Examining Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula

Since the failed attempt on Christmas day to bring down a Northwest Airlines flight, Yemen has continued to make mention in nearly every story of the incident and the country's links to terror are making headlines. It has been well-known that Al-Qaida has significant support and links inside the country, however the U.S. has not received a great deal of cooperation from the government which opts to let the already fragile security situation continue to deteriorate. President Saleh's sphere of influence reaches as far out as the capital, after that the country is filled with autonomous tribes and a government that is largely sympathetic to the jihadist sentiment that makes up Al-Qaida.


To those who have followed the development of Al-Qaida since the 2001 Afghanistan it is well-known that there are two major havens for the group now in which it can recruit and train freely - Northern Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Both locations have reportedly witnessed an influx of Westerners who have received training, raising the concerns of intelligence. The advantages of both locations being they offer delicate governments who can not use the resources to fight the terrorists in their countries, which is conveniently where the U.S. steps in more times than none. Some countries take the fight seriously, such as President Bouteflika of Algeria. Others, like President Saleh in Yemen refuse to confront the jihadist threat coming from their country.


Following the 2000 bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in the Port of Aden, the government in Yemen refused to respond and even had Parliament members call for jihad against the West as FBI investigators were arriving in the country. It has been reported that when agents requested to talk to any Yemenis believed to be involved in the attack, President Saleh's government denied any access. One of those individuals reportedly was a member of the President's family and a colonel in the Political Security Organization (PSO). There has been no justice inside Yemen against those who perpetrated the Cole bombing.

Nearly all of the individuals charged in Yemen have experienced their sentences being commuted from death to a matter of years, and the heaviest sentence delivered was fifteen years for the group's leader, Jamal Muhammad al-Badawi, who had his death sentence commuted. He managed to escape prison for the second time in 2006 along with 17 other accused terrorists and remains at large. Jaber Elbaneh, a Yemeni-American accused of being involved in the 2001 "Lackawanna Six" plot, has been living in Yemen and living under the protection of President Saleh while avoiding justice in the United States despite a $5 million reward.

Inside Yemen, Al-Qaida has a great deal of support from within the Saleh government and in the general public. The country is filled with anti-Western sentiment, fueled by the U.S. military action in Iraq. As the media looks at "Al-Qaida's new haven" inside his country, President Saleh is capitalizing off of this title to appeal and secure Western funds. He apparently will allow action in the tribal areas, but when it comes to the wanted terrorists like Elbaneh there is no cooperation. Terrorism is a business in Yemen, and it is unlikely that the U.S. will be able to work cooperatively in the long-term to stop Al-Qaida's influence in the country.

What should be noted about the failed Christmas Day attack

As the media continues into day three of its coverage of trying to find somebody to blame for the Christmas Day attempt on the Northwest Airlines flight, this finally has showed us how vulnerable we still are. This is not something that was a result of a new administration over the next twelve months, but rather an exploitation of where our Homeland Security Department is lacking. Had the bomb worked and passengers not been able to bring down Abdulmutallab, this attack would have been successful. Nowhere in that equation did the Homeland Security Department factor into stopping it until the pilot landed the plane.


What should be shown is just like with the Fort Hood shootings, the databases that we have are not serving any real purchase by placing suspect individuals into three categories. Major Hasan was disqualified because he exceeded the age parameters set by DHS that is based from the 20-30 year-old age range of the 9/11 attackers. In the case of Abdulmutallab, he was in one of the databases for possibly having suspect contacts, but apparently was not investigated further.


Ironically the highest threat level category is for those who travel to Pakistan or other countries where they could potentially receive training. In the age of Youtube and self-indoctrination, our classification system with these databases is outdated and as with all of our security measures, created as a reaction and not a preemptive intervention. If these are two individuals who can slip past our intelligence, how many more are out there?


The other factor in this attack is how Abdulmutallab was treated at the airport. With DHS money flowing to big cities like New York and Los Angeles, smaller cities are sometimes the last to receive advanced training and funding in DHS programs. Abdulmutallab had significant aspects of concern that should have been recognized beginning at the ticket counter. Why should a person making a nearly 8,000 mile trip travel with only a carry-on bag? The TSA has trained individuals who are meant to blend in at airports and spot potential red flags, however this did not factor in at all with this international flight.


Furthermore, the suspect's father voluntarily came into the U.S. embassy to warn that his son had been out of touch with him and he feared his connections. Apparently, this information did not get used to further investigate Abdulmutallab's travels and contacts and discern whether he was indeed a threat. Ultimately, his visa status was never questioned and he obviously was allowed to get on a plane to enter the U.S.


What the media is finally beginning to discuss is Abdulmutallab's background. The son of a wealthy Nigerian family, he lived a very privileged life. He had generous aspects to him, reportedly giving money to an orphanage rather than buy souvenirs on a class field trip to London. This incident verifies that economic status does not drive someone to jihad. It is their hatred for a way of life that the West believes in, where there are freedoms afforded in every aspect of life.


The enemy we are fighting should be taken seriously, it is not a group of insane schizophrenics. They are skilled fighters who train similar to militaries and are prepared to fight for their religion. The Islam they fight for they have perverted and it is essential that we understand that Muslims are not violent, but there are those present who seek to do harm. Examining a person with suspect ties is not a crime, and we need to be more aggressive in pushing the DHS out of the era of political correctness. Whenever anyone comes forward with information regarding terrorism, they should be taken seriously just as any local police force would take involving a criminal investigation. Greater standards need to be in place to categorize the individuals inside the present database system and make sure that information is continuously collected to either exonerate or elevate a person's presence on such a list.

A glance at the Christmas Day Northwest Airlines incident

As the media continues to fact check the reports surrounding the Northwest Airlines flight that made an emergency landing after a passenger attempted to detonate an explosive during landing, there are many questions that remain about the incident being described as an "Al-Qaida linked terrorist plot." According to the latest reports, the perpetrator was 23-year old Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian student at the University of London. It has been broadcast that he acquired the device from Yemen. This plot, if indeed Al-Qaida derived, could hold a great deal of information for the future of forecasting terror plots.


It is unknown whether or not the device did indeed originate in Yemen, however if it did and is traced to Al-Qaida it is unlikely the leadership for the group was involved in such a seemingly small-scale, traditional attack. This did not involve any new techniques, and is almost identical to the Richard Reid attempt almost exactly eight years ago. However, the use of a Nigerian by Al-Qaida is interesting as Africans have continued to be involved with recent Al-Qaida operations since 9/11.


The question remains whether or not this was an individual acting independently and is sympathetic to the jihadist movement or indeed took orders from Al-Qaida leadership. If he did and the plot is traced back to Yemen, the next question is was this plot created by Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula, which has traditionally stuck to attacking Saudi Arabia and Yemen but has expressed goals to perpetrate attacks in the West. If this is the group's first attempt to attack the U.S., acting independent of Al-Qaida central in Pakistan, this is a bold move made from what used to be an Al-Qaida franchise.


The question being if that this individual was in a database, is this another failure similar to the Fort Hood disaster of "rating" the threat level of individuals based on limited surveillance? While not on the "no fly list", Abdulmutallab was in a federal database. It would be safe to assume that he was being monitored by British authorities as well. How he got what was reportedly a liquid explosive device aboard despite restrictions after the 2006 transAtlantic bomb plot proves that we are still vulnerable.


In my opinion, this was not the next Al-Qaida attack. After being significantly weakened as the global jihadist movement due to a hiatus after the 9/11 attacks, Al-Qaida needs a powerful attack to reinforce its image in the Muslim world. Why would a terrorist detonate the explosive in the final stages of a nearly 4,000 mile flight? My concern rests in the ability to perpetrate attacks similar to Mumbai, which provided the terrorists with nearly 2 days of nonstop international coverage as they held hostages and killed people indiscriminately. I do believe that not enough safeguards have been taken to prevent such an attack, and that it could be achieved in another major city with relative ease. We are still vulnerable and this attempt proves that one breach is all it takes for another tragedy.

Are we fighting in Afghanistan?

After President Obama issued his orders to increase the U.S. troop presence in Afghanistan by an additional 30,000 troops, can we expect victory in Afghanistan? As Steve Schippert notes, the president has yet to express the U.S. ambitions as "victory" or "success", but rather stating that he seeks to "finish the job." As the speech mentioned a U.S. goal of beginning a withdrawal by 2011, this is hardly the type of language the Afghan people needed to hear as they endure the fragile security in their homes, towns, and provinces.



When we entered Afghanistan, we not only took on the task of removing the Taliban and Al-Qaida elements from the havens they once had, but made a pledge to the Afghan people. We're supposed to be the good guys, the ones fighting the good fight and confronting those who claim the lives of innocents. Our primary mission in Afghanistan should be to secure all provinces, not cede them over to Taliban control (as is reportedly being negotiated in the previous entry).


Afghanistan is winnable, but we need to work with the people who want to see change. The people on the ground who cast the votes and experience the threats of the Taliban everyday, not the false leadership of a Karzai administration. These are the people who have settled for the Taliban simply because they do not have the capabilities or resources to resist the Taliban's influence. They have turned to them as an alternative, not as an answer. Nobody - not a Karzai, not the U.S., nor NATO - has the ability to unite all the different groups present in the country under a government that actually functioned, much less the present administration.


This war is something that President Obama understands well, a grassroots war. Just as his presidential campaign went through many hardships, it was the fight that people had in small towns across states that propelled his election over a year ago. This can be applied to Afghanistan. Major Jim Gant, of the Special Forces that have fought in the country, has seen and interacted with the tribes that could very well win this war. He writes:

"Afghan tribes always have and always will resist any type of foreign intervention in their affairs. This includes a central government located in Kabul, which to them is a million miles away from their problems, a million miles away from their security."

In his report, One Tribe at a Time, Gant explains quite simply how we can fight the war in Afghanistan and still end up losing. Our mission is far more difficult than that of the Taliban, which he says is simply to not lose. The task of the U.S. and NATO is a difficult one, but by trying to unite the country behind a government similar to ours is a rather radical goal that Gant explains is not possible without the support of the tribes. While living among Malik Noorafzhal's tribe in Afghanistan, Gant witnessed the foremost responsibilities of any Afghan lie within their tribe.


Historically, Afghanistan has never found answers in a national government. Even with the most advanced military, our [the U.S.] soldiers can not achieve victory through technology alone. It was the spirit of the tribes that helped fight off the Soviets after all. Gant observes, after experiencing battle in both Iraq and Afghanistan, that "Afghanistan is by far the more difficult and brutal operational environment. The enemy there has never been defeated."


Quite simply the task at hand is hard. However, the U.S. needs to throw all its interest into training not only the members of the Afghan Army and National Police Force and focus on cooperating with the tribes. A military answer by itself is not possible, it will be the integration of our soldiers into the tribal networks that will propel the U.S.'s goals in the country and provide the security that the Afghanistan needs to become a functioning country.

U.S. talking with the Taliban?

Afghanistan is fallen. The cleanup the U.S. and NATO has to do in there is immensely difficult at this point. With President Obama continuing to mull over his options, now months after General McChrystal issued his report, what are we doing about this situation? According to the Saudi al-Watan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenbarry, has been discussing a ceasefire with Taliban elements as high as Foreign Minister Ahmad Mutawakil. Based on the report, the U.S. is offering Taliban control of 5 provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Kunar, and Nuristan) in return for a halt in attacks on U.S. bases.


The U.S. embassy in Riyadh has denied the claims, but sources in Afghanistan are saying that somebody is most definitely talking to the Taliban. Who can make such a call? Given the Taliban's continued threats of "absolute defeat" against the U.S. and NATO, I would venture to say that it isn't the Americans who are negotiating. Karzai has tried time and time again to make offers to the Taliban, only to end up bringing his country into escalated violence. Remember the April 2008 attack in Kabul on the Afghan Independence Day Parade that caused dignitaries and Karzai himself to flee the celebrations? That came shortly after Karzai had denounced the U.S. and NATO presence for civilian casualties.


Afghanistan remains winnable, if we start treating this like a war. We are seeking to make this a post-war situation when we have not won yet. The NATO forces need to pursue the elements creating chaos without restraint and seek to bring stability to the environment. Afghans have no confidence in their government, and just as the cartels that operated in Latin America or the gangs that operated in Chicago in the 1930s, the Taliban have risen as a parallel to a failed government. Negotiating with someone who is willing to recklessly target civilian lives simply because they do not adhere to Islam will be a failure. By allowing the possibility of the Taliban to operate in 5 provinces, or nearly 25% of the country, we only lend credibility to them and turn a blind eye to their acceptance of violence. That is just a reckless strategy.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. III)

However, the most recent case brought to the public attention is that of Najibullah Zazi. Zazi, who was arrested on September 19, 2009, for his involvement in a New York City terror plot. Details surrounding the plot continue to remain sealed by prosecutors, but a timeline of events places Zazi as a more mainstream radical jihadist subscribing to Al-Qaida's theology.

This case puts all traditional profiling into play – a 24-year old Afghan national who became a legal resident in the U.S. after immigrating in 1999. Zazi got married in 2006 to his cousin, who resides in Pakistan. He then reportedly began traveling to visit her and their two children annually. It was in the years following his visits where his customers at his coffee stand in New York noticed a change. He was said to have "grown a beard, wore traditional Islamic clothing, and was less friendly to his customers" (Gruen). A rather noticeable change from a boy who as a child enjoyed wearing stylish clothes and playing video games. The question remains where did Zazi embrace violent jihadist tactics as part of his beliefs – was it during his travels to Pakistan or could it have occurred at his home mosque in Flushing, New York? The mosque he and his family attended since immigrating to the U.S., Masjid Hazrat Abu Bakr, reportedly was split on support for the Taliban and Al-Qaida after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The split reportedly pushed the imam out at the time, who disapproved of the violence (Gruen).

It did not take long after Zazi's arrest, despite the evidence the government had, for Muslim groups to decry the police's tactics. Law enforcement officials in the days following Zazi's initial arrest were not sure as to how many more suspects there were and feared that the plot may still be in motion. Reportedly, Muslims in the Flushing, New York neighborhood that Zazi visited were subject to intensified questioning by police patrols on the ground. Immediately their fears of racial profiling were broadcast via blogs and media outlets.

The question remains how much did his ethnicity and religion play in the investigation process of Najibullah Zazi? According to a report, Zazi had contact with members of Al-Qaida's leadership overseas, which came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA then requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assume a domestic investigation.

The Zazi case proves a very important characteristic about profiling: that it can be a valuable tool to affirm suspicions about an individual. When partnered properly with various pieces of intelligence, profiling is a very useful tool for law enforcement in the fight to help identify those who seek to perpetrate violent acts. There is no doubt that had there been a profile before the 9/11 hijackers, we could have probably saved thousands of lives. By recognizing who was receiving training in the Al-Qaida camps of Sudan and Afghanistan during the 1990s, law enforcement would have been more vigilant to potential warning signs and red flags. Targeting an individual for their race or beliefs is wrong and counterproductive to the mission of this war. Community cooperation is essential, and risking the alienation of Muslims or other groups only hinders investigations. Every investigation should pursue what will be accepted in a court of law. Profiling is not a form of evidence that will prosecute an individual, however it assists law enforcement in the identification of security risks and how best to approach them.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. II)

One such case is that of the Liberty City Seven in Miami, Florida. Public skepticism has plagued such a case since its beginning, where many have argued that the defendants were merely financially-troubled African-Americans seeking an opportunity to raise money. Critics accused the government of instigating and seducing the defendants into such a plot. However, by examining the sentiments of the individuals and their language in audio recordings, the sentiment does exist clearly.

The accused cell leader, Narseal Batiste, countered claims that he requested money from a confidential informant in order to create a nonprofit religious organization and community outreach program in Liberty City (Reuters.com). While this case bears many suspicious ties to finances, the sentiment on the nearly 15,000 audio and video tapes used in testimony shows a sentiment either of insanity or total disregard for the activity he was associating with. The case was brought before a jury three times, with two mistrials declared during the process. By its third time, two defendants had been found not guilty and five others were convicted for their involvement.

In the recordings with the FBI informant, who many have said was not a credible source due to a history of domestic violence and other criminal offenses, Batiste stated that with his history in the construction business, "If I can put up a building, I should definitely know how to take one down (NEFA)." While being under surveillance, he continuously stated of plans to be "just as good or greater than 9/11" and discussed expanding the target list to prisons which he hoped to use as a means to build up an army of soldiers loyal to his cause, presumably the violent jihad that the informant discussed.

During the court proceedings, many questioned how credible any of Batiste's statements were. The defense continuously pointed to the promised financial incentives made by the informant, suggesting Batiste sought to use it for his community. This case while in the minds of jurors may seem like a tangled web of misconceptions and role-playing by Batiste and his associates, actually provides a very important detail that should be examined when profiling the potential for extremism to find root in certain communities.

While the Liberty City Seven case was laced by a great deal of unfortunate setbacks that made prosecuting the individuals a lot more complicated than if they had been found to be in possession of dangerous weapons, it proved how opportune recruitment of individuals can be.

What occurred was the recruitment and establishment of a figurehead [Batiste] and his subsequent involvement to involve his associates. Through his own lawyer's defense, the motive that lured Batiste into the situation was the promise of $50,000. Despite many of the aspects of the plots that Batiste discussed seeming as though they were fantasies to even a well-trained terrorist, the fact remains that Batiste was willing to cooperate with an individual who identified himself as an extremist. It's reported that during the conversations, the FBI informant identified himself as a key figure in the development of the USS Cole attack in 2000 (Couwels), which killed 17 U.S. sailors. This clearly shows a lack of discretion on Batiste's part and begs at what point would he have withdrawn from the plot?

Whether it was the promise of finances or a genuine support for the violent jihad described in the recordings, the Liberty City Seven case proves under what circumstances an extremist group can find alliances. Indeed, in recent statements, groups such as Al-Qaida have announced a willingness to pursue partnering with other low-level groups (not linked to Islam) in order to perpetrate violence. In a recent forum in Bahrain, a known Al-Qaida recruiter – Abdullah al-Nafisi, discusses smuggling weapons and people into the United States via underground tunnels and also promotes white supremacist groups to commit violent acts against the American government ("Kuwaiti Professor Abdallah Nafisi Suggests about a Biological Attack at the White House"). The potential of allying with groups that already support violence and already have capabilities and resources makes detecting terrorists more complicated when they may already exist within the U.S. population. In this case, the complaints of placing individuals under surveillance for their religious or ethnic backgrounds do not factor at all. The social and economic backgrounds as well as an individual's behavior play relevant to the investigation.