Are we really even fighting a war anymore?

The War on Terror was designed with the intent to disrupt the leadership network of Al-Qaida that was instrumental behind the attacks of September 11, 2001. Since operations began a month after the attacks in 2001, the U.S. has eliminated numerous senior figures and seasoned veterans of the mujahideen that made up Al-Qaida Central. The leadership of Al-Qaida has been replaced now by a movement made up of collective pockets of fighters distributed among the globe, all seeking to develop the momentum that Al-Qaida once enjoyed.


The attacks in Uganda during the World Cup evidence this, showing that as many experts have suggested for some time that the general trend of terrorist groups turning from promoting their agenda in a local, regional based setting into a global movement applies now to the Shabaab of Somalia. The twin bombings exercised the group's intent to disrupt a global event with violence in order to attract the attention of the viewing public. It is more than likely that the group did not have the resources and capabilities to penetrate the security apparatus surrounding Cape Town.


Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula gained recognition upon the failed bombing of Northwest 253 on Christmas Day last year. The group previously was responsible primarily for Al-Qaida operations inside Saudi Arabia, using the lacking government of President Saleh of Yemen in order to gain refuge across the border. Anwar al-Awlaki was able to use his charm in order to benefit the group by obtaining Westernized recruits who already spoke English and had no tell-tale red flags.


Al-Qaida Central, based in Pakistan, is largely disrupted in my analysis. Figureheads like Osama bin Laden control the public front of the group, but hold no true value outside of their immediate location. The recordings simply are a ploy for credibility in the Muslim world, utilizing the once strong persona that bin Laden and his leaders once held when they were capable of attacks such as the Embassy bombings of 1998. The destruction that Al-Qaida was able to claim actually was linked to bin Laden's direct leadership, rather than a network of regional leaders who operated freely and independent of the group's chain of command.


The U.S. has failed at providing any real results in the War on Terror, opting to ignore developing threats until innocent lives have been claimed. The days of assigning any associates to Al-Qaida on the blacklists has been replaced by simply waiting until those associates have blood on their hands to place them under any sanctions. Intelligence is an invaluable asset in any war, especially a war where the enemy is everywhere. The ability to produce HUMINT in this war has proven extremely difficult. The only able way is to put eyes and ears everywhere, providing assistance in the local tribes that make up the many regions where Al-Qaida's partners find haven.


A grassroots-up strategy would provide the most assistance to those impacted most by an unstable country, especially in Afghanistan and Yemen. The defining problem in most situations is that the local tribes have no reason to believe in a corrupt national government that exists inside the bubble of the capital. By providing aid to those who experience the insurgency violence on a day-to-day basis and standing beside them, there is hope in gaining assets that can prove effective in designing larger counter terrorism strategies. Fighting a war is hard work, but it is something that takes time, patience, and a collective effort in order to achieve success.