's most wanted terrorist resided here, but that he was able to infiltrate the urban cities of Pakistan clearly shows a huge lapse in Pakistan's defense in its most vital areas.


However, now that OBL is off the list, I would expect the Pakistani leadership to become increasingly hostile and defensive to any scrutiny regarding its military and ISI complacency with the jihadist figures. It is highly probable that President Zardari did not know anything about OBL's abode outside the capital, but someone most definitely did and it was probably ISI. The two branches, separated from the presidency, have always been first and foremost focused on having options available against India. The Taliban and bin Laden's mujahideen represented this opportunity before, and most assuredly to this day remain a viable option that Pakistan's military would like to hide in the closet until they must bring them out.


In summary, Pakistan will no longer see the U.S. War on Terror as a legitimate fight within its boundaries. Expect cooperation to stall as President Zardari's advisers push for the War on Terror inside Pakistan to occur only by Pakistani troops and assets without any U.S. drones being authorized. The U.S. complained long enough that it couldn't get across to where OBL was, but we finally did taking it directly to his doorstep. Pakistan did not care then, and now has to recover from the disgrace and scrutiny of the international community. Rehman Malik has a lot of explaining to do, he might want to actually start reading intelligence reports before making claims that the U.S. is going after ghosts inside his country. We found the biggest fish so far, who knows what else is lurking right outside his door.

A lose-lose situation in Libya

At the National Defense University tonight, President Obama addressed lawmakers, military commanders and the American public to support his decision to encourage the uprising in Libya. While listening, it became increasingly clear that we have learned nothing about the dangers we face when jumping into a conflict and picking sides. This is an executive decision that is merely built on the principle of overthrowing Gaddafi from power with no planning once that mission is accomplished. The simplicity of global affairs in this White House, as well as among the international community, seems to forget about the about-face made by the mujahideen we supported in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Our steadfast support for a cause has put us on a side that can, and most assuredly will, place the region and the Muslim world into a state of relentless chaos.

In 2003, it was the Bush doctrine that motivated Gaddafi's abandonment of a nuclear program which ushered in hopes for a new beginning of U.S.-Libyan relations. For the first time in nearly 40 years, it was President Obama who was the first U.S. president to meet with Gaddafi at the G8 in Italy of 2009, where Gaddafi was the African Union's representative. The picture above documented the meeting between the two leaders.

Without a doubt, when Gaddafi turned guns on protesters the international community should have been quick to act and it has successfully frozen an estimated $30 billion in Libyan assets. There are clear alternatives to force Gaddafi's hand without utilizing the U.S. military in a country where there is no apparent mission. The end goal is clear, a Libya without Gaddafi, but how that is achieved is something the international community is unwilling to support. However, with leaders like Secretary of State Clinton meeting with Libyan resistance, it appears as though we are drawing up plans like kindergartners on paper depicting our fantasies but not having any accomplishment to further this objective.

One thing remains increasingly clear, the risk of holding a maniac like Gaddafi in power are great. His history of using terrorism to retaliate in the Lockerbie bombing is deeply disturbing, and proves that if Gaddafi leaves, it is imperative to remove him from society or he will hold a vengeance.

However, despite the scenarios of where Gaddafi can go and what Libya will look like, the Obama fantasy for a new government led by ? (Who really knows?) completely turns a blind eye to all the atrocities in the region from regimes that have far worse agendas, tactics, and human rights records. Take Syria. The Assad family has held power for 45 years, and President Bashar Assad is notorious for the state he has created. However, from day one President Obama has made it a priority through backdoor channels to mediate with Syria and gradually relax U.S. sanctions and policies in hopes of enticing Bashar to a pro-Western thought. In March 2009, the story leading from the White House was that at the same G8 summit where Obama met with Gaddafi, there was a strong possibility for him to meet with President Assad.

Amongst the killings of protestors in Syria, the same egregious crimes Gaddafi ordered, the U.S. stood silent. Amidst the uprisings in Lebanon where Christians and Hezbollah battled for power, the U.S. stood on the sidelines and watched a terrorist group seize a country. As Ahmadinejad and the Ayatollah utilized the Basij to quell their resistance, Obama stated that we would recognize Ahmadinejad as Iran's President. Foreign policy calls for that, a policy. This administration's aspirations put Libya in a dangerous power struggle that leads opportunity for jihadist forces to move in.

Bin Laden's battle for relevance

This weekend saw the emergence of Al-Qaida figurehead Osama bin Laden and the continued redefinition of Al-Qaida's jihad against the U.S. amid reports of a growing threat faced in Europe. The normally reclusive leader, who releases a handful of audio tapes usually annually, released two tapes this weekend in a ploy to rally support among Muslims. The consecutive releases of tapes raise several concerns, specifically with the recent revelation that OBL was connected to the recent plot thwarted in Europe.


Al-Qaida's resources are dwindling, and the necessities to implement a large-scale plot like 9/11 does not exist. However, the ability to take individuals (such as Faisal Shahzad and Najibullah Zazi) who actively pursue training abroad and then commit to executing terrorist attacks remains the most relevant and difficult threat to counter. The operational war against terrorism is the easiest fight, but the ideological aspect remains difficult to address by law enforcement and intelligence agencies.


Bin Laden's latest tapes went back to an issue released in a recording from January this year - climate change. This issue perhaps gained insertion due to the floods that devastated Pakistan a couple months ago. Bin Laden faulted Arab governments, lending credit to the UN for its response and accusing the regimes around the Middle East for closing their eyes to the suffering. The plight of the Palestinian people is no longer an opportunity for recruitment apparently, as the focus has shifted and the tapes no longer mention the continued stalemate among Israel and the Palestinians. Instead, bin Laden again makes a subtle cry for Muslims to avoid the U.S. economy (perhaps to attempt to gain more finances for his group's diminishing finances) and identifies the significance of each Muslim's role in his battle with the West.


This latest tape continues the normal message of blaming Arab governments for turning a blind eye to the suffering of Muslims. The reality is bin Laden is struggling in the battle to remain relevant. The surge Al-Qaida experienced as the superpower of jihadist groups for 9/11 has diminished, replaced by groups seeking to instigate the Palestinian-Israeli conflict even more. Hizbullah's global dominance and established assets present the clearest threat to Israel and its allies, however the group understands the necessity of maintaining a covert threat. Bin Laden has constantly lost the recruiting power he once held, with his franchises operating in other groups like AQIM, AQAP, and now al-Shabaab. Recruits now are forced to independently travel abroad, in hopes of being considered trustworthy by al-Qaida and Taliban contacts inside Pakistan. Otherwise, they must travel to Yemen or Somalia with the same goal, but the ability to recruit from within the U.S. solely relies on the individual's radical leanings.


OBL now must utilize whatever global development he can, playing the role of the Muslim father trying to protect his suffering Muslim brothers and sisters. However, Sheikh Nasrallah has continuously been considered in poll after poll among Muslim nations that he and his group take up the Muslim fight best. Hizbullah's recruiting has not dwindled, nor its assets, unlike bin Laden. The desperation for OBL to continue to pursue his fight against the U.S. has made the group seem almost uninterested in the Israeli-Palestinian saga that seems almost too easy to utilize if Al-Qaida was interested in establishing legitimacy among Muslims. The dependence on individual's willing to pursue suicide or creating bombs will be the only thing that carries on the jihad when Al-Qaida is no more, with or without bin Laden. It is only when this is adequately addressed by Muslim nations, as well as Western nations, that the struggle to confront terrorism and its roots can begin.

Fighting a war for the right reasons

Afghanistan is failing. As the U.S. has been in the country since 2001, there has been very little return or signs of progress, the fight still continues. The country is caught in a complicated crisis where leadership has failed. It's as though everyone has forgotten about how life was prior to the U.S. invasion that ousted the Taliban, where a barbaric state of ancient law killed those suspected of petty crimes. While the U.S. entered the country, President George W. Bush spoke of how in Afghanistan, we would seek to make it a beacon for the region where the Taliban would be removed and the country would be in the hands of the people. Here we are in 2010, where the empty promises have been lost in the political system.


President Hamid Karzai seems like the choice if there was one to select a leader, bearing substantial ties throughout his family's lineage to Afghanistan's politics. Karzai himself fled the country from Taliban rule, his wife was a doctor at Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan - making it safe to assume that at some point, he was aware and was a witness to the Afghanistan he liberated. However, the debate over Afghanistan's future could place the group he once fought in a position where not only would they be recognized, but would have a say in the government.


Not enough has been done to engage the Afghan population on the tribal level. The ability to create a strong, centralized national government is not remotely possible without the commitment and allegiance of all the tribes. This simply can not be done without promising these people deliverance from the subversive shadow governments set up by the Taliban in order to act as a replacement to the failed reform that Karzai once promised. Without offering an alternative, the options on the table for these tribes simply all point back to the Taliban.


What has come out of Karzai's rule has been a gradual evolution of a man who sought to bring about change, but has been burdened with a task that travels through complicated tribal ties to figures who have undermined his role. It is said that after last summer's election, where the international community suggested that the vote for Karzai was illegitimate, accusing the U.S. of "stealing his legitimacy." It seems as though the future of Afghanistan rests on one man's personal dilemma, is he willing to set aside his ego?


There is no doubt the Afghan military and police forces are incompetent and juvenile at best. The fledgling ranks are easily infiltrated and once again, burdened by complicated alliances. However, this is a situation made by Karzai's micromanagement of coalition forces inside his country. His criticism of coalition forces when civilians are caught in the crossfire directly undermines NATO support amongst the populations he is dependent on. If there was ever more of a time to allow action and reform, it is now. As we look to a situation that is becoming increasingly desperate, the opportunity is now for President Karzai to prove he is a capable and competent leader. It is not the U.S. undermining him, it is the very people he has held meetings with to propose their integration into the "new" Afghanistan - the Taliban.


The Taliban massacres of innocent civilians is something that can not be endorsed by the international community. Have we honestly reached a society where we will face outcry over "enhanced interrogations" but will ignore a system where a 7-year old boy was killed for alleged spying or women for adultery or pursuing an education? Those offenses were constantly denounced by the international community, but now they seem to be forgotten. The alternative in Afghanistan simply can not be with the Taliban holding any power, there is too much at stake.

The risk of making terrorism a criminal matter

We are a nation at war. The near bombing of Northwest 253 on Christmas day serves as a stark reminder that this is not some foreign conflict, but rather one that essentially contains many fronts that all arrive on our streets eventually. It is the men and women in law enforcement and the intelligence community that are tasked with a difficult duty of allowing no margin for error. As witnessed in the Christmas day incident, it took just one lapse in the system to jeopardize the lives of nearly 300 people aboard that plane.


We face an enemy that is by all standards, an anomaly. Without an Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida will still live on. Without Al-Qaida, the war against jihadists will still remain. There is no domino effect in this to eliminate the motivations of this enemy.


While the intelligence community is under scrutiny for its shortcomings with the Christmas day plot, there is a much greater vulnerability in our system that is inadequate at handling terrorism cases. With the Obama administration's move to put terrorists like Abdulmutallab or Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in American courtrooms, the natural pattern will be that they will end up in American jails eventually. This ultimately may benefit the spread of the jihadists and will most certainly place severe strains on the corrections system.


One does not need to look far to see the impacts of housing jihadists among general population prisons. In the UK, a study by the Quilliam Foundation found severe lapses inside jails that housed radical Islamists. Among those listed:

"Prominent pro Al-Qaida ideologues such as Abu Qatada have been able to smuggle messages out of prison to their supporters"

"In 2008 and 2009, two of the most prominent Arab jihadists imprisoned in the UK released pro-jihadist propaganda and fatwas from within Long Lartin prison"

"..a leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, produced written pro-jihadist tracts from within prison aiming to refute criticism of Al-Qaida, while Abu Qatada issued fatwas from within prison which legitimised jihadist attacks worldwide"


In 2006, Belmarsh jail in the UK was reportedly "taken over" by a Muslim gang called "The Muslim Boys." The group reportedly attacked those who failed to convert to Islam with everything from hot water to razor blades attached to brushes. Guards also fell victim to attacks during the group's weekly "religious meetings." At the services being held, guards sat idly by not understanding a word said by Al-Qaida members housed in the jail. There was significant concern that the group may have been capable of using such a time to discuss plots. One official stated,

"We can't even tape the service and get it translated because it is against human rights. It's frightening."

At a separate prison, Whitemoor, a similar report in May 2008 found almost identical concerns amongst staff who reported that the nearly 200 Muslim prisoners had become "more of a gang than a religious group." Both reports addressed fears that jihadists housed inside the facilities were actively recruiting members from within the prison population.


The simple fact is that prisons are made up of a diverse community that are all commonly linked by their criminality. The potential to exploit anger of a common criminal towards the American justice system by a jihadist remains. If these people enter back on the streets after being indoctrinated with a hatred for a government that put them in a jail and a belief that Islam calls for them to wage jihad on America, we are adding to the enemy rather than containing it. This is not a question of denying people rights, but rather doing what is best to stop the spread of radical Islam. By treating jihadists as separate militants and isolating them from a general population, we are eliminating their potential to breed more militants. Without containment the jobs of all those involved in the fight on terrorism expands even greater, allowing the potential for more Abdulmutallabs to slip through the cracks.

U.S. talking with the Taliban?

Afghanistan is fallen. The cleanup the U.S. and NATO has to do in there is immensely difficult at this point. With President Obama continuing to mull over his options, now months after General McChrystal issued his report, what are we doing about this situation? According to the Saudi al-Watan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenbarry, has been discussing a ceasefire with Taliban elements as high as Foreign Minister Ahmad Mutawakil. Based on the report, the U.S. is offering Taliban control of 5 provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Kunar, and Nuristan) in return for a halt in attacks on U.S. bases.


The U.S. embassy in Riyadh has denied the claims, but sources in Afghanistan are saying that somebody is most definitely talking to the Taliban. Who can make such a call? Given the Taliban's continued threats of "absolute defeat" against the U.S. and NATO, I would venture to say that it isn't the Americans who are negotiating. Karzai has tried time and time again to make offers to the Taliban, only to end up bringing his country into escalated violence. Remember the April 2008 attack in Kabul on the Afghan Independence Day Parade that caused dignitaries and Karzai himself to flee the celebrations? That came shortly after Karzai had denounced the U.S. and NATO presence for civilian casualties.


Afghanistan remains winnable, if we start treating this like a war. We are seeking to make this a post-war situation when we have not won yet. The NATO forces need to pursue the elements creating chaos without restraint and seek to bring stability to the environment. Afghans have no confidence in their government, and just as the cartels that operated in Latin America or the gangs that operated in Chicago in the 1930s, the Taliban have risen as a parallel to a failed government. Negotiating with someone who is willing to recklessly target civilian lives simply because they do not adhere to Islam will be a failure. By allowing the possibility of the Taliban to operate in 5 provinces, or nearly 25% of the country, we only lend credibility to them and turn a blind eye to their acceptance of violence. That is just a reckless strategy.

Feds investigate Denver man in most recent terror probe

It's been one week since news reports began to circulate around a series of terror raids in Queens, New York. Details surrounding the investigation seem to be rather tight-lipped and the tone of the officials willing to discuss the case suggest that this plot was hot and the members were active. The level of the plot has been paralleled to that of another 9/11, but the intended target remains unknown to the general public. Security has been beefed up at airports and transit hubs surrounding New York.


The investigation is centered on Najibullah Zazi, a 25 year-old male reportedly of Afghan descent. Many terror officials are intrigued by the use of an Afghan as opposed to the preference of Arabs, Pakistanis, and Africans by Al-Qaida. More than a dozen individuals have been linked to this cell and are being monitored by authorities.


As the news reports come out, it is difficult to determine who decided that now was the necessary time to intervene. While this was reportedly a FBI investigation, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly is believed to have pressed for the raid after Zazi's weekend visit to Queens. It is interesting to note that terror investigations have evolved a long way since pre-9/11, when the feds rushed to accuse a suspect rather than use them as a means of obtaining information. The level of surveillance on Zazi most undoubtedly developed a substantial amount of good information on the network and could pay off if the plot was disrupted.

TTP leader Mehsud killed in airstrike

As news comes out of Pakistan that Baitullah Mehsud is believed to be among the casualties of Wednesday's air strike in Waziristan, many analysts are no doubt looking at what is next for Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There is no doubt that Baitullah wore the title of Taliban commander well, becoming the government's most fierce competition, but will his death yield any actual results in what Pakistan's struggle against militants?


When Baitullah first emerged, he brought a new face to the militancy that he inherited. Opting to be in the shadows, he stayed away from cameras and chose to live a life centered around a fear that he would be found. His paranoia was evidenced by his routine - traveling in convoys, sleeping in different locations every night. His predecessor had become a victim of too much media attention and it appeared Baitullah had taken note. However, shortly after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, he evolved into a militant who sought to go after the Pakistani government and create chaos.


The question stands does the death of Baitullah accomplish anything in both Pakistan's war on terror and the global war. In all likelihood, the violence in the country will remain and the attempts to destabilize the government will remain persistent. As Baitullah rose in status as Pakistan's key militant, he alienated a great deal of his commanders who became his competition. The one thing that Baitullah had going for him in the tribal region was his pledge that he gave to residents that he would protect them from foreign fighters - including Pakistan's military. Baitullah was a strong fighter for the independence of those regions, seeking to keep the military and government from interfering.


It is highly possible that as the TTP names Baitullah's successor, that it will seek to establish itself as a powerful force that is unified in its beliefs. The schism that was created by Baitullah can be healed by the regathering of the group and by no means is the TTP in a struggle to survive. Baitullah was an extremely capable leader who had a great deal of resources at his disposal. In a recent editorial, the capabilities of the TTP are reflected upon, giving credit to how the resistance has maintained its struggle:

"According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion (around $48 million US) to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and "protection money" in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory."

The death of Baitullah does not mean a shift in the Taliban's tactics. The Taliban have a momentum and an agenda, which means that the TTP is still one of the most potentially damaging networks to the region. With its ties and resources, the new leader of the group has an endless flow of ability to fight jihad without making the same errors that may have led to his predecessor's death. The Taliban can not be defeated by air strikes alone, but rather attacking the very things that sustain it. There is a desperate need for the government to establish itself as capable of protecting its people, not negotiating useless ceasefires with militants who have the upper hand. The government will have to pursue the very things that finance the groups - including logging and mining. These, along with extensive ties to the drug trade, helped make up the nearly $48 million that the TTP earned. Only by the government conducting an offensive on all levels, not just using foot soldiers, will it win any real successes against its enemies.


For now, there is the success of eliminating a man who had countless amounts of blood on his hands. However, at the end of the day terrorism does not start or end with just one man.

Pakistan Five-Star Hotel bombed

As the reports come in pertaining to the attack today on Peshawar's only five-star hotel, the Pearl Continental, this can be seen as a direct threat by Taliban militants to not only the Pakistani government, but to the U.S. as well. The attack will more than likely be traced back to Taliban groups, probably with links to TTP commander Baitullah Mehsud. Following the government's offensive on Taliban hideouts, threats were made to attack prominent locations as revenge. The attack is the latest in a trend of attacks since the November Mumbai attacks, which combines gunmen and bombs creating two waves of attacks inside and outside the target.


Perhaps most concerning should be that the hotel was a spot not only frequented by diplomats in the region, but was included in negotiations by the U.S. to purchase the hotel for use as a consulate. This was part of a nearly $756 million plan for improving the U.S.'s embassy and consulates inside the country, putting the costs for such second to the new embassy in Iraq. It should be noted that the Taliban and Al-Qaida hold the U.S. responsible for exerting influence on the Zardari administration to conduct the operations in the tribal region. Today's attack should be perceived as not only another affront to Pakistan's government, but also a shot across the bow to the U.S. More details will emerge soon I am sure.

The future of Saudi Arabia in the War on Terror

Buried in a one-sentence statement by the Saudi Press Agency on March 27 was the surprise announcement that Prince Nayef had been appointed second deputy prime minister of the Kingdom. The move places a man with strong opposition to Western initiatives as the potential successor to King Abdullah, only led by the ailing Prince Sultan. At a crucial time where the U.S.-Saudi partnership is necessary for the region, it is expected that a King Nayef would deal a significant blow to any of the reformist potential that King Abdullah has embraced.



Since King Fahd's death in 2005, Abdullah has at least taken steps to pander to the West and presented a possibility of a Saudi Arabia that can fit into a modern world. Last July, King Abdullah opened the World Conference for Dialogue in Spain, which was held after his meeting in November 2007 with the Pope at the Vatican. Despite the meetings being a great deal of extravagant media/public relations "fluff", Abdullah opened himself up to criticism from his Muslim critics. Al-Qaida has shown King Abdullah and the Pope walking together in its propaganda, however it should be noted that while the meetings occurred, Saudi Arabia remains an Islamic state that forbids the public practice of any religions other than Islam. The Sunni-Shi'a divide still remains strong in the country, so the likelihood of imminent religious reforms remains unlikely.


Freedom of religion is just one aspect of what a democratic Saudi Arabia would look like. While it remains in doubt that Abdullah will commit to any reform as King, it is virtually nonexistent that a King Nayef would further any potential democratic changes.


Just prior to the March announcement, Nayef was quoted as saying that Saudi Arabia did not need women serving in Parliament or elections. In short, how undemocratic can you be to oppose women's rights and elections universally? Progress regarding either aspect on any level would have been an encouraging sign that Saudi Arabia is looking to develop its role in the global community, rather than pull itself into obscurity. With the Iranian influence expanding on a global scale, Saudi Arabia has failed to increase its influence on a regional and global scale at a rate proportionate to Iran. One would assume that King Abdullah would see that in the long-term, Iran will eclipse Saudi Arabia for the once heated battle over who has the most influence over the Middle East. In short, Prince Nayef has experience over ruling the Kingdom as Interior Minister, but is ill-equipped to the dealings on a global scale.


Furthermore, as the War on Terrorism remains a vital aspect for Middle East policy in the near future, the U.S.-Saudi partnership must be upheld by any Saudi monarch. There is no doubt that the Interior Ministry remains the most significant branch of the government to confront terrorism in the Kingdom, but Prince Nayef is plagued by extreme doubt over his effectiveness overseeing such operations. In a June 22, 2004 hearing, Sen. Charles Schumer (NY-D) urged then Secretary of State Colin Powell to demand that Prince Nayef be replaced with "with someone more credible and committed to fighting terrorism." These calls came after reports surfaced that Prince Nayef's Interior Ministry security forces assisted in the kidnapping and murder of Paul Johnson-an U.S. contractor residing in the Kingdom. Sen. Schumer's demand cited Prince Nayef's lengthy history of aiding terrorists and interference of investigations.

"Prince Nayef Ibn Abd Al-Aziz is the supervisor general of the Saudi Committee for the Support of the Al Quds Intifadah, an organization that has provided families of Palestinian suicide bombers with millions of dollars through specially designated bank accounts. In 2002, a single Saudi Arabian telethon raised about $112 million for this purpose.


In November of 2002, Prince Nayef told Ain-Al-Yageen, another Saudi newspaper, that Zionists were responsible for the 9-11 attacks despite that fact that Saudi Arabia has admitted that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis. In addition, Prince Nayef [deletion] single-handedly prevented the trial of 13 Saudis indicted for killing 19 Americans in the bombing of the Khobar Towers by refusing to turn the men over to the United States. More recently Prince Nayef claimed that Zionists were behind the murder of six western contractors in Saudi Arabia and stated that "Al Qaeda is backed by Israel and Zionism."

In short, there is no person more ill-fit to govern Saudi Arabia then Prince Nayef. Given that a government report last year found that Saudi Arabia remains the leading sponsor of terrorism, there should be no expectation of any enhanced measures under Nayef's rule. If he has failed to crack down on it under his position as Interior Minister (held since 1975), it is likely that any existing measures would be scaled back. With his history of "blame the Jews" and his strong held Wahhabist views, Saudi Arabia will withdraw from global initiatives and lose any reformist views. Perhaps there is no better way to summarize what Saudi Arabia will look like than to quote Prince Nayef himself from a 2006 speech.


"Unless we face reality with truth, courage, and evidence, and if we do not stop all the transgressors who are trying to distort Islam with their claims of reform and their corrupt progress - this will be dangerous. These people have been tempted by the West, and have been employed in its service. We are familiar with their relations with foreign elements. We are fighting them and will continue to fight them, and we will cut off their tongues."

Assessing Iran and U.S. policy under the next administration

Needless to say, the nuclear standoff with Iran lingers on as the West attempts to threaten the Islamic state with more sanctions. Despite its consistent defiance of the obligations listed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran seems to not be willing to negotiate on many aspects of its "peaceful" nuclear program. As the Bush administration leaves office, it appears Iran will be a situation dealt with by the next U.S. President.


As reports come out that suggest President Bush is willing to give Iran some diplomatic legitimacy by establishing an interests section potentially during his final month in office, one must wonder at what point does a lame duck president sit back and allow his successor to take the reigns. After three years of consistent rhetoric on alienating Iran diplomatically, a sudden reversal of U.S. policy would be detrimental in allowing the next administration to resolve the issue.


While the next administration will likely change the U.S. approach towards Iran, it must continue to declare that an Iranian state that sponsors terrorism and desires to possess a completely unregulated nuclear program is not acceptable. Without Iran providing any reasons to change U.S. policy drastically, preemptively providing a potential incentive to bribe them into coming to the table is not going to be the missing piece to the issue.


The best hope is to potentially pursue paths of alienating Iranian allies such as Syria. By potentially separating an Iranian ally that has historically held an anti-Western approach and providing a new face on U.S. policy in the Mid-East of cooperation with regimes that are willing to change their stance, a new phase of negotiations in this crisis can be achieved. However, if either side too hastily pursues a radical compromise the situation will be exacerbated. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to separate state sponsors of terrorism. Without any form of commitment on that regard, U.S. relations should not be pursued with those countries. By removing a strong Iranian ally, the potential to enhance relations could be achieved through Syria's establishment as a comfortable middle-ground and precedent.


Under the new President and his Secretary of State, there is potential for a breakthrough regarding Iran. However, it is necessary that the pressure remains existent on all levels until a reversal of support for international meddling via terror groups is obtained from Iranian leadership. Issues should be addressed one step at a time, and while the U.S. would like to see numerous changes in Tehran, the situation should be dealt with one step at a time. If either side too hastily pursues a radical compromise the situation will be exacerbated. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to encourage Iranian participation, not isolation, in international affairs. This issue should be addressed as the primary goal, and could be an issue that if pursued by Iran, could allow easier negotiations on the requirements of its nuclear program.


Only time will tell how Iran will greet the change of American leadership, but it will continue to be a difficult situation so long as each side consistently promotes a division and intolerance for the other. By potentially connecting the cultures in common pursuits, this gap can be overcome. Through forming common partnerships that enhance cooperation in the region, the U.S. can not be seen as an invading force but rather as an ally of the Middle East. The situation is difficult, but there is the hope that doors will open that allow Iran and the West to pursue negotiations and relationships in the future.

Terrorism a social problem? The battle to clearly counter terrorism's roots continues.

At the Annual Meeting of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in London, it seems that the roots of terrorism have been clearly defined now. Or not. Professor Scott Atran, research director in anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and presidential scholar in sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, told the group that terrorism was a social problem and not a mental or health issue. Is this really a significant breakthrough that gets us any closer to confronting why there are still Al-Qaida sympathizers willing to go out and kill those who oppose their supremacist Islamic views? While I have read some of Professor Atran's works and find many to be accurate and informative, this "finding" seems to only continue with the acceptance that we can not adequately describe terrorism for what it is, allowing ourselves to do a pathetic job of countering the jihadist message.

In 2007, Professor Atran presented a piece to the State Department and House of Lords entitled "Terrorism and Radicalization: What Not to Do, What to Do." In the first slide he said "If people want to kill you or your friends, and you want to stop this from happening, it helps to know why they may want to kill. So ask them if you can." I believe this is the vital concept that the U.S. and its allies have overlooked. I believe that we have allowed ourselves to be put on the defensive about our actions in the Muslim world. We have allowed our successes to be overlooked and let jihadist leaders frame the talking points, only responding when accusations are leveled against us or something goes terribly wrong.

There is no doubt the U.S has a "Midas touch" in the region, except everything we touch is turned into bad PR. Whether it's right or wrong, the campaign against the U.S. is strong on Arab TV. Just ask any Muslim in the region if they've heard of Abu Ghraib. The embarassment surrounding the violation of Muslim prisoners' rights is still a talking point muttered by many when discussing the U.S., just like Guantanamo Bay. Perceived U.S. allies like President Musharraf and the Saudis take heat in every recording from bin Laden it seems. The ideals the U.S. pushes for have been forgotten by these distractions. The U.S. needs to change the image of being a controlling hand over the region into that of being a cooperative partner pushing for the acceptance of religious ideals and freedoms. The War on Terror is not a War on Islam, but a chuckle by the President with a quick and firm "no" does nothing to counter the claim.

While the U.S. can achieve as many operational successes in Iraq and Afghanistan as it wants, military successes like the Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq hold little value in the war of thoughts. We need to broadcast that we have partnered with religious sects to promote an environment where their religious differences are discussed, not threatened. Figures like bin Laden and Zawahiri hold little power in the Western media, but their messages in the Middle East are what possess the power of persuading one suicide bomber. The U.S. needs to quit responding to the messages and issue statements preceding their release. Intensify the PR campaign on Arab television thoroughly explaining the U.S. role in the region. Five years after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. and Iraq are at a stalemate over the Status of Forces agreement because many Iraqi leaders believe that the continued presence of U.S. troops in the country would mean the U.S. would effectively, "run the show" and mandate Iraqi affairs. This is the result of none other than the U.S. letting its foreign policy be hijacked by ideologues like bin Laden.

The War on Terror is not about operational successes, but it is structured around making partnerships in the Middle East and building bridges with not just the leadership, but the people as well. By no means does this mean sacrificing elements of our national security to make friendships, but it does mean approaching the people and discussing issues relevant to them. We should be clear that when threatened, we will be a threatening force, but our primary goal is to promote an alliance in the region that allows sovereignty of the countries. The United States could not have single-handedly won the Cold War, and it certainly can not win the War on Terror alone.