Deaths of senior AQ leaders reported; where are we in the GWoT?

News broke yesterday morning stating that several AQAP leaders, including two U.S. citizens, had been killed in a Predator strike. Anwar al-Awlaki and Samir Khan, both American citizens, were reported among the dead in a statement by Yemen's Defense Ministry. Also reported to have been killed was AQAP's top bomb maker, Ibrahim Hassan Tali al Asiri, in a separate strike. These successes, if indeed fact, prove that the use of drones as assets in the GWoT are virtually invaluable in eliminating high-value targets. With the intensity of this tactic under President Obama, it appears that there is no hint of attempting to slow down anytime soon.

According to the Washington Post, the CIA is in the process of constructing four drone airstrip bases intended to strike AQ affiliates inside Yemen and Somalia. The enhancement of such a program should be welcomed by many, allowing the U.S. to fight this new-age war with new-age technology that does not risk our soldiers lives.

However, with such an intensity and fury coming from drones to target the leadership in faraway places, there is an underlying question. What is really being done here at home to enhance the U.S. in this War on Terror? When President Obama took office, critics questioned if he had the determination and ability to conduct a war. It appears that indeed he has skillfully handled the GWoT in regards to specifics, but like his predecessors, is unwilling to come to a full on confrontation with the pandemic of radicalism.

The real question is legally, are we enhancing our fight and clearly defining the legal abilities of law enforcement in confronting this war? I do not feel as though the outreach mission to incorporate the Muslim community has succeeded and quite honestly, has returned to the pre-9/11 days. Between the media and politicians, we have made this a war about names - similar to the Communist threat from nation states like the USSR. However, this is a war of ideals that has no boundaries or structural organization. Dare I say without OBL's pre-9/11 corporate structuring, Al-Qaeda as a whole will splinter off into the independent franchises based in the Northern Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and Kashmir/Pakistan.

Pakistan will always play host to a radical faction of jihadists, given its dispute with India, the alliances published most recently regarding the U.S. embassy strike in Kabul will always be an asset to the ISI. Inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. strategy is seen at odds with the tribal structuring and has done little to incorporate and facilitate a partnership. While most definitely easier said than done, a comprehensive approach to turn the dependence on Taliban and AQ, especially inside Pakistan, would drastically change the dynamics of this conflict that is about winning hearts and minds.

The fact of the matter is we can take out as many leaders as we want, but there will always be this radical jihadist element that will pose the primary national security threat to the U.S. Over the duration of the War on Terror, several major blows to terrorist organizations in Indonesia, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Russia have been facilitated largely by U.S. cooperation in nearly almost every circumstance. We are taking this war to the terrorists doorsteps in, as Pres. George W. Bush stated was necessary so we would not have to fight them on our own streets as we felt on 9/11. While killing off bad guys is easy, defining the legal challenges and alliances in this war is where the real struggle lies.

9/11: Reviving U.S.-Muslim Relations with a new perspective

September 11, 2001, is a date that everyone will remember. The pain and anger that resulted from that day was felt by many worldwide, changing the dynamics of the United States-Muslim relationship. This week, everyone watched as Pastor Terry Jones announced plans to burn the Qu'ran as a demonstration against radical Islam, inciting a flash wave of anger amongst Muslims worldwide. This abuse of freedom of speech, driven by a narcissistic leader of a small congregation, sabotaged a day filled with remembrance for victims. Jones acknowledged he did not know the victims of 9/11, had not read the Qu'ran, and then attempted to state that this was a protest of radical Islam. The fact of the matter is by burning and desecrating a religious text used by followers of any faith, it is not targeting the problem-makers, but rather is offensive to all.


The complexity of the Muslim world is something that has baffled the experts at all levels of government, and accomplished virtually nothing when it comes to official policy. The fact of the matter is the organizations linked to the government - whether it be Department of Justice, the Pentagon, or even in the White House - all are questionable.

-The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) was listed as an unindicted co-conspirator in the notorious Holy Land Foundation trial. The reality of the matter is the group has held links to terror-financing operations since 1994. This excerpt from a Fox News report by David Lee Miller with CAIR Legislative Affairs Director Corey Saylor was featured in an assessment on CAIR by the Investigative Project on Terrorism:


Miller: Can you sit here now and in just one sentence tell me - CAIR condemns Hamas and CAIR condemns Hezbollah?

Saylor: I'm telling you in a very clear fashion - CAIR condemns terrorist acts, whoever commits them, wherever they commit them, whenever they commit them.

Miller: That's not the same thing as saying you condemn Hamas and you condemn Hezbollah.

Saylor: Well I recognize that you don't like my answer to the question, but that's the answer to the question.

Miller: It's not no. It's not whether I like or dislike it. I was asking you if you can sit here now and say - CAIR condemns Hamas or Hezbollah. If you don't want to, just say that. If that is a position your group doesn't take, I certainly accept that. I just want to understand what your answer is.

Saylor: The position that my group takes is that we condemn terrorism on a consistent, persistent basis, wherever it happens, whenever it happens.

Video here.


In summary, a blanket rejection of the tactic, but not the groups that use it. Perhaps it's CAIR's links dating back to 1994 to Hamas fundraising that makes it so difficult in denying a group whose founding charter "commits the group to the destruction of Israel." Or the group's claim that suicide bombings are the equivalent to an F-16 fighter jet. Why did this organization ever even receive the time of day with government officials?


Perhaps the biggest embarrassment to attempting to moderate with the Muslim community lies somewhere in Yemen. The new face of terrorism, viewed more dangerous than Osama bin Laden by some, is Anwar al-Awlaki. A former U.S. citizen, Awlaki spoke at the U.S. Capitol just weeks before the 2001 attacks that would evacuate that same building. How did someone with such radical beliefs receive an invitation to become an ambassador for Islam on Capitol Hill?


The list goes on and on of instances where the government outreach to the Muslim community has backfired. The problem is not with Muslims, but rather the sheer incompetence of the government to understand that there is a liability with those that empathize with Hamas and Hezbollah. So long as the groups use terrorism, and the United States designates them as Foreign Terrorist Organizations, there should be a firm stance to disregard any individuals affiliated with any groups on that list. Islam is not an organization, but a religion practiced by a fifth of the world. The strength lies in the outreach and ability to communicate with the people, not an organization.

Are we really even fighting a war anymore?

The War on Terror was designed with the intent to disrupt the leadership network of Al-Qaida that was instrumental behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since operations began a month after the attacks in 2001, the U.S. has eliminated numerous senior figures and seasoned veterans of the mujahideen that made up Al-Qaida Central. The leadership of Al-Qaida has been replaced now by a movement made up of collective pockets of fighters distributed among the globe, all seeking to develop the momentum that Al-Qaida once enjoyed.


The attacks in Uganda during the World Cup evidence this, showing that as many experts have suggested for some time that the general trend of terrorist groups turning from promoting their agenda in a local, regional based setting into a global movement applies now to the Shabaab of Somalia. The twin bombings exercised the group's intent to disrupt a global event with violence in order to attract the attention of the viewing public. It is more than likely that the group did not have the resources and capabilities to penetrate the security apparatus surrounding Cape Town.


Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula gained recognition upon the failed bombing of Northwest 253 on Christmas Day last year. The group previously was responsible primarily for Al-Qaida operations inside Saudi Arabia, using the lacking government of President Saleh of Yemen in order to gain refuge across the border. Anwar al-Awlaki was able to use his charm in order to benefit the group by obtaining Westernized recruits who already spoke English and had no tell-tale red flags.


Al-Qaida Central, based in Pakistan, is largely disrupted in my analysis. Figureheads like Osama bin Laden control the public front of the group, but hold no true value outside of their immediate location. The recordings simply are a ploy for credibility in the Muslim world, utilizing the once strong persona that bin Laden and his leaders once held when they were capable of attacks such as the Embassy bombings of 1998. The destruction that Al-Qaida was able to claim actually was linked to bin Laden's direct leadership, rather than a network of regional leaders who operated freely and independent of the group's chain of command.


The U.S. has failed at providing any real results in the War on Terror, opting to ignore developing threats until innocent lives have been claimed. The days of assigning any associates to Al-Qaida on the blacklists has been replaced by simply waiting until those associates have blood on their hands to place them under any sanctions. Intelligence is an invaluable asset in any war, especially a war where the enemy is everywhere. The ability to produce HUMINT in this war has proven extremely difficult. The only able way is to put eyes and ears everywhere, providing assistance in the local tribes that make up the many regions where Al-Qaida's partners find haven.


A grassroots-up strategy would provide the most assistance to those impacted most by an unstable country, especially in Afghanistan and Yemen. The defining problem in most situations is that the local tribes have no reason to believe in a corrupt national government that exists inside the bubble of the capital. By providing aid to those who experience the insurgency violence on a day-to-day basis and standing beside them, there is hope in gaining assets that can prove effective in designing larger counter terrorism strategies. Fighting a war is hard work, but it is something that takes time, patience, and a collective effort in order to achieve success.