A successful operation by all standards

I want to say that the Colombian military operation that rescued 15 hostages from the hands of FARC rebels was by all standards a brilliant exercise. To say several years ago that the military was capable of rescuing hostages without incident would most assuredly received laughter from most individuals, quite possibly President Uribe himself. Douglas Farah writes that the operation was the result of over three years of planning that required astounding coordination given recent developments in the Colombia-FARC conflict.

One has to take into consideration that the FARC was in many senses paranoid of a traditional rescue operation. The example of Sigifredo Lopez, a hostage since 2002 to present day, shows how reckless the FARC has been in its defense of hostages. Lopez, while being moved with 11 other hostages he had been taken with, became caught in the middle of a firefight with what FARC rebels believed were Colombian forces attempting a rescue. The 11 others were killed in the incident, Lopez was injured, and the perceived Colombian forces were none other than another FARC group. Friendly fire accounted for the murder of nearly an entire group of hostages.

This incident proves that the Colombians had to "think outside the box," and by all standards they did an astounding job. However, given all the years of planning, this operation could not have occurred without the recent successes the military has achieved against the FARC. If FARC's leadership was not thrown into disarray after the deaths of three commanders in the Secretariat, Manuel Marulanda-its leader of 44 years, this would probably still be a hypothetical rescue attempt. As Doug Farah writes, his successor, Raul Reyes, was killed preceding his death and the group was forced to appoint Alfonso Cano as its head. The true power the Secretariat now holds seems questionable as leaders have either surrendered or vanished as a result of the targeted killings by Colombian forces or betrayal by their bodyguards, as is the case with Ivan Rios and his March 3 killing. This lack of communication amongst leaders likely benefited the forces, as they were able to deceive the hostage-holders with orders they claimed to be from Cano.

However, as Aaron Mannes writes, the operation does have some issues that should be of concern. The Colombian use of a false NGO may lend harmful for the legitimate ones and their involvement in the region, but Mannes does suggest that the FARC uses NGOs to operate under the government's radar. As he writes, this issue is far too complicated and could take years to determine, but by all means this should not establish a precedent of government dependence to use them as a lifeline in situations.

It will be interesting to see how this rescue relates to the fate of the estimated 700 hostages still held by FARC. While this success rescued the most notable hostages, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and the three U.S. hostages, the remainder should not be treated as less significant. As one commentator on CNN discussed the rescue, "I don't believe that 90% of America knew there were hostages in Colombia until now." One can only hope that following the joyous reaction by nearly all world leaders following the rescue, most notably Hugo Chavez, who stated that he would meet former nemesis President Uribe, whom he dubbed "a criminal" and requested the UN charge for genocide as recent as March.

This is by all means a success, but not a victory over the FARC. To think the FARC, an organization that has survived for 44 years, cannot recover is extremely ignorant. The question remains, will FARC follow its political origin or will it increase its dabblings as a criminal enterprise? Either way, it is likely the FARC will still enjoy connections with the governments of Chavez, Correa, and Noriega in either form. However, so long as the Uribe government continue its offensive against the FARC leadership and continues to isolate the group from mainstream Colombia, it is highly probable that a victory can be declared sometime in the next decade.