As weeks have passed since the attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi that killed 4 Americans, including the U.S. Ambassador Chris Stevens, answers regarding the exact details of the plot seem to be nonexistent. I believe that within the hours following the attack, just by assessing the predominate groups operating in the region that would select a U.S. target, AQIM (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) would be placed as a prime suspect in the attack. While Ambassador Susan Rice explained that she believed the attack was a spontaneous assault by elements loyal to Qaddafi, the basis for the target selection just doesn't add up. Such groups are largely disorganized and lack the firepower to select a target such as a U.S. Consulate, that would undeniably get a response utilizing American firepower, the likes of which they could not withstand. It would, to say the least, have been a suicide mission.
If this had been a pro-Qaddafi outfit responsible, it would have been more than likely that you would have seen something similar to the likes of Al-Shabaab in the targeting of Somalian and Ethiopian forces as well as the attempted assassination of the new Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahamud. That attack came the day following the Libyan and Egyptian incidents. Shabaab's template is one that seeks to largely destabilize the region and complicate interactions between Ethiopia and Somalia, which have mutually agreed to hunt down the group's fighters and have offered ceasefires.
What is particularly alarming is that with AQIM's involvement in this attack, the group has signaled they are willing to target Americans similar to Al-Qaida's 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The group had remained silent since the failed 1993 World Trade Center attack, utilizing the time to organize and equip its fighters for missions. Now, after 11 years since the attack that killed 3,031, Al-Qaida is continuing a familiar pattern. Without a doubt the group lacks the ability to perpetrate a large-scale attack like 9/11/01, but it can enhance its ability by perpetrating small-scale attacks on targets that are outside of U.S. borders and largely vulnerable like embassies or consulates. Make no mistake, the point of surveillance is to find weaknesses and our embassies no matter how fortified we attempt to make them will always have a soft spot without the cooperation of foreign governments to protect the outer perimeters. If such protection existed in places like Egypt, our embassy there would not have encountered such a threatening scenario as it did had Egyptian police responded and immediately attempted to disperse the crowds.
For instance, the 2008 attempted attack on the U.S. Consulate is an example of how the system should work. When the attackers approached the compound, Turkish police immediately returned fire killing all three. Three police officers were killed and one injured during the attempted attack but those officers did their jobs to do what is Turkey's responsibility - insuring that the threat did not make it inside the Consulate's walls.
This situation should ask the real question, and this is not the issue that most seem to make out about the attack in Benghazi. That rocket was fired from outside the compound on Libyan soil. The real question we should be asking is how did protesters encounter almost no resistance in storming our embassy in Egypt? What does this signal as to how safe our facility is if police are either ordered to not intervene or allow such a threat to continue? Had the groups outside been armed, it would have been exactly like August 7, 1998 when two U.S. installations in Africa were attacked. However, those attacks were truck bombs blending into traffic and not part of a targeted assault from a mob. It is incomprehensible to me how Egyptian police could have let people scale our walls, climb our building and yet they seemed to have done nothing to disperse the crowd outside.
It is my belief that the protests were an attempt by either Al-Qaida itself or pro-Qaida groups to utilize unarmed people and provoke a U.S. response once the embassy's territory was breached that would result in what would undoubtedly be labeled a massacre of unarmed martyrs - an undeniable win for Qaida recruiting. However, I believe that the Libyan attack was the work of AQIM in what either was a concerted effort with regional partners and minimal AQ Central involvement. This means I do not believe that the leaders of AQ were involved in the details of any of these incidents. I believe what you are seeing is Al-Qaida's involvement in taking its fights rather from a global jihad, or "glocal terrorism" which mixes local and global, traditional and imported practices, as well as high and low technologies. The pioneer for this template is Hizbullah, considered the A-team in terrorism by experts.
Despite the opening in 2008 of Africom, the Central command for U.S. operations in Africa, the continent houses what has always been a vulnerable host for terrorism. Recruiting, financing, laundering, whatever criminal operations that need to take place to promote jihadism all comes from this continent. Iran and Hizbullah have massive networks in the country, as well as Al-Qaida's previous involvement in the Blood Diamond trade that was journaled in Doug Farah's book "Blood from Stones". The political instability and lawlessness that comes with it, as well as the Muslim population, make Africa a prime host for the jihad envisioned by Al-Qaida. Undoubtedly, breaking this mold is something that requires international cooperation and partnerships that will require years to even attempt to tap into and reverse the networks which have been rooted for decades now. It is my hope that both presidential candidates will take the threats emerging in Africa seriously, as well as AQAP (Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula) in Yemen and recognize the development of the glocal trend.
9-11-01
Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Somalia. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 2, 2012
Monday, August 16, 2010
Are we really even fighting a war anymore?
The War on Terror was designed with the intent to disrupt the leadership network of Al-Qaida that was instrumental behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since operations began a month after the attacks in 2001, the U.S. has eliminated numerous senior figures and seasoned veterans of the mujahideen that made up Al-Qaida Central. The leadership of Al-Qaida has been replaced now by a movement made up of collective pockets of fighters distributed among the globe, all seeking to develop the momentum that Al-Qaida once enjoyed.
The attacks in Uganda during the World Cup evidence this, showing that as many experts have suggested for some time that the general trend of terrorist groups turning from promoting their agenda in a local, regional based setting into a global movement applies now to the Shabaab of Somalia. The twin bombings exercised the group's intent to disrupt a global event with violence in order to attract the attention of the viewing public. It is more than likely that the group did not have the resources and capabilities to penetrate the security apparatus surrounding Cape Town.
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula gained recognition upon the failed bombing of Northwest 253 on Christmas Day last year. The group previously was responsible primarily for Al-Qaida operations inside Saudi Arabia, using the lacking government of President Saleh of Yemen in order to gain refuge across the border. Anwar al-Awlaki was able to use his charm in order to benefit the group by obtaining Westernized recruits who already spoke English and had no tell-tale red flags.
Al-Qaida Central, based in Pakistan, is largely disrupted in my analysis. Figureheads like Osama bin Laden control the public front of the group, but hold no true value outside of their immediate location. The recordings simply are a ploy for credibility in the Muslim world, utilizing the once strong persona that bin Laden and his leaders once held when they were capable of attacks such as the Embassy bombings of 1998. The destruction that Al-Qaida was able to claim actually was linked to bin Laden's direct leadership, rather than a network of regional leaders who operated freely and independent of the group's chain of command.
The U.S. has failed at providing any real results in the War on Terror, opting to ignore developing threats until innocent lives have been claimed. The days of assigning any associates to Al-Qaida on the blacklists has been replaced by simply waiting until those associates have blood on their hands to place them under any sanctions. Intelligence is an invaluable asset in any war, especially a war where the enemy is everywhere. The ability to produce HUMINT in this war has proven extremely difficult. The only able way is to put eyes and ears everywhere, providing assistance in the local tribes that make up the many regions where Al-Qaida's partners find haven.
A grassroots-up strategy would provide the most assistance to those impacted most by an unstable country, especially in Afghanistan and Yemen. The defining problem in most situations is that the local tribes have no reason to believe in a corrupt national government that exists inside the bubble of the capital. By providing aid to those who experience the insurgency violence on a day-to-day basis and standing beside them, there is hope in gaining assets that can prove effective in designing larger counter terrorism strategies. Fighting a war is hard work, but it is something that takes time, patience, and a collective effort in order to achieve success.
The attacks in Uganda during the World Cup evidence this, showing that as many experts have suggested for some time that the general trend of terrorist groups turning from promoting their agenda in a local, regional based setting into a global movement applies now to the Shabaab of Somalia. The twin bombings exercised the group's intent to disrupt a global event with violence in order to attract the attention of the viewing public. It is more than likely that the group did not have the resources and capabilities to penetrate the security apparatus surrounding Cape Town.
Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula gained recognition upon the failed bombing of Northwest 253 on Christmas Day last year. The group previously was responsible primarily for Al-Qaida operations inside Saudi Arabia, using the lacking government of President Saleh of Yemen in order to gain refuge across the border. Anwar al-Awlaki was able to use his charm in order to benefit the group by obtaining Westernized recruits who already spoke English and had no tell-tale red flags.
Al-Qaida Central, based in Pakistan, is largely disrupted in my analysis. Figureheads like Osama bin Laden control the public front of the group, but hold no true value outside of their immediate location. The recordings simply are a ploy for credibility in the Muslim world, utilizing the once strong persona that bin Laden and his leaders once held when they were capable of attacks such as the Embassy bombings of 1998. The destruction that Al-Qaida was able to claim actually was linked to bin Laden's direct leadership, rather than a network of regional leaders who operated freely and independent of the group's chain of command.
The U.S. has failed at providing any real results in the War on Terror, opting to ignore developing threats until innocent lives have been claimed. The days of assigning any associates to Al-Qaida on the blacklists has been replaced by simply waiting until those associates have blood on their hands to place them under any sanctions. Intelligence is an invaluable asset in any war, especially a war where the enemy is everywhere. The ability to produce HUMINT in this war has proven extremely difficult. The only able way is to put eyes and ears everywhere, providing assistance in the local tribes that make up the many regions where Al-Qaida's partners find haven.
A grassroots-up strategy would provide the most assistance to those impacted most by an unstable country, especially in Afghanistan and Yemen. The defining problem in most situations is that the local tribes have no reason to believe in a corrupt national government that exists inside the bubble of the capital. By providing aid to those who experience the insurgency violence on a day-to-day basis and standing beside them, there is hope in gaining assets that can prove effective in designing larger counter terrorism strategies. Fighting a war is hard work, but it is something that takes time, patience, and a collective effort in order to achieve success.
Friday, March 20, 2009
The danger of generalizing terrorism
As several measures of legislation are being reversed and established in terror cases in the U.S. under the new administration, we are effectively facing a major dilemma that could resurface in the imminent future. Rewind back to September 12, 2001, when using the word terrorist captured the atrocities committed the day previous. That day we saw jihad from a radical Islamic element, which used our way of life against us.
Under the Obama administration's brief two months in office, the future of identifying international terrorists and those with links seems to be rewinding back to the pre-9/11 days full of murky labels that fail to address the criminal elements that drive global terror organizations. While many of the politically-driven critics look to suggest that such maneuvers will reduce law enforcement's capabilities to stop the next mass-casualty attacks, there is a far more dangerous potential.
Over the past few months, several outlets have reported the FBI's attempts to monitor the Somali community in Minneapolis. This effort was established shortly after a suicide bombing in Somalia was orchestrated by Shirwa Ahmed, a missing Somali-American from Minnesota. It was soon discovered that several groups of young men from specifically the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center. The mosque has denied any links and condemned suicide bombings as a whole.
However, the alarming concern should be that there are at least a dozen young men who travelled abroad to support jihad in Somalia from our country. How will the international community perceive our ability to fight terrorists when Americans are perpetrating attacks overseas? This is a crucial moment as Al-Qaida is thrusting more of its abilities into Somalia yet again, evidenced by Osama bin Laden's March 19 recording and Ayman Zawahiri's February 2009 video. It is expected that Al-Shabaab, already ideologically linked with bin Laden, will pledge ties in the near future to Al-Qaida.
There is a dangerous problem posed to us here in the U.S. as to whether or not we can win the War on Terror. Simply put, the international support for combating terror will diminish drastically if more American citizens surface as perpetrators of terrorist acts abroad. We can not ask of other countries what we can not effectively do. Somalia is breeding a new wave of jihad yet again, and Al-Shabaab has been active in threatening the U.S. as well as most recently denouncing the new government in the country. With a potential active recruiting cell operating domestically, the future for Al-Shabaab to be the active global cell for Al-Qaida could render severe consequences in the global War on Terror and undermine the U.S. ability to pioneer counter terror initiatives.
Under the Obama administration's brief two months in office, the future of identifying international terrorists and those with links seems to be rewinding back to the pre-9/11 days full of murky labels that fail to address the criminal elements that drive global terror organizations. While many of the politically-driven critics look to suggest that such maneuvers will reduce law enforcement's capabilities to stop the next mass-casualty attacks, there is a far more dangerous potential.
Over the past few months, several outlets have reported the FBI's attempts to monitor the Somali community in Minneapolis. This effort was established shortly after a suicide bombing in Somalia was orchestrated by Shirwa Ahmed, a missing Somali-American from Minnesota. It was soon discovered that several groups of young men from specifically the Abubakar As-Saddique Islamic Center. The mosque has denied any links and condemned suicide bombings as a whole.
However, the alarming concern should be that there are at least a dozen young men who travelled abroad to support jihad in Somalia from our country. How will the international community perceive our ability to fight terrorists when Americans are perpetrating attacks overseas? This is a crucial moment as Al-Qaida is thrusting more of its abilities into Somalia yet again, evidenced by Osama bin Laden's March 19 recording and Ayman Zawahiri's February 2009 video. It is expected that Al-Shabaab, already ideologically linked with bin Laden, will pledge ties in the near future to Al-Qaida.
There is a dangerous problem posed to us here in the U.S. as to whether or not we can win the War on Terror. Simply put, the international support for combating terror will diminish drastically if more American citizens surface as perpetrators of terrorist acts abroad. We can not ask of other countries what we can not effectively do. Somalia is breeding a new wave of jihad yet again, and Al-Shabaab has been active in threatening the U.S. as well as most recently denouncing the new government in the country. With a potential active recruiting cell operating domestically, the future for Al-Shabaab to be the active global cell for Al-Qaida could render severe consequences in the global War on Terror and undermine the U.S. ability to pioneer counter terror initiatives.
Monday, September 29, 2008
Update on Pt. II of Iran's influence
As I wrote my piece on Iran's influence in Africa last week, details began to come in over an ongoing incident off of Somalia's coast.
On August 21, a team of nearly 40 pirates armed with RPGs and AK-47s blocked the passage of an Iranian cargo ship. The captain of the MV Iran Deyanat was forced to surrender his ship to the Somali pirates, who were banking on another vessel to add to their captured fleet of nearly a dozen vessels.
Immediately, questions should surface over the Deyanat's declared cargo of "minerals" and "industrial products." Both industries that the Revolutionary Guard holds a heavy stake in.
Affirming suspicions, the MV Iran Deyanat is owned and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a state-owned company run by the Iranian military and included in a list of companies blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Dept. on September 10. The official statement explains the extent of IRISL's collusion with Iranian entities.
"Not only does IRISL facilitate the transport of cargo for U.N. designated proliferators, it also falsifies documents and uses deceptive schemes to shroud its involvement in illicit commerce," said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "IRISL's actions are part of a broader pattern of deception and fabrication that Iran uses to advance its nuclear and missile programs."
Upon the hijacking of the Deyanat, the crew of 29 was separated from the vessel after the pirates moved it to a fishing village in northeastern Somalia, Eyl. Reportedly within days after the pirates boarded the vessel to search the cargo, several of them fell "gravely ill." Andrew Mwangura, Director of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Program, has confirmed the claim by the pirates of several fatalities. The fatalities have been attributed to individuals who came in contact with the ship's cargo containers. Many of the individuals suffered skin burns and loss of hair (which many have suggested is indicative of radiation or chemical exposure).
After news of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the ship reached the government of the region in Garowe, a delegation was dispatched to negotiate with the pirates. Led by Minister of Minerals and Oil Hassan Allore Osman, the team was sent on September 4. Osman has said during the six days of negotiations with the pirates, the group had members become ill and die. Osman's assessment of the vessel:
"That ship is unusual. It is not carrying a normal shipment."
The pirates reportedly threatened to blow up the ship's cargo hold should the government attempt to force a search of the vessel. The pirates stated that they had been unsuccessful at opening the ship's seven cargo containers due to not possessing the access codes. After the standoff, Osman was able to establish contact with members of the ship's crew and ask questions pertaining to the cargo. The captain and engineer of the Deyanat reportedly shared different answers when asked about what they were transporting. What initially was crude oil then developed into minerals over the questioning.
The tale gets more interesting with the establishment of the ransom by the pirates. Set at $2 million, the Iranian government reportedly had agreed to pay the price and had moved $200,000 to a local broker in hopes of finalizing the release. Then came the September 10 sanctions announcement, which triggered Iran to call off the deal. With an increased U.S. naval presence off the coast, the Iranians could not gain access to the ship. All hopes of moving the ship out of the region without interception were shattered, leaving the ship still off of Eyl. Iranian media has reported the U.S. has offered $7 million for the ship.
The ultimate answer of what is on the MV Iran Deyanat still remains in the ship's cargo containers. Officials in Somalia suggest that the ship was carrying weapons destined for Eritrea, and ultimately Islamist militants fighting in Somalia. At the very least, it is known small arms were destined for the country's jihadist movement. However, due to the circumstances surrounding the Deyanat's seizure, it is highly probable that chemical weapons were destined for the militants as well. Iran has an involvement with the Somali rebels, having sent the Islamic Courts Union anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry in 2006. Furthermore, a UN report from the same year states that Iran sent two representatives to negotiate with the ICU for access to Somalia's uranium mines.
As Iran's influence in well-established regions of Africa has soared, it's increased involvement in fresh areas should be of great concern. Whatever is on the Deyanat, it is of interest to a great deal of officials. The ship's links to the Iranian government shows that Tehran's military is still flaunting its abilities to circumvent any actions taken against it. Should Iran be able to secure the ship's release from the pirates, chances are the ship will end up scrubbed in hopes of leaving questions unanswered. It remains pretty clear that there is no intention of moving it so long as the U.S. has Task Force 150 perched off the coast ready to intercept.
On August 21, a team of nearly 40 pirates armed with RPGs and AK-47s blocked the passage of an Iranian cargo ship. The captain of the MV Iran Deyanat was forced to surrender his ship to the Somali pirates, who were banking on another vessel to add to their captured fleet of nearly a dozen vessels.
Immediately, questions should surface over the Deyanat's declared cargo of "minerals" and "industrial products." Both industries that the Revolutionary Guard holds a heavy stake in.
Affirming suspicions, the MV Iran Deyanat is owned and operated by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which is a state-owned company run by the Iranian military and included in a list of companies blacklisted by the U.S. Treasury Dept. on September 10. The official statement explains the extent of IRISL's collusion with Iranian entities.
"Not only does IRISL facilitate the transport of cargo for U.N. designated proliferators, it also falsifies documents and uses deceptive schemes to shroud its involvement in illicit commerce," said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. "IRISL's actions are part of a broader pattern of deception and fabrication that Iran uses to advance its nuclear and missile programs."
Upon the hijacking of the Deyanat, the crew of 29 was separated from the vessel after the pirates moved it to a fishing village in northeastern Somalia, Eyl. Reportedly within days after the pirates boarded the vessel to search the cargo, several of them fell "gravely ill." Andrew Mwangura, Director of the East African Seafarers' Assistance Program, has confirmed the claim by the pirates of several fatalities. The fatalities have been attributed to individuals who came in contact with the ship's cargo containers. Many of the individuals suffered skin burns and loss of hair (which many have suggested is indicative of radiation or chemical exposure).
After news of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the ship reached the government of the region in Garowe, a delegation was dispatched to negotiate with the pirates. Led by Minister of Minerals and Oil Hassan Allore Osman, the team was sent on September 4. Osman has said during the six days of negotiations with the pirates, the group had members become ill and die. Osman's assessment of the vessel:
"That ship is unusual. It is not carrying a normal shipment."
The pirates reportedly threatened to blow up the ship's cargo hold should the government attempt to force a search of the vessel. The pirates stated that they had been unsuccessful at opening the ship's seven cargo containers due to not possessing the access codes. After the standoff, Osman was able to establish contact with members of the ship's crew and ask questions pertaining to the cargo. The captain and engineer of the Deyanat reportedly shared different answers when asked about what they were transporting. What initially was crude oil then developed into minerals over the questioning.
The tale gets more interesting with the establishment of the ransom by the pirates. Set at $2 million, the Iranian government reportedly had agreed to pay the price and had moved $200,000 to a local broker in hopes of finalizing the release. Then came the September 10 sanctions announcement, which triggered Iran to call off the deal. With an increased U.S. naval presence off the coast, the Iranians could not gain access to the ship. All hopes of moving the ship out of the region without interception were shattered, leaving the ship still off of Eyl. Iranian media has reported the U.S. has offered $7 million for the ship.
The ultimate answer of what is on the MV Iran Deyanat still remains in the ship's cargo containers. Officials in Somalia suggest that the ship was carrying weapons destined for Eritrea, and ultimately Islamist militants fighting in Somalia. At the very least, it is known small arms were destined for the country's jihadist movement. However, due to the circumstances surrounding the Deyanat's seizure, it is highly probable that chemical weapons were destined for the militants as well. Iran has an involvement with the Somali rebels, having sent the Islamic Courts Union anti-aircraft and anti-tank weaponry in 2006. Furthermore, a UN report from the same year states that Iran sent two representatives to negotiate with the ICU for access to Somalia's uranium mines.
As Iran's influence in well-established regions of Africa has soared, it's increased involvement in fresh areas should be of great concern. Whatever is on the Deyanat, it is of interest to a great deal of officials. The ship's links to the Iranian government shows that Tehran's military is still flaunting its abilities to circumvent any actions taken against it. Should Iran be able to secure the ship's release from the pirates, chances are the ship will end up scrubbed in hopes of leaving questions unanswered. It remains pretty clear that there is no intention of moving it so long as the U.S. has Task Force 150 perched off the coast ready to intercept.
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