Lessons from a mujahid

"If you see your enemy modest, you must make it arrogant. You must appear weak in front of your enemy for some time to make it become arrogant."

These were the words remembered by Al-Qaida in honor of one of their great military planners, Shaykh Yousef al-Ayyirri. The commander of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula until his death in 2003, al-Ayyirri had begun his career in the ranks of the Afghan mujahideen of the 1980s against the Soviets. Following the mujahideen's success, he began what would be a lifelong career that began in those ranks at the age of 18.

Five years after his death by Saudi security forces, al-Ayyirri's words should caution the U.S. about the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As global leaders clamor in unison for a declaration of successes in Iraq, Afghanistan falls deeper into a state of turmoil.

Last week, Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) was officially declared as defeated by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The number of foreign fighters entering the country plummeted from the 110 at this time last year to about 20. The factor overlooked by many, is that the number of foreign fighters moving into Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan has spiked over the past 2-3 months. New recruits who would have gone to AQI are now moving into these regions, from either their native countries or departing Iraq. Does this mean such a success in Iraq is permanent? By all means no.

Based on how many times the blame has been pinned on Iran for insurgent activity in Iraq, saying that they are responsible for a situation in Afghanistan as well seems like a played-out card. The truth is, part of the blame does lie on lax border security along the border, but Afghanistan and President Hamid Karzai bear an equal share of blame. President Karzai has allowed his policies to be framed solely on domestic affairs, alienating the involvement of the neighbors to the east and west in particular. Karzai has not pushed through any security agreements mandating strict border enforcement and cooperation between his country and Pakistan and Iran in particular.

What does any of this have to do with Yousef al-Ayyirri?

Based on the report this week that even AQI commanders are fleeing Iraq for Afghanistan, the potential for the tides to change in Afghanistan and/or Iraq will remain vulnerable so long as the Iran-Afghanistan borders remain unchecked. The passage can ferry foreign fighters from either front to the other so long as there is foreign fighters to move. To declare AQI dead is by all means a baseless claim. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the group's leader following the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, is by no means an al-Ayyirri. His experience with Al-Qaida did not begin with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets, but rather in 1999.

If al-Masri has indeed fled with his commanders to Afghanistan, chances are he is no longer isolated from the Al-Qaida hierarchy consisting of experienced Soviet-era mujahideen commanders, but rather a puppet for such a group. Remember Zawahiri and bin Laden didn't favor Zarqawi for his inexperience and his conventional terror tactics. Perhaps Prime Min. Maliki should reconsider his arrogance and consider who he would rather battle - a wannabe mujahid al-Masri or an al-Ayyirri, who is worshiped as the hero for the mujahideen.

Terrorism a social problem? The battle to clearly counter terrorism's roots continues.

At the Annual Meeting of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in London, it seems that the roots of terrorism have been clearly defined now. Or not. Professor Scott Atran, research director in anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and presidential scholar in sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, told the group that terrorism was a social problem and not a mental or health issue. Is this really a significant breakthrough that gets us any closer to confronting why there are still Al-Qaida sympathizers willing to go out and kill those who oppose their supremacist Islamic views? While I have read some of Professor Atran's works and find many to be accurate and informative, this "finding" seems to only continue with the acceptance that we can not adequately describe terrorism for what it is, allowing ourselves to do a pathetic job of countering the jihadist message.

In 2007, Professor Atran presented a piece to the State Department and House of Lords entitled "Terrorism and Radicalization: What Not to Do, What to Do." In the first slide he said "If people want to kill you or your friends, and you want to stop this from happening, it helps to know why they may want to kill. So ask them if you can." I believe this is the vital concept that the U.S. and its allies have overlooked. I believe that we have allowed ourselves to be put on the defensive about our actions in the Muslim world. We have allowed our successes to be overlooked and let jihadist leaders frame the talking points, only responding when accusations are leveled against us or something goes terribly wrong.

There is no doubt the U.S has a "Midas touch" in the region, except everything we touch is turned into bad PR. Whether it's right or wrong, the campaign against the U.S. is strong on Arab TV. Just ask any Muslim in the region if they've heard of Abu Ghraib. The embarassment surrounding the violation of Muslim prisoners' rights is still a talking point muttered by many when discussing the U.S., just like Guantanamo Bay. Perceived U.S. allies like President Musharraf and the Saudis take heat in every recording from bin Laden it seems. The ideals the U.S. pushes for have been forgotten by these distractions. The U.S. needs to change the image of being a controlling hand over the region into that of being a cooperative partner pushing for the acceptance of religious ideals and freedoms. The War on Terror is not a War on Islam, but a chuckle by the President with a quick and firm "no" does nothing to counter the claim.

While the U.S. can achieve as many operational successes in Iraq and Afghanistan as it wants, military successes like the Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq hold little value in the war of thoughts. We need to broadcast that we have partnered with religious sects to promote an environment where their religious differences are discussed, not threatened. Figures like bin Laden and Zawahiri hold little power in the Western media, but their messages in the Middle East are what possess the power of persuading one suicide bomber. The U.S. needs to quit responding to the messages and issue statements preceding their release. Intensify the PR campaign on Arab television thoroughly explaining the U.S. role in the region. Five years after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. and Iraq are at a stalemate over the Status of Forces agreement because many Iraqi leaders believe that the continued presence of U.S. troops in the country would mean the U.S. would effectively, "run the show" and mandate Iraqi affairs. This is the result of none other than the U.S. letting its foreign policy be hijacked by ideologues like bin Laden.

The War on Terror is not about operational successes, but it is structured around making partnerships in the Middle East and building bridges with not just the leadership, but the people as well. By no means does this mean sacrificing elements of our national security to make friendships, but it does mean approaching the people and discussing issues relevant to them. We should be clear that when threatened, we will be a threatening force, but our primary goal is to promote an alliance in the region that allows sovereignty of the countries. The United States could not have single-handedly won the Cold War, and it certainly can not win the War on Terror alone.