Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. II)

One such case is that of the Liberty City Seven in Miami, Florida. Public skepticism has plagued such a case since its beginning, where many have argued that the defendants were merely financially-troubled African-Americans seeking an opportunity to raise money. Critics accused the government of instigating and seducing the defendants into such a plot. However, by examining the sentiments of the individuals and their language in audio recordings, the sentiment does exist clearly.

The accused cell leader, Narseal Batiste, countered claims that he requested money from a confidential informant in order to create a nonprofit religious organization and community outreach program in Liberty City (Reuters.com). While this case bears many suspicious ties to finances, the sentiment on the nearly 15,000 audio and video tapes used in testimony shows a sentiment either of insanity or total disregard for the activity he was associating with. The case was brought before a jury three times, with two mistrials declared during the process. By its third time, two defendants had been found not guilty and five others were convicted for their involvement.

In the recordings with the FBI informant, who many have said was not a credible source due to a history of domestic violence and other criminal offenses, Batiste stated that with his history in the construction business, "If I can put up a building, I should definitely know how to take one down (NEFA)." While being under surveillance, he continuously stated of plans to be "just as good or greater than 9/11" and discussed expanding the target list to prisons which he hoped to use as a means to build up an army of soldiers loyal to his cause, presumably the violent jihad that the informant discussed.

During the court proceedings, many questioned how credible any of Batiste's statements were. The defense continuously pointed to the promised financial incentives made by the informant, suggesting Batiste sought to use it for his community. This case while in the minds of jurors may seem like a tangled web of misconceptions and role-playing by Batiste and his associates, actually provides a very important detail that should be examined when profiling the potential for extremism to find root in certain communities.

While the Liberty City Seven case was laced by a great deal of unfortunate setbacks that made prosecuting the individuals a lot more complicated than if they had been found to be in possession of dangerous weapons, it proved how opportune recruitment of individuals can be.

What occurred was the recruitment and establishment of a figurehead [Batiste] and his subsequent involvement to involve his associates. Through his own lawyer's defense, the motive that lured Batiste into the situation was the promise of $50,000. Despite many of the aspects of the plots that Batiste discussed seeming as though they were fantasies to even a well-trained terrorist, the fact remains that Batiste was willing to cooperate with an individual who identified himself as an extremist. It's reported that during the conversations, the FBI informant identified himself as a key figure in the development of the USS Cole attack in 2000 (Couwels), which killed 17 U.S. sailors. This clearly shows a lack of discretion on Batiste's part and begs at what point would he have withdrawn from the plot?

Whether it was the promise of finances or a genuine support for the violent jihad described in the recordings, the Liberty City Seven case proves under what circumstances an extremist group can find alliances. Indeed, in recent statements, groups such as Al-Qaida have announced a willingness to pursue partnering with other low-level groups (not linked to Islam) in order to perpetrate violence. In a recent forum in Bahrain, a known Al-Qaida recruiter – Abdullah al-Nafisi, discusses smuggling weapons and people into the United States via underground tunnels and also promotes white supremacist groups to commit violent acts against the American government ("Kuwaiti Professor Abdallah Nafisi Suggests about a Biological Attack at the White House"). The potential of allying with groups that already support violence and already have capabilities and resources makes detecting terrorists more complicated when they may already exist within the U.S. population. In this case, the complaints of placing individuals under surveillance for their religious or ethnic backgrounds do not factor at all. The social and economic backgrounds as well as an individual's behavior play relevant to the investigation.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, a massive debate emerged as to what methods and instruments could be made available to law enforcement to prevent any future incidents. Media and the general public continuously aired details related to the hijackers, designating 15 of the 19 hijackers as being of Saudi descent. This fact continues to be one of the most prominent details when it comes to the debate as to where radical Islam begins. This clearly begs the question, can extremism be linked to a common religious or ethnic group and can that be used as a tool for the law enforcement community?

Since its beginning, profiling has come under the constant scrutiny of those who believe that it is a method that promotes unfair discrimination by police. Profiling is defined as the "the use of specific characteristics, as race or age, to make generalizations about a person, as whether he or she may be engaged in illegal activity (dictionary.com)." Profiling as a tool became available and was used by law enforcement in the 1980s, under Operation Pipeline – started by the Drug Enforcement Administration as the United States declared its "War on Drugs." Police used profiling, aided by other techniques such as recognizing suspicious behavior and the possible concealment of contraband when making traffic stops in order to intercept drug shipments.

It was during this time period that in some states, such as California, minorities began to feel as though they were being unfairly targeted due to their race. The terms "Driving While Black" or "Driving While Brown" originated in response to such stops (Jrank.org).

In present day, it may seem as though there is a racial bias against minorities for criminal offenses. As of June 30, 2007, data indicated that the incarceration rate for white men was 773 per 100,000, black men was 4,618 per 100,000, and Hispanics was 1,747 per 100,000 (Sabol 7). However, these statistics are reflective of a potential bias in the judicial system, not necessarily in the policing aspect of law enforcement. This paper's intended purpose is to assess the capabilities of the investigations process and will not address any potential discrimination in the court system.

Following the September 11 attacks, a new debate emerged over the use of racial profiling by a relatively new group, the Arab-American community. Consisting of a large number of Muslims, this group specifically feared a wave of reciprocal violence on its members. While such concerns are justifiable, they have been given significant allowances so as not to provide any potentially conflicting links to terrorist organizations that use religion as a justification, such as Al-Qaida. In 2008, the State Department and Department of Justice, along with several other government agencies, issued memos providing a proper lexicon of appropriate terms when speaking of radical Muslim groups. So as not to confuse mainstream Islam with that of the radical beliefs of Al-Qaida, the memo requested that Islamic terms such as "jihad," "mujahidin," or "Islamist" not be used when discussing groups (Msnbc.com).

However, can providing such safeguards while ignoring what these groups portray themselves as create a conflict that encourages an atmosphere of political correctness rather than accuracy? Radical groups do exist representing an array of causes – whether they be religious, political, social, or economic. The common link that gives way to terrorism and extremist violence is that not the cause that these groups identify with, but rather the acceptance of violence as a means to lobby the public. The beginnings of those who represent such groups normally do bear similar characteristics that can aid in detecting tendencies to resort to violence. Several recent terror cases all share various aspects that should be observed and should be noted when debating whether profiling can be an accurate tool in law enforcement.

Afghanistan - Why We're Losing

How do we win in Afghanistan? Eight years after the U.S. campaign that ousted the Taliban from power, the country remains a list of "to-dos" that have yet to be checked off. Since President Obama tasked Gen. Stanley McChrystal in charge of forces in Afghanistan, there has been talk of transforming the strategies that many have said made this war unwinnable. The dilemma remains, how can this war be turned around? There seems to a be a vague understanding of what makes this a winnable war - with critics like George Will joining the ranks of Vice President Joe Biden. The Veep has called for less troops on the ground in Afghanistan because he believes we should be pursuing Al-Qaida's havens in Pakistan instead.


I remain a skeptic of how useful Gen. McChrystal can be on the ground. This war has become a political tool for many, breeding lines of bureaucratic red-tape that puts restrictions on those who have fought in wars. While people like George Will and the Vice President sit in their lavish offices in Washington, the people of Afghanistan are waiting for this rhetoric to pan out to action. The attitude of your average Afghan looks back at the Soviet invasion and remembers how "committed" the U.S. was then. The country is used to corruption and being plagued by violence, it has become part of the culture and they do not seek to be used by anyone. At the first sign of their country becoming a means by a superpower, they are willing to confront it - just like the Soviets.


This war has become a failure because of those who were put in charge of the country. The Karzai administration has done nothing for the people in the country, it has bred corruption throughout every level and has enabled those who operate the trafficking of narcotics out of the country. With the contested results of the election that put him into office for another term, Hamid Karzai will continue to be a portrait of all that is wrong in his country.


President Karzai has opted to play both sides in this war, blaming NATO forces for violence in the country and civilian deaths. Meanwhile, he asks for the Taliban to sit around a table and talk about their involvement in a "post-Taliban" society. Mr. Karzai has repeatedly shown he does not have the attitude or motivation to confront the Taliban, seeing them as the coalition's problem.


However, this idea has been embraced by many in Washington who seek to use Lebanon's Hizbullah as a model for bringing a violent group into the political affairs of a country. Maybe it's time that the cubicle monkeys of Foggy Bottom examine the testimony over the years.


"Hezbollah may be the 'A-Team of Terrorists' and maybe al-Qaeda is actually the 'B' team."
-former Dep. Sec. of State Richard Armitage

"Al-Qaeda and its network are our most serious immediate threat, they may not be our most serious long-term threat….[Hezbollah] has developed capabilities that Al-Qaeda can only dream of, including large quantities of missiles and highly sophisticated explosives."
-former DHS Sec. Michael Chertoff


The belief that Hizbullah is a regional player is complete and total B.S. Hezbollah controls Lebanon, it does not fit into the political system of the country. It has killed to get where it is and possesses global capabilities to obtain resources and attack targets. Ask Saad Hariri how Hizbullah has fit into the political system of his father on the Feb. 14, 2006 car bombing that shook Beirut.


If we want to push Afghanistan into a society that is ass backwards, by all means put the Taliban in the "reformed" government. If we withdraw our forces or do not commit to rebuilding their society, they will turn on us even more. They remember the U.S. pullout after ousting the Soviets, the question is do we?

Feds investigate Denver man in most recent terror probe

It's been one week since news reports began to circulate around a series of terror raids in Queens, New York. Details surrounding the investigation seem to be rather tight-lipped and the tone of the officials willing to discuss the case suggest that this plot was hot and the members were active. The level of the plot has been paralleled to that of another 9/11, but the intended target remains unknown to the general public. Security has been beefed up at airports and transit hubs surrounding New York.


The investigation is centered on Najibullah Zazi, a 25 year-old male reportedly of Afghan descent. Many terror officials are intrigued by the use of an Afghan as opposed to the preference of Arabs, Pakistanis, and Africans by Al-Qaida. More than a dozen individuals have been linked to this cell and are being monitored by authorities.


As the news reports come out, it is difficult to determine who decided that now was the necessary time to intervene. While this was reportedly a FBI investigation, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly is believed to have pressed for the raid after Zazi's weekend visit to Queens. It is interesting to note that terror investigations have evolved a long way since pre-9/11, when the feds rushed to accuse a suspect rather than use them as a means of obtaining information. The level of surveillance on Zazi most undoubtedly developed a substantial amount of good information on the network and could pay off if the plot was disrupted.

Al-Qaida over the past eight years

As the U.S. remembers the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centers, the question among many in the intelligence community question how to measure feats achieved in the Global War on Terror. The group behind 9/11, Al-Qaida, has yet to achieve any attacks that rival those which killed 3,000. Many commentators suggest that Al-Qaida is phasing out in its recruitment capabilities, faced with the fact that it has not lived up to the precedent set in the 2001 attacks. In TIME, Tony Karon writes a piece titled "Eight Years After 9/11: Why Osama bin Laden Failed," which suggests that bin Laden's quest to instigate global jihad through his group has not occurred.


I would question the legitimacy of such an argument, showing that Al-Qaida was forced to adapt to a situation that was largely unexpected. The 2001 campaign in Operation Enduring Freedom took the group by surprise, and the memories of the mujahideen against the Soviets throughout the 1980s had no place in a present-day conflict. Afghanistan was taken from the Taliban and Al-Qaida was forced to withdraw to secure compounds among tribal allies.


It is largely impractical to believe that Al-Qaida would be capable of creating 9/11-esque attacks everyday, as the international community largely remains persistent in its quest to limit the group. At its best throughout the 1990s, the group was developing numerous large-scale plots, but only capable of the 1993 WTC bombing, the 1998 Embassy bombings, and the 2000 USS Cole attack. Only one of those occurred inside the United States. In the overseas incidents, Al-Qaida would not have been successful without its regional voices. I firmly believe that when it comes to Al-Qaida in a regional environment, the group is thriving still.


Proof of this can be seen in the violence that the group has achieved through its allies. Nearly every notable attack inside India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Northern Africa and Indonesia has been from an Al-Qaida partner. The Al-Qaida and Taliban alliance I believe has been abandoned largely as the Taliban has developed its own partnerships to raise funding and become a movement inside Afghanistan and Pakistan. I believe that the Taliban are largely self-sufficient in maintaining their attack capabilities. Al-Qaida may not be the international movement it once aspired to be, however it plays a powerful role in regional affairs.


We have played this game before, allowing intelligence officials to declare Al-Qaida on the Arabian Peninsula (responsible for attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen) as struggling, as well as stating that progress in Northern Africa (Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb) meant that we were winning. However, one year after those statements were made, both Al-Qaida affiliates remain capable of the same attacks they were in the past. The Al-Qaida most people remember in America was the enemy that flew planes into towers, however the group's beginnings were a humble guerrilla resistance. Perhaps the group has turned back to what gave it a name, looking to develop a new infrastructure trained in the ways that have kept the group alive.

Al-Qaida's war against the royal family continues

For quite some time, it seemed as though Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula had felt the heat of Saudi security operations and moved all its operations south to Yemen to use as a staging ground. The group had been dealt significant blows with sweeping raids netting hundreds of members over the last two years. Violence had escalated inside Yemen as the group sought refuge in border provinces to the Kingdom, however the Saudis had successfully foiled several series of plots on mostly oil interests.


On Monday, a suicide bomber targeted Dep. Interior Minister Prince Mohammed bin Nayef at his palace during a Ramadan celebration. Nayef's capacity as Dep. Interior Minister places him in command over all counterterror operations. Al-Qaida was quick to declare its involvement in the attack, giving credit to Abdullah Hassan Taleh Aseri (alias "Abu al-Khayr"), who was listed in an INTERPOL orange notice for 85 individuals suspected of involvement in plotting terrorist attacks. The list raised an eyebrow by many skeptics of the Kingdom's "War on Terror" as 14 of the suspects were released from Guantanamo Bay into the Saudi rehabilitation program for "deviants" (the label applied to Islamic terrorists by authorities). Now reports are providing insight into the targeting of such a prominent member of the royal family.


The Al-Qaida statement suggests that Aseri was flown aboard Nayef's private jet, allowed access to the Prince's palace and upon being searched by security, detonated an explosive device. It should be noted that it is standard for the royal family to open their palaces to the public for Ramadan events. The curious aspect to the story remains as to what brought Aseri into the Kingdom. It is suggested that he crossed into Saudi Arabia from Yemen with the expressed intent to surrender to authorities. It is reported that he had expressed interest to speak to his followers and negotiate their surrender as well.


This is undoubtedly disturbing news coming out of Saudi Arabia, that the security around the equivalent to CIA Director Leon Panetta placed a wanted individual on his private jet, with explosives, and allowed him access to the palace. As this story develops it appears this was to be a momentous development that went horribly wrong. This incident lowers the confidence in certain internal elements, namely Nayef's security detail. Despite the pretenses of surrender provided by Aseri, he should have been treated as the dangerous criminal that he was.


This attempt can be credited to the resourceful tactics of Al-Qaida, utilizing the Islamic principle of taqqiya. Walid Phares has written before on taqqiya, stating that as a jihadist concept it instructs "Combatants “in the path of Allah,” as instructed by ideologues to “fake” normalcy, and lie if needed, about their real beliefs so that the deception of the enemy is full." This incident acts as a stark warning that Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula is not under pressure and remains as resourceful as it ever was. The potential for renewed conflict inside the Kingdom is now on a brink as Al-Qaida appears to have its sights back inside the country.

TTP leader Mehsud killed in airstrike

As news comes out of Pakistan that Baitullah Mehsud is believed to be among the casualties of Wednesday's air strike in Waziristan, many analysts are no doubt looking at what is next for Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP). There is no doubt that Baitullah wore the title of Taliban commander well, becoming the government's most fierce competition, but will his death yield any actual results in what Pakistan's struggle against militants?


When Baitullah first emerged, he brought a new face to the militancy that he inherited. Opting to be in the shadows, he stayed away from cameras and chose to live a life centered around a fear that he would be found. His paranoia was evidenced by his routine - traveling in convoys, sleeping in different locations every night. His predecessor had become a victim of too much media attention and it appeared Baitullah had taken note. However, shortly after the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, he evolved into a militant who sought to go after the Pakistani government and create chaos.


The question stands does the death of Baitullah accomplish anything in both Pakistan's war on terror and the global war. In all likelihood, the violence in the country will remain and the attempts to destabilize the government will remain persistent. As Baitullah rose in status as Pakistan's key militant, he alienated a great deal of his commanders who became his competition. The one thing that Baitullah had going for him in the tribal region was his pledge that he gave to residents that he would protect them from foreign fighters - including Pakistan's military. Baitullah was a strong fighter for the independence of those regions, seeking to keep the military and government from interfering.


It is highly possible that as the TTP names Baitullah's successor, that it will seek to establish itself as a powerful force that is unified in its beliefs. The schism that was created by Baitullah can be healed by the regathering of the group and by no means is the TTP in a struggle to survive. Baitullah was an extremely capable leader who had a great deal of resources at his disposal. In a recent editorial, the capabilities of the TTP are reflected upon, giving credit to how the resistance has maintained its struggle:

"According to some estimates, Baitullah could have in his kitty around Rs 4 billion (around $48 million US) to spend annually. This money comes from drugs facilitated by Al Qaeda contacts, Arab money from the Gulf, money made from kidnapping for ransom, looting of banks, smuggling and "protection money" in general. He has weapons produced in Russia, the US and India, and has been looting explosives produced at the Wah munitions factory."

The death of Baitullah does not mean a shift in the Taliban's tactics. The Taliban have a momentum and an agenda, which means that the TTP is still one of the most potentially damaging networks to the region. With its ties and resources, the new leader of the group has an endless flow of ability to fight jihad without making the same errors that may have led to his predecessor's death. The Taliban can not be defeated by air strikes alone, but rather attacking the very things that sustain it. There is a desperate need for the government to establish itself as capable of protecting its people, not negotiating useless ceasefires with militants who have the upper hand. The government will have to pursue the very things that finance the groups - including logging and mining. These, along with extensive ties to the drug trade, helped make up the nearly $48 million that the TTP earned. Only by the government conducting an offensive on all levels, not just using foot soldiers, will it win any real successes against its enemies.


For now, there is the success of eliminating a man who had countless amounts of blood on his hands. However, at the end of the day terrorism does not start or end with just one man.