After yesterday's attacks, many officials remain stunned as to how this breakthrough attack went virtually undetected until its implementation. The plotters of this attack had the significant benefit of India being in disarray when it comes to developing its internal security. Shortly after the July 26 blasts in Ahmedabad that killed 56 and injured over 200, India finally realized that its ability to counter terrorism was already ill-prepared. However, several suggestions by Indian government officials focused only on com batting the traditional remote-detonated devices used in most attacks this decade. The intent to take hostages and to actually use ground forces in such an assault has been one that seemed to have vanished from the scene in India.
Perhaps the greatest setback to Indian domestic security is that it has no nationwide intelligence network. With 28 states, each operating its own individual intelligence apparatus, the state is the ultimate head and is not required to share information with its neighbors. This was proved in the July attacks, when four of the cars used were stolen from Mumbai and then used in the attacks. The cars license plates were not completely altered, and would have found their way on a list by law-enforcement in a state here in the U.S.. However, in India such a network does not exist and the vehicles were able to pass multiple security checkpoints before their use in the blasts. In August, Gujarat province announced that it would create a special intelligence cell specifically to counter terrorism - yet it would only have an intelligence collecting purpose.
Furthermore, while India is quick to suggest Pakistani involvement in yesterday's attack, it acknowledged that it had seen substantial problems in its prison system. Cell phone SIM cards have frequently found their way into prisons that do not have a phone jamming system, allowing communication and other contacts from a supposed "secure" environment. Indian authorities had intercepted messages regarding terror plots being hatched from inside the country's prisons and were finally made aware of this vulnerability. The ability for domestic terrorism to thrive has extended well beyond Kashmir and into numerous systems in India, all of which has never been addressed or countered.
The country's intelligence collecting and sharing abilities are at best - deficient. It was only a matter of time until India felt the affects of an attack that may have been prevented, and yesterday was that point. The anti-terror squads have been tested by the most recent attack and it has proven that India has under equipped what is intended to be their elite services. This time, it will be necessary for the government there to not just talk about making changes and actually implements them in a rapid line. The components of the Mumbai assault leave a dangerous pattern among all countries concerned with international security, and all countries should evaluate the ability to coordinate and distribute emergency services across numerous areas and dealing with waves of militants. The patterns of this most recent attack have sent shock waves among the intelligence community, and it will be an incident that must be remembered for the lessons learned.
9-11-01
Thursday, November 27, 2008
India's Mumbai terror attacks continue 24 hours later
The chaos in Mumbai continues nearly a day after the attacks began. With the head of the anti-terror squad killed along with several other senior commanders, the effectiveness of the ATS remains questionable as the army has taken responsibility of operations. As the casualty figures continue to remain sketchy, it will take time to clearly identify the situation as it appears the goal of spreading chaos throughout the city was achieved. It appears that the majority of the hostages have been released, yet reports of explosions at the Taj Hotel suggest that the situation remains tense.
The attack represents a new phase in the fight against terror, as the goal of essentially shutting down a city was achieved in the remarkably coordinated attacks. As the squads were able to hit at least 10 sites across Mumbai, the emergency services were clearly under equipped and ill-prepared for such massive attacks occurring simultaneously. It appears that these squads of gunmen are mostly in their 20s, suggesting a potential recruitment and alliance of the Indian youth mujahideens and larger groups. If yesterday's attacks were merely explosions, this incident would be no different from the Ahmedabad blasts in July in which 21 bombs were detonated across the city. However, the use of "foot soldiers" and the intent of hostage-taking is one that has not been seen in India for some time.
Ultimately, the investigation part of the phase has yet to begin as clues of the attackers are just now being discovered. With such a breakthrough attack the focus should be on outside elements support - specifically the ISI. As of now, the focus appears to be on SIMI and its offshoots. However, a report suggests that the perpetrators reached Mumbai using boats originally from Karachi. The intelligence trail for the preliminary setup for this operation could go as far back as six months ago, with the finding of a barge nearly four months ago. As police have reportedly found at least four boats laden with explosives outside the city, the investigation may have some fairly solid links to help establish the origin and trail of support that masterminded this operation.
The fight of what Walid Phares called "urban Jihad" has hit India and proven to the world that terror groups are capable of striking anywhere at any time. By all means, this attack is clearly a successful hit taking out various targets in nearly every major part of a hub. This type of tactic has yet to be seen in such a violent form, and many Western intelligence officials remain concerned that this could only be the beginning. Undoubtedly, information will be revealed in the coming days describing foreign terror connections once the situation is resolved. Until then, it is my hope that the anti-terror squads and Indian military are prepared to potentially deal with any further crises that could erupt.
The attack represents a new phase in the fight against terror, as the goal of essentially shutting down a city was achieved in the remarkably coordinated attacks. As the squads were able to hit at least 10 sites across Mumbai, the emergency services were clearly under equipped and ill-prepared for such massive attacks occurring simultaneously. It appears that these squads of gunmen are mostly in their 20s, suggesting a potential recruitment and alliance of the Indian youth mujahideens and larger groups. If yesterday's attacks were merely explosions, this incident would be no different from the Ahmedabad blasts in July in which 21 bombs were detonated across the city. However, the use of "foot soldiers" and the intent of hostage-taking is one that has not been seen in India for some time.
Ultimately, the investigation part of the phase has yet to begin as clues of the attackers are just now being discovered. With such a breakthrough attack the focus should be on outside elements support - specifically the ISI. As of now, the focus appears to be on SIMI and its offshoots. However, a report suggests that the perpetrators reached Mumbai using boats originally from Karachi. The intelligence trail for the preliminary setup for this operation could go as far back as six months ago, with the finding of a barge nearly four months ago. As police have reportedly found at least four boats laden with explosives outside the city, the investigation may have some fairly solid links to help establish the origin and trail of support that masterminded this operation.
The fight of what Walid Phares called "urban Jihad" has hit India and proven to the world that terror groups are capable of striking anywhere at any time. By all means, this attack is clearly a successful hit taking out various targets in nearly every major part of a hub. This type of tactic has yet to be seen in such a violent form, and many Western intelligence officials remain concerned that this could only be the beginning. Undoubtedly, information will be revealed in the coming days describing foreign terror connections once the situation is resolved. Until then, it is my hope that the anti-terror squads and Indian military are prepared to potentially deal with any further crises that could erupt.
Wednesday, November 26, 2008
Mumbai hit again by Indian terror in new wave of violence
Today India experienced a new chapter in its long history of terror attacks, with a series of coordinated attacks on multiple sites throughout the financial hub of Mumbai. Gunmen reportedly ambushed several famed hotels that are frequented by foreigners, taking hostages and lobbing grenades as well. Among the casualties of the attack are the head of Mumbai's "elite" anti-terror squad, as well as several other senior officers. Needless to say that several hours after the initial attack, the situation remains chaotic as casualty figures continue to climb and the fate of the hostages remains unknown.
Sadly, India continues to fall under violence due to jihadist groups thriving in Kashmir. With reported connections to Al-Qaida elements and support for them coming from Pakistan's ISI, these groups face little opposition and have the means to create massive amounts of damage. The perpetrators of today's attacks are yet to be confirmed, but it is reported that an unknown group calling itself Deccan Mujahideen has claimed responsibility. If this is true, it will be interesting to see how connections unravel and if there is a link to any pre-existing Kashmir militant groups.
Animesh Roul posted an article on the Jamestown Foundation's page on the revival of India's terror groups. Read it here:
"India's Troubled Northeast Region: The Resurgence of Ethno-Islamist Terrorism"
Sadly, India continues to fall under violence due to jihadist groups thriving in Kashmir. With reported connections to Al-Qaida elements and support for them coming from Pakistan's ISI, these groups face little opposition and have the means to create massive amounts of damage. The perpetrators of today's attacks are yet to be confirmed, but it is reported that an unknown group calling itself Deccan Mujahideen has claimed responsibility. If this is true, it will be interesting to see how connections unravel and if there is a link to any pre-existing Kashmir militant groups.
Animesh Roul posted an article on the Jamestown Foundation's page on the revival of India's terror groups. Read it here:
"India's Troubled Northeast Region: The Resurgence of Ethno-Islamist Terrorism"
Thursday, November 6, 2008
How we lost Afghanistan
Seven years after invading Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban regime, the situation in Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worst. The idea that the Taliban had vanished after their 2001 retreat from Kabul was quickly gone after this year's spectacular attacks. There was the April assassination attempt on Pres. Hamid Karzai, followed by the jailbreak of nearly 1000 prisoners from the Kandahar prison in June. Both attacks brought a component that was relatively unprecedented by the group - organization. The insurgency in Afghanistan had previously appeared to be a collection of cells with no connection and means to coordinate, capable only of occasional IED attacks and mortar rounds here and there. After those two attacks, joined by the Indian embassy bombing in July, it was clear that the rosy assessments painted by diplomats on the ground was merely a fantasy lived out in their secure compounds.
In reality, the Taliban do not have the ability to establish control as a legitimate government in Afghanistan. However, their fight has been one that is emerging as a strategic threat to the reconstruction and development in the country. By the June prison break, attacks were up 40% from last year and symbols of development were increasingly being targeted.
Shortly thereafter, reports emerged of the Taliban's "shadow" government systems that supposedly exist in nearly every province. With their own courts based on Shari'a, the Taliban had infiltrated local tribes and had become an alternative to a flawed Afghan justice system vulnerable to bribes.
What happened over the last seven years is of extreme importance to winning back Afghanistan. While the U.S. and NATO declared victory, the Taliban opted to be patient with their efforts and allow the opportunity to strengthen their capabilities. Without state sponsorship any more, they needed to find a means to fund their insurgency and partnered with the international opium market as a replacement. With Afghanistan consistently being the number one supplier of the product, it was an unregulated criminal enterprise that the U.S. and NATO seldom touched.
Either out of fear of turning the impoverished locals that grew the poppies nearer to the Taliban or intervention by Hamid Karzai's opium-profiting governors, over the seven years in Afghanistan nobody has addressed and confronted the issue of poppies. With anywhere between 88-93% of the global opium supply coming from Afghanistan, the Taliban had their moneymaker. During the Taliban's rule in the country, they allowed the farmers to grow poppies until they banned it in 2000. This ban did not curb the amount of opium pouring out of the country onto nearly every street.
Last week, TIME magazine held an interesting report that alleges the Taliban have officially entered the global crime syndicate. The UN's Office on Drugs and Crime announced that over the last three years, anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of opium have vanished from the global market. Consider that annually, the world consumes around 4,500 tons of the drug. Nearly two years worth of the drug, which retails for around $464,000 a ton, has just disappeared off the market.
The UN Office has not made any official assessments, but theories are circulating as to where such a large stash may have ended up. Officials are skeptical that this was a mere instance of the stockpile being lost in the black market and not appearing, basing their opinion on the global market. With opium being a fairly consistent $70 per kg, such a significant portion of the crop would have lowered prices. That simply hasn't happened.
The concern now is that the Taliban may have spent up to 3 years collecting the crop, and now have a bundle worth anywhere between $2.8 and 3 billion in their possession. Needless to say, with that kind of potential income, the Taliban's tactics and weaponry should continue to increase at the expense of the U.S. and President Karzai's blind eye to the crop. With market manipulation and the Taliban's control on the safety of opium exports, they hold the potential to spike the price and reach record profits all due to their patience. Unfortunately, there is little the coalition can do to prevent this besides stumbling across the stash which could already be on the streets of Europe and the U.S..
Simply put, the U.S., NATO, and Hamid Karzai all made a doomsday mistake by not controlling the poppy situation. We have opted to see the issue as a black and white one, rather than offering an alternative to the farmers. The London-based think tank Senlis Council has advised that the coalition and the Karzai government allow the growth of poppies, however instead of flooding the black market and paying for the bombs that kill our troops, have them sold to pharmaceutical companies worldwide. Then, the hope is that the money will collectively go to the tribes in the area and help pay for the rebuilding of the infrastructure.
It is my hope that President-elect Obama and his administration focus on this problem before the Taliban are able to control it even more. However, only once during the whole presidential campaign season did a candidate mention "opium" and "Afghanistan" collectively. With such a massive supply coming from Afghanistan, not every gram of opium has to end up in the hands of an addict in the UK. By promoting a legal alternative that is internationally acceptable, we can utilize international companies and agencies involvement to win the hearts and minds of the people. By allowing farmers to provide funding for local projects such as their schools and roads, it will be the people of Afghanistan making up the infrastructure and not just international aid. With that type of invested interest, the Taliban can hopefully be seen as the obstacle towards peace in the country and their monopoly on the Afghan poppies can end.
In reality, the Taliban do not have the ability to establish control as a legitimate government in Afghanistan. However, their fight has been one that is emerging as a strategic threat to the reconstruction and development in the country. By the June prison break, attacks were up 40% from last year and symbols of development were increasingly being targeted.
Shortly thereafter, reports emerged of the Taliban's "shadow" government systems that supposedly exist in nearly every province. With their own courts based on Shari'a, the Taliban had infiltrated local tribes and had become an alternative to a flawed Afghan justice system vulnerable to bribes.
What happened over the last seven years is of extreme importance to winning back Afghanistan. While the U.S. and NATO declared victory, the Taliban opted to be patient with their efforts and allow the opportunity to strengthen their capabilities. Without state sponsorship any more, they needed to find a means to fund their insurgency and partnered with the international opium market as a replacement. With Afghanistan consistently being the number one supplier of the product, it was an unregulated criminal enterprise that the U.S. and NATO seldom touched.
Either out of fear of turning the impoverished locals that grew the poppies nearer to the Taliban or intervention by Hamid Karzai's opium-profiting governors, over the seven years in Afghanistan nobody has addressed and confronted the issue of poppies. With anywhere between 88-93% of the global opium supply coming from Afghanistan, the Taliban had their moneymaker. During the Taliban's rule in the country, they allowed the farmers to grow poppies until they banned it in 2000. This ban did not curb the amount of opium pouring out of the country onto nearly every street.
Last week, TIME magazine held an interesting report that alleges the Taliban have officially entered the global crime syndicate. The UN's Office on Drugs and Crime announced that over the last three years, anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of opium have vanished from the global market. Consider that annually, the world consumes around 4,500 tons of the drug. Nearly two years worth of the drug, which retails for around $464,000 a ton, has just disappeared off the market.
The UN Office has not made any official assessments, but theories are circulating as to where such a large stash may have ended up. Officials are skeptical that this was a mere instance of the stockpile being lost in the black market and not appearing, basing their opinion on the global market. With opium being a fairly consistent $70 per kg, such a significant portion of the crop would have lowered prices. That simply hasn't happened.
The concern now is that the Taliban may have spent up to 3 years collecting the crop, and now have a bundle worth anywhere between $2.8 and 3 billion in their possession. Needless to say, with that kind of potential income, the Taliban's tactics and weaponry should continue to increase at the expense of the U.S. and President Karzai's blind eye to the crop. With market manipulation and the Taliban's control on the safety of opium exports, they hold the potential to spike the price and reach record profits all due to their patience. Unfortunately, there is little the coalition can do to prevent this besides stumbling across the stash which could already be on the streets of Europe and the U.S..
Simply put, the U.S., NATO, and Hamid Karzai all made a doomsday mistake by not controlling the poppy situation. We have opted to see the issue as a black and white one, rather than offering an alternative to the farmers. The London-based think tank Senlis Council has advised that the coalition and the Karzai government allow the growth of poppies, however instead of flooding the black market and paying for the bombs that kill our troops, have them sold to pharmaceutical companies worldwide. Then, the hope is that the money will collectively go to the tribes in the area and help pay for the rebuilding of the infrastructure.
It is my hope that President-elect Obama and his administration focus on this problem before the Taliban are able to control it even more. However, only once during the whole presidential campaign season did a candidate mention "opium" and "Afghanistan" collectively. With such a massive supply coming from Afghanistan, not every gram of opium has to end up in the hands of an addict in the UK. By promoting a legal alternative that is internationally acceptable, we can utilize international companies and agencies involvement to win the hearts and minds of the people. By allowing farmers to provide funding for local projects such as their schools and roads, it will be the people of Afghanistan making up the infrastructure and not just international aid. With that type of invested interest, the Taliban can hopefully be seen as the obstacle towards peace in the country and their monopoly on the Afghan poppies can end.
Monday, October 20, 2008
Assessing Iran and U.S. policy under the next administration
Needless to say, the nuclear standoff with Iran lingers on as the West attempts to threaten the Islamic state with more sanctions. Despite its consistent defiance of the obligations listed in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran seems to not be willing to negotiate on many aspects of its "peaceful" nuclear program. As the Bush administration leaves office, it appears Iran will be a situation dealt with by the next U.S. President.
As reports come out that suggest President Bush is willing to give Iran some diplomatic legitimacy by establishing an interests section potentially during his final month in office, one must wonder at what point does a lame duck president sit back and allow his successor to take the reigns. After three years of consistent rhetoric on alienating Iran diplomatically, a sudden reversal of U.S. policy would be detrimental in allowing the next administration to resolve the issue.
While the next administration will likely change the U.S. approach towards Iran, it must continue to declare that an Iranian state that sponsors terrorism and desires to possess a completely unregulated nuclear program is not acceptable. Without Iran providing any reasons to change U.S. policy drastically, preemptively providing a potential incentive to bribe them into coming to the table is not going to be the missing piece to the issue.
The best hope is to potentially pursue paths of alienating Iranian allies such as Syria. By potentially separating an Iranian ally that has historically held an anti-Western approach and providing a new face on U.S. policy in the Mid-East of cooperation with regimes that are willing to change their stance, a new phase of negotiations in this crisis can be achieved. However, if either side too hastily pursues a radical compromise the situation will be exacerbated. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to separate state sponsors of terrorism. Without any form of commitment on that regard, U.S. relations should not be pursued with those countries. By removing a strong Iranian ally, the potential to enhance relations could be achieved through Syria's establishment as a comfortable middle-ground and precedent.
Under the new President and his Secretary of State, there is potential for a breakthrough regarding Iran. However, it is necessary that the pressure remains existent on all levels until a reversal of support for international meddling via terror groups is obtained from Iranian leadership. Issues should be addressed one step at a time, and while the U.S. would like to see numerous changes in Tehran, the situation should be dealt with one step at a time. If either side too hastily pursues a radical compromise the situation will be exacerbated. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to encourage Iranian participation, not isolation, in international affairs. This issue should be addressed as the primary goal, and could be an issue that if pursued by Iran, could allow easier negotiations on the requirements of its nuclear program.
Only time will tell how Iran will greet the change of American leadership, but it will continue to be a difficult situation so long as each side consistently promotes a division and intolerance for the other. By potentially connecting the cultures in common pursuits, this gap can be overcome. Through forming common partnerships that enhance cooperation in the region, the U.S. can not be seen as an invading force but rather as an ally of the Middle East. The situation is difficult, but there is the hope that doors will open that allow Iran and the West to pursue negotiations and relationships in the future.
As reports come out that suggest President Bush is willing to give Iran some diplomatic legitimacy by establishing an interests section potentially during his final month in office, one must wonder at what point does a lame duck president sit back and allow his successor to take the reigns. After three years of consistent rhetoric on alienating Iran diplomatically, a sudden reversal of U.S. policy would be detrimental in allowing the next administration to resolve the issue.
While the next administration will likely change the U.S. approach towards Iran, it must continue to declare that an Iranian state that sponsors terrorism and desires to possess a completely unregulated nuclear program is not acceptable. Without Iran providing any reasons to change U.S. policy drastically, preemptively providing a potential incentive to bribe them into coming to the table is not going to be the missing piece to the issue.
The best hope is to potentially pursue paths of alienating Iranian allies such as Syria. By potentially separating an Iranian ally that has historically held an anti-Western approach and providing a new face on U.S. policy in the Mid-East of cooperation with regimes that are willing to change their stance, a new phase of negotiations in this crisis can be achieved. However, if either side too hastily pursues a radical compromise the situation will be exacerbated. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to separate state sponsors of terrorism. Without any form of commitment on that regard, U.S. relations should not be pursued with those countries. By removing a strong Iranian ally, the potential to enhance relations could be achieved through Syria's establishment as a comfortable middle-ground and precedent.
Under the new President and his Secretary of State, there is potential for a breakthrough regarding Iran. However, it is necessary that the pressure remains existent on all levels until a reversal of support for international meddling via terror groups is obtained from Iranian leadership. Issues should be addressed one step at a time, and while the U.S. would like to see numerous changes in Tehran, the situation should be dealt with one step at a time. If either side too hastily pursues a radical compromise the situation will be exacerbated. The ultimate goal of the U.S. should be to encourage Iranian participation, not isolation, in international affairs. This issue should be addressed as the primary goal, and could be an issue that if pursued by Iran, could allow easier negotiations on the requirements of its nuclear program.
Only time will tell how Iran will greet the change of American leadership, but it will continue to be a difficult situation so long as each side consistently promotes a division and intolerance for the other. By potentially connecting the cultures in common pursuits, this gap can be overcome. Through forming common partnerships that enhance cooperation in the region, the U.S. can not be seen as an invading force but rather as an ally of the Middle East. The situation is difficult, but there is the hope that doors will open that allow Iran and the West to pursue negotiations and relationships in the future.
Monday, October 13, 2008
If we close our eyes, we can say nothing happened (Pt. III)
This is the third of three parts detailing Iran's growing influence in various regions. From Latin America to Africa to Europe, Iran has undeniably risen from the shadows largely due to its mouthy president who emerged in 2005 and its proxies' expansion. In such a short period of time, the growth of the Khomenist state has extended to nearly every hemisphere, facing little resistance by the West and its allies. As the standoff with Iran continues, it is important to understand the reality of the religious state that many say is now the key to Middle East policy.
After President Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, the Western powers lost any successes obtained in negotiating a resolution to Iran's nuclear pursuits. Ahmadinejad has made it very clear that the nuclear "know-how" is part of a vast religious obligation to utilize his power for the coming of the Mahdi. There was one dilemma. Iran was not capable of independently creating its nuclear program, it needed assistance. Once again, Ahmadinejad set out on his goal of forming a strategic partnership with a country that possessed what the Islamic republic lacked.
The criteria that formed the African and Latin American alliances was the same - a leader who was not willing to bow to Western influence and opposed the increasing American Imperialist movement. With North Korea constantly in talks over its program and Libya's agreement to abandonment, Ahmadinejad found a friend in Russia. Russia offered a partnership that elevated Iran from the shadows of international diplomacy and brought it to new levels. With Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated criticisms of U.S. policy, Iran now had a major voice in international affairs - as well as a country which possessed the ability to veto any measures drafted in the UN Security Council.
With Russia's increased involvement with Tehran, there are several issues of concern. In 2005, it is reported that trade between the two countries was in excess of $1 billion, making Russia the seventh largest exporter to Iran. Estimates suggest that exports from Russia could grow to $10 billion annually within years. With such an invested stake in Iranian exports, Russian desire to impose increased sanctions has predictably been in opposition. It should be no surprise then that on September 29, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that he saw "no need for urgent measures against Iran." Those comments were made one week after an IAEA report criticized Iran for not allowing the agency to fully investigate certain aspects of the nuclear program.
The chief area of trade that has seen a spike under Ahmadinejad's presidency is arms sales, which has put Russian arms dealers as the chief suppliers to Iran. In 2006 Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Washington's Institute for Near East Policy's Military and Security Studies Program, said that the Islamic Republic was specifically seeking to increase it's air defense capabilities.
Late last year, the announcement came that Russia had agreed to sell Iran its S-300 air defense system, one of the most advanced of its kind. Capable of tracking around 100 targets simultaneously while intercepting up to 12 from a distance of over 100 miles, the reported sale was for deployment specifically around Iranian nuclear sites to dissuade Israel from any air strike on such sites. Now, amid reports that the system could be delivered by late this year, both Russia and Iran refuse to confirm nor deny whether there is such an agreement. The Russian Foreign Ministry has only stated that "we do not intend to deliver those types of arms to countries which are located in troubled regions." However, Russia has deployed the S-300 in Syria and the director for the Russian arms exports agency, Rosoboronexport, was quoted by Russian media on September 17 that his agency was in advanced negotiations to sell S-300 missiles to Iran. The agency later issued a statement denying that it had sold such missiles to Iran, but did not speak to whether or not there were talks for their sale. It is highly probable that Iran will seek to enhance its defenses around facilities such as its Bushehr reactor, which the Russian agency Atomstroyexport has stated should be operational by early to mid 2009.
While the official dealings of the Russian government remain unclear with Tehran, the most frightening component of all remains an ever present force in the Russian economy. Black market arms dealers continue to operate with relative ease in Moscow, creating a dangerous link with the Russian government that could extend into Iran and its proxies such as Hizbullah. To see the cooperation that exists between Russian officials and black market arms dealers, one need not look further than the case of Viktor Bout, the "Lord of War," who was arrested in Thailand in March. After Thai authorities agreed to drop their charges to allow a quicker extradition to the U.S., where he faces several charges related to terrorism, there have been several reports that the Russian Foreign Ministry is attempting to broker military sales with the Thai prime minister in exchange for Bout. According to Douglas Farah, despite a 20o2 Interpol Red Notice requiring Bout's arrest and a Belgian warrant for his arrest for money laundering, Bout resided in Moscow and used at least five Russian passports.
Bout is just one example of how Russia has used the black market to insert itself into the global dynamics, enabling and controlling conflict. Russian weapons were present in the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, which allowed Hizbullah to use advanced armor-piercing Russian missiles. Farah has stated that "such activities project Russian power, at a time when the Putin government is desperate to project Russian power across the world, as well as provide outlets for the sale of Russian weapons." Reports of late, most recently in September by Vice President Dick Cheney, suggested that Russian weapons sold to Syria were ending up in the hands of Hizbullah forces in Lebanon. The increasing concern should be the shadowy trend of Russian deals, specifically regarding the sales of weapons and the continued blind eye given by the Russian government regarding black market operations inside its country.
A growing problem is the scenario of black market sales regarding nuclear material originating in Russia. The growing trend of smuggling nuclear material from Russia has taken a path through the two territories where the Russian-Georgian crisis began in September - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Most of the time, sellers attempt to sell off spent material that would prove useless in the construction of a nuclear weapon. However, there have been several arrests made by Georgian authorities that involve Russian individuals attempting to smuggle Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Last year, a Russian national was sentenced to eight years in a Georgian jail for attempting to sell 100 g of HEU for $1 million. Experts say that while the quality of the material would be suitable in weapons construction, the quantity remained insufficient. It should be noted that so far in Georgia, there have been publicized arrests in 2003 and 2006 that involved the attempted sale of HEU.
There are substantial implications for the fight against terrorism if the international community can not lure Russia to cooperate in an international effort. While Russia states that it will not do business in "troubled regions," its black market agents are involved in conflicts ranging from Africa to the Mideast to Latin America. The partnership of Russia and Iran brings in the component of a criminal network to Tehran's quest for globalization. The ability by both Iran and Russia to mask their global activities promotes a relationship that is dangerous to international affairs and creates yet another obstacle in resolving the West's standoff regarding Iran's nuclear activities. Through Iran's network of terrorist proxies, as well as Russia's connection to global crime, another dangerous alliance has been formed that compromises international security concerns at a time when the UN has sought to create a comprehensive, global effort to combat terrorism globally.
After President Ahmadinejad took office in 2005, the Western powers lost any successes obtained in negotiating a resolution to Iran's nuclear pursuits. Ahmadinejad has made it very clear that the nuclear "know-how" is part of a vast religious obligation to utilize his power for the coming of the Mahdi. There was one dilemma. Iran was not capable of independently creating its nuclear program, it needed assistance. Once again, Ahmadinejad set out on his goal of forming a strategic partnership with a country that possessed what the Islamic republic lacked.
The criteria that formed the African and Latin American alliances was the same - a leader who was not willing to bow to Western influence and opposed the increasing American Imperialist movement. With North Korea constantly in talks over its program and Libya's agreement to abandonment, Ahmadinejad found a friend in Russia. Russia offered a partnership that elevated Iran from the shadows of international diplomacy and brought it to new levels. With Russian President Vladimir Putin's repeated criticisms of U.S. policy, Iran now had a major voice in international affairs - as well as a country which possessed the ability to veto any measures drafted in the UN Security Council.
With Russia's increased involvement with Tehran, there are several issues of concern. In 2005, it is reported that trade between the two countries was in excess of $1 billion, making Russia the seventh largest exporter to Iran. Estimates suggest that exports from Russia could grow to $10 billion annually within years. With such an invested stake in Iranian exports, Russian desire to impose increased sanctions has predictably been in opposition. It should be no surprise then that on September 29, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that he saw "no need for urgent measures against Iran." Those comments were made one week after an IAEA report criticized Iran for not allowing the agency to fully investigate certain aspects of the nuclear program.
The chief area of trade that has seen a spike under Ahmadinejad's presidency is arms sales, which has put Russian arms dealers as the chief suppliers to Iran. In 2006 Michael Eisenstadt, director of the Washington's Institute for Near East Policy's Military and Security Studies Program, said that the Islamic Republic was specifically seeking to increase it's air defense capabilities.
Late last year, the announcement came that Russia had agreed to sell Iran its S-300 air defense system, one of the most advanced of its kind. Capable of tracking around 100 targets simultaneously while intercepting up to 12 from a distance of over 100 miles, the reported sale was for deployment specifically around Iranian nuclear sites to dissuade Israel from any air strike on such sites. Now, amid reports that the system could be delivered by late this year, both Russia and Iran refuse to confirm nor deny whether there is such an agreement. The Russian Foreign Ministry has only stated that "we do not intend to deliver those types of arms to countries which are located in troubled regions." However, Russia has deployed the S-300 in Syria and the director for the Russian arms exports agency, Rosoboronexport, was quoted by Russian media on September 17 that his agency was in advanced negotiations to sell S-300 missiles to Iran. The agency later issued a statement denying that it had sold such missiles to Iran, but did not speak to whether or not there were talks for their sale. It is highly probable that Iran will seek to enhance its defenses around facilities such as its Bushehr reactor, which the Russian agency Atomstroyexport has stated should be operational by early to mid 2009.
While the official dealings of the Russian government remain unclear with Tehran, the most frightening component of all remains an ever present force in the Russian economy. Black market arms dealers continue to operate with relative ease in Moscow, creating a dangerous link with the Russian government that could extend into Iran and its proxies such as Hizbullah. To see the cooperation that exists between Russian officials and black market arms dealers, one need not look further than the case of Viktor Bout, the "Lord of War," who was arrested in Thailand in March. After Thai authorities agreed to drop their charges to allow a quicker extradition to the U.S., where he faces several charges related to terrorism, there have been several reports that the Russian Foreign Ministry is attempting to broker military sales with the Thai prime minister in exchange for Bout. According to Douglas Farah, despite a 20o2 Interpol Red Notice requiring Bout's arrest and a Belgian warrant for his arrest for money laundering, Bout resided in Moscow and used at least five Russian passports.
Bout is just one example of how Russia has used the black market to insert itself into the global dynamics, enabling and controlling conflict. Russian weapons were present in the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese conflict, which allowed Hizbullah to use advanced armor-piercing Russian missiles. Farah has stated that "such activities project Russian power, at a time when the Putin government is desperate to project Russian power across the world, as well as provide outlets for the sale of Russian weapons." Reports of late, most recently in September by Vice President Dick Cheney, suggested that Russian weapons sold to Syria were ending up in the hands of Hizbullah forces in Lebanon. The increasing concern should be the shadowy trend of Russian deals, specifically regarding the sales of weapons and the continued blind eye given by the Russian government regarding black market operations inside its country.
A growing problem is the scenario of black market sales regarding nuclear material originating in Russia. The growing trend of smuggling nuclear material from Russia has taken a path through the two territories where the Russian-Georgian crisis began in September - Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Most of the time, sellers attempt to sell off spent material that would prove useless in the construction of a nuclear weapon. However, there have been several arrests made by Georgian authorities that involve Russian individuals attempting to smuggle Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Last year, a Russian national was sentenced to eight years in a Georgian jail for attempting to sell 100 g of HEU for $1 million. Experts say that while the quality of the material would be suitable in weapons construction, the quantity remained insufficient. It should be noted that so far in Georgia, there have been publicized arrests in 2003 and 2006 that involved the attempted sale of HEU.
There are substantial implications for the fight against terrorism if the international community can not lure Russia to cooperate in an international effort. While Russia states that it will not do business in "troubled regions," its black market agents are involved in conflicts ranging from Africa to the Mideast to Latin America. The partnership of Russia and Iran brings in the component of a criminal network to Tehran's quest for globalization. The ability by both Iran and Russia to mask their global activities promotes a relationship that is dangerous to international affairs and creates yet another obstacle in resolving the West's standoff regarding Iran's nuclear activities. Through Iran's network of terrorist proxies, as well as Russia's connection to global crime, another dangerous alliance has been formed that compromises international security concerns at a time when the UN has sought to create a comprehensive, global effort to combat terrorism globally.
Monday, September 29, 2008
Update on Pt. II of Iran's influence
As I wrote my piece on Iran's influence in Africa last week, details began to come in over an ongoing incident off of Somalia's coast.
On August 21, a team of nearly 40 pirates armed with RPGs and AK-47s blocked the passage of an Iranian cargo ship. The captain of the MV Iran Deyanat was forced to surrender his ship to the Somali pirates, who were banking on another vessel to add to their captured fleet of nearly a dozen vessels.
Immediately, questions should surface over the Deyanat's declared cargo of "minerals" and "industrial products." Both industries that the Revolutionary Guard holds a heavy stake in.
Affirming suspicions, the MV Iran Deyanat is owned and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a state-owned company run by the Iranian military and included in a list of companies blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Dept. on September 10. The official statement explains the extent of IRISL's collusion with Iranian entities.
"Not only does IRISL facilitate the transport of cargo for U.N. designated proliferators, it also falsifies documents and uses deceptive schemes to shroud its involvement in illicit commerce," said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "IRISL's actions are part of a broader pattern of deception and fabrication that Iran uses to advance its nuclear and missile programs."
Upon the hijacking of the Deyanat, the crew of 29 was separated from the vessel after the pirates moved it to a fishing village in northeastern Somalia, Eyl. Reportedly within days after the pirates boarded the vessel to search the cargo, several of them fell "gravely ill." Andrew Mwangura, Director of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Program, has confirmed the claim by the pirates of several fatalities. The fatalities have been attributed to individuals who came in contact with the ship's cargo containers. Many of the individuals suffered skin burns and loss of hair (which many have suggested is indicative of radiation or chemical exposure).
After news of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the ship reached the government of the region in Garowe, a delegation was dispatched to negotiate with the pirates. Led by Minister of Minerals and Oil Hassan Allore Osman, the team was sent on September 4. Osman has said during the six days of negotiations with the pirates, the group had members become ill and die. Osman's assessment of the vessel:
"That ship is unusual. It is not carrying a normal shipment."
The pirates reportedly threatened to blow up the ship's cargo hold should the government attempt to force a search of the vessel. The pirates stated that they had been unsuccessful at opening the ship's seven cargo containers due to not possessing the access codes. After the standoff, Osman was able to establish contact with members of the ship's crew and ask questions pertaining to the cargo. The captain and engineer of the Deyanat reportedly shared different answers when asked about what they were transporting. What initially was crude oil then developed into minerals over the questioning.
The tale gets more interesting with the establishment of the ransom by the pirates. Set at $2 million, the Iranian government reportedly had agreed to pay the price and had moved $200,000 to a local broker in hopes of finalizing the release. Then came the September 10 sanctions announcement, which triggered Iran to call off the deal. With an increased U.S. naval presence off the coast, the Iranians could not gain access to the ship. All hopes of moving the ship out of the region without interception were shattered, leaving the ship still off of Eyl. Iranian media has reported the U.S. has offered $7 million for the ship.
The ultimate answer of what is on the MV Iran Deyanat still remains in the ship's cargo containers. Officials in Somalia suggest that the ship was carrying weapons destined for Eritrea, and ultimately Islamist militants fighting in Somalia. At the very least, it is known small arms were destined for the country's jihadist movement. However, due to the circumstances surrounding the Deyanat's seizure, it is highly probable that chemical weapons were destined for the militants as well. Iran has an involvement with the Somali rebels, having sent the Islamic Courts Union anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry in 2006. Furthermore, a UN report from the same year states that Iran sent two representatives to negotiate with the ICU for access to Somalia's uranium mines.
As Iran's influence in well-established regions of Africa has soared, it's increased involvement in fresh areas should be of great concern. Whatever is on the Deyanat, it is of interest to a great deal of officials. The ship's links to the Iranian government shows that Tehran's military is still flaunting its abilities to circumvent any actions taken against it. Should Iran be able to secure the ship's release from the pirates, chances are the ship will end up scrubbed in hopes of leaving questions unanswered. It remains pretty clear that there is no intention of moving it so long as the U.S. has Task Force 150 perched off the coast ready to intercept.
On August 21, a team of nearly 40 pirates armed with RPGs and AK-47s blocked the passage of an Iranian cargo ship. The captain of the MV Iran Deyanat was forced to surrender his ship to the Somali pirates, who were banking on another vessel to add to their captured fleet of nearly a dozen vessels.
Immediately, questions should surface over the Deyanat's declared cargo of "minerals" and "industrial products." Both industries that the Revolutionary Guard holds a heavy stake in.
Affirming suspicions, the MV Iran Deyanat is owned and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a state-owned company run by the Iranian military and included in a list of companies blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Dept. on September 10. The official statement explains the extent of IRISL's collusion with Iranian entities.
"Not only does IRISL facilitate the transport of cargo for U.N. designated proliferators, it also falsifies documents and uses deceptive schemes to shroud its involvement in illicit commerce," said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "IRISL's actions are part of a broader pattern of deception and fabrication that Iran uses to advance its nuclear and missile programs."
Upon the hijacking of the Deyanat, the crew of 29 was separated from the vessel after the pirates moved it to a fishing village in northeastern Somalia, Eyl. Reportedly within days after the pirates boarded the vessel to search the cargo, several of them fell "gravely ill." Andrew Mwangura, Director of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Program, has confirmed the claim by the pirates of several fatalities. The fatalities have been attributed to individuals who came in contact with the ship's cargo containers. Many of the individuals suffered skin burns and loss of hair (which many have suggested is indicative of radiation or chemical exposure).
After news of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the ship reached the government of the region in Garowe, a delegation was dispatched to negotiate with the pirates. Led by Minister of Minerals and Oil Hassan Allore Osman, the team was sent on September 4. Osman has said during the six days of negotiations with the pirates, the group had members become ill and die. Osman's assessment of the vessel:
"That ship is unusual. It is not carrying a normal shipment."
The pirates reportedly threatened to blow up the ship's cargo hold should the government attempt to force a search of the vessel. The pirates stated that they had been unsuccessful at opening the ship's seven cargo containers due to not possessing the access codes. After the standoff, Osman was able to establish contact with members of the ship's crew and ask questions pertaining to the cargo. The captain and engineer of the Deyanat reportedly shared different answers when asked about what they were transporting. What initially was crude oil then developed into minerals over the questioning.
The tale gets more interesting with the establishment of the ransom by the pirates. Set at $2 million, the Iranian government reportedly had agreed to pay the price and had moved $200,000 to a local broker in hopes of finalizing the release. Then came the September 10 sanctions announcement, which triggered Iran to call off the deal. With an increased U.S. naval presence off the coast, the Iranians could not gain access to the ship. All hopes of moving the ship out of the region without interception were shattered, leaving the ship still off of Eyl. Iranian media has reported the U.S. has offered $7 million for the ship.
The ultimate answer of what is on the MV Iran Deyanat still remains in the ship's cargo containers. Officials in Somalia suggest that the ship was carrying weapons destined for Eritrea, and ultimately Islamist militants fighting in Somalia. At the very least, it is known small arms were destined for the country's jihadist movement. However, due to the circumstances surrounding the Deyanat's seizure, it is highly probable that chemical weapons were destined for the militants as well. Iran has an involvement with the Somali rebels, having sent the Islamic Courts Union anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry in 2006. Furthermore, a UN report from the same year states that Iran sent two representatives to negotiate with the ICU for access to Somalia's uranium mines.
As Iran's influence in well-established regions of Africa has soared, it's increased involvement in fresh areas should be of great concern. Whatever is on the Deyanat, it is of interest to a great deal of officials. The ship's links to the Iranian government shows that Tehran's military is still flaunting its abilities to circumvent any actions taken against it. Should Iran be able to secure the ship's release from the pirates, chances are the ship will end up scrubbed in hopes of leaving questions unanswered. It remains pretty clear that there is no intention of moving it so long as the U.S. has Task Force 150 perched off the coast ready to intercept.
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