U.S. talking with the Taliban?

Afghanistan is fallen. The cleanup the U.S. and NATO has to do in there is immensely difficult at this point. With President Obama continuing to mull over his options, now months after General McChrystal issued his report, what are we doing about this situation? According to the Saudi al-Watan, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, Karl Eikenbarry, has been discussing a ceasefire with Taliban elements as high as Foreign Minister Ahmad Mutawakil. Based on the report, the U.S. is offering Taliban control of 5 provinces (Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Kunar, and Nuristan) in return for a halt in attacks on U.S. bases.


The U.S. embassy in Riyadh has denied the claims, but sources in Afghanistan are saying that somebody is most definitely talking to the Taliban. Who can make such a call? Given the Taliban's continued threats of "absolute defeat" against the U.S. and NATO, I would venture to say that it isn't the Americans who are negotiating. Karzai has tried time and time again to make offers to the Taliban, only to end up bringing his country into escalated violence. Remember the April 2008 attack in Kabul on the Afghan Independence Day Parade that caused dignitaries and Karzai himself to flee the celebrations? That came shortly after Karzai had denounced the U.S. and NATO presence for civilian casualties.


Afghanistan remains winnable, if we start treating this like a war. We are seeking to make this a post-war situation when we have not won yet. The NATO forces need to pursue the elements creating chaos without restraint and seek to bring stability to the environment. Afghans have no confidence in their government, and just as the cartels that operated in Latin America or the gangs that operated in Chicago in the 1930s, the Taliban have risen as a parallel to a failed government. Negotiating with someone who is willing to recklessly target civilian lives simply because they do not adhere to Islam will be a failure. By allowing the possibility of the Taliban to operate in 5 provinces, or nearly 25% of the country, we only lend credibility to them and turn a blind eye to their acceptance of violence. That is just a reckless strategy.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. III)

However, the most recent case brought to the public attention is that of Najibullah Zazi. Zazi, who was arrested on September 19, 2009, for his involvement in a New York City terror plot. Details surrounding the plot continue to remain sealed by prosecutors, but a timeline of events places Zazi as a more mainstream radical jihadist subscribing to Al-Qaida's theology.

This case puts all traditional profiling into play – a 24-year old Afghan national who became a legal resident in the U.S. after immigrating in 1999. Zazi got married in 2006 to his cousin, who resides in Pakistan. He then reportedly began traveling to visit her and their two children annually. It was in the years following his visits where his customers at his coffee stand in New York noticed a change. He was said to have "grown a beard, wore traditional Islamic clothing, and was less friendly to his customers" (Gruen). A rather noticeable change from a boy who as a child enjoyed wearing stylish clothes and playing video games. The question remains where did Zazi embrace violent jihadist tactics as part of his beliefs – was it during his travels to Pakistan or could it have occurred at his home mosque in Flushing, New York? The mosque he and his family attended since immigrating to the U.S., Masjid Hazrat Abu Bakr, reportedly was split on support for the Taliban and Al-Qaida after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The split reportedly pushed the imam out at the time, who disapproved of the violence (Gruen).

It did not take long after Zazi's arrest, despite the evidence the government had, for Muslim groups to decry the police's tactics. Law enforcement officials in the days following Zazi's initial arrest were not sure as to how many more suspects there were and feared that the plot may still be in motion. Reportedly, Muslims in the Flushing, New York neighborhood that Zazi visited were subject to intensified questioning by police patrols on the ground. Immediately their fears of racial profiling were broadcast via blogs and media outlets.

The question remains how much did his ethnicity and religion play in the investigation process of Najibullah Zazi? According to a report, Zazi had contact with members of Al-Qaida's leadership overseas, which came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency. The CIA then requested the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assume a domestic investigation.

The Zazi case proves a very important characteristic about profiling: that it can be a valuable tool to affirm suspicions about an individual. When partnered properly with various pieces of intelligence, profiling is a very useful tool for law enforcement in the fight to help identify those who seek to perpetrate violent acts. There is no doubt that had there been a profile before the 9/11 hijackers, we could have probably saved thousands of lives. By recognizing who was receiving training in the Al-Qaida camps of Sudan and Afghanistan during the 1990s, law enforcement would have been more vigilant to potential warning signs and red flags. Targeting an individual for their race or beliefs is wrong and counterproductive to the mission of this war. Community cooperation is essential, and risking the alienation of Muslims or other groups only hinders investigations. Every investigation should pursue what will be accepted in a court of law. Profiling is not a form of evidence that will prosecute an individual, however it assists law enforcement in the identification of security risks and how best to approach them.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism (Pt. II)

One such case is that of the Liberty City Seven in Miami, Florida. Public skepticism has plagued such a case since its beginning, where many have argued that the defendants were merely financially-troubled African-Americans seeking an opportunity to raise money. Critics accused the government of instigating and seducing the defendants into such a plot. However, by examining the sentiments of the individuals and their language in audio recordings, the sentiment does exist clearly.

The accused cell leader, Narseal Batiste, countered claims that he requested money from a confidential informant in order to create a nonprofit religious organization and community outreach program in Liberty City (Reuters.com). While this case bears many suspicious ties to finances, the sentiment on the nearly 15,000 audio and video tapes used in testimony shows a sentiment either of insanity or total disregard for the activity he was associating with. The case was brought before a jury three times, with two mistrials declared during the process. By its third time, two defendants had been found not guilty and five others were convicted for their involvement.

In the recordings with the FBI informant, who many have said was not a credible source due to a history of domestic violence and other criminal offenses, Batiste stated that with his history in the construction business, "If I can put up a building, I should definitely know how to take one down (NEFA)." While being under surveillance, he continuously stated of plans to be "just as good or greater than 9/11" and discussed expanding the target list to prisons which he hoped to use as a means to build up an army of soldiers loyal to his cause, presumably the violent jihad that the informant discussed.

During the court proceedings, many questioned how credible any of Batiste's statements were. The defense continuously pointed to the promised financial incentives made by the informant, suggesting Batiste sought to use it for his community. This case while in the minds of jurors may seem like a tangled web of misconceptions and role-playing by Batiste and his associates, actually provides a very important detail that should be examined when profiling the potential for extremism to find root in certain communities.

While the Liberty City Seven case was laced by a great deal of unfortunate setbacks that made prosecuting the individuals a lot more complicated than if they had been found to be in possession of dangerous weapons, it proved how opportune recruitment of individuals can be.

What occurred was the recruitment and establishment of a figurehead [Batiste] and his subsequent involvement to involve his associates. Through his own lawyer's defense, the motive that lured Batiste into the situation was the promise of $50,000. Despite many of the aspects of the plots that Batiste discussed seeming as though they were fantasies to even a well-trained terrorist, the fact remains that Batiste was willing to cooperate with an individual who identified himself as an extremist. It's reported that during the conversations, the FBI informant identified himself as a key figure in the development of the USS Cole attack in 2000 (Couwels), which killed 17 U.S. sailors. This clearly shows a lack of discretion on Batiste's part and begs at what point would he have withdrawn from the plot?

Whether it was the promise of finances or a genuine support for the violent jihad described in the recordings, the Liberty City Seven case proves under what circumstances an extremist group can find alliances. Indeed, in recent statements, groups such as Al-Qaida have announced a willingness to pursue partnering with other low-level groups (not linked to Islam) in order to perpetrate violence. In a recent forum in Bahrain, a known Al-Qaida recruiter – Abdullah al-Nafisi, discusses smuggling weapons and people into the United States via underground tunnels and also promotes white supremacist groups to commit violent acts against the American government ("Kuwaiti Professor Abdallah Nafisi Suggests about a Biological Attack at the White House"). The potential of allying with groups that already support violence and already have capabilities and resources makes detecting terrorists more complicated when they may already exist within the U.S. population. In this case, the complaints of placing individuals under surveillance for their religious or ethnic backgrounds do not factor at all. The social and economic backgrounds as well as an individual's behavior play relevant to the investigation.

Profiling as a tool in the fight against terrorism

Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, a massive debate emerged as to what methods and instruments could be made available to law enforcement to prevent any future incidents. Media and the general public continuously aired details related to the hijackers, designating 15 of the 19 hijackers as being of Saudi descent. This fact continues to be one of the most prominent details when it comes to the debate as to where radical Islam begins. This clearly begs the question, can extremism be linked to a common religious or ethnic group and can that be used as a tool for the law enforcement community?

Since its beginning, profiling has come under the constant scrutiny of those who believe that it is a method that promotes unfair discrimination by police. Profiling is defined as the "the use of specific characteristics, as race or age, to make generalizations about a person, as whether he or she may be engaged in illegal activity (dictionary.com)." Profiling as a tool became available and was used by law enforcement in the 1980s, under Operation Pipeline – started by the Drug Enforcement Administration as the United States declared its "War on Drugs." Police used profiling, aided by other techniques such as recognizing suspicious behavior and the possible concealment of contraband when making traffic stops in order to intercept drug shipments.

It was during this time period that in some states, such as California, minorities began to feel as though they were being unfairly targeted due to their race. The terms "Driving While Black" or "Driving While Brown" originated in response to such stops (Jrank.org).

In present day, it may seem as though there is a racial bias against minorities for criminal offenses. As of June 30, 2007, data indicated that the incarceration rate for white men was 773 per 100,000, black men was 4,618 per 100,000, and Hispanics was 1,747 per 100,000 (Sabol 7). However, these statistics are reflective of a potential bias in the judicial system, not necessarily in the policing aspect of law enforcement. This paper's intended purpose is to assess the capabilities of the investigations process and will not address any potential discrimination in the court system.

Following the September 11 attacks, a new debate emerged over the use of racial profiling by a relatively new group, the Arab-American community. Consisting of a large number of Muslims, this group specifically feared a wave of reciprocal violence on its members. While such concerns are justifiable, they have been given significant allowances so as not to provide any potentially conflicting links to terrorist organizations that use religion as a justification, such as Al-Qaida. In 2008, the State Department and Department of Justice, along with several other government agencies, issued memos providing a proper lexicon of appropriate terms when speaking of radical Muslim groups. So as not to confuse mainstream Islam with that of the radical beliefs of Al-Qaida, the memo requested that Islamic terms such as "jihad," "mujahidin," or "Islamist" not be used when discussing groups (Msnbc.com).

However, can providing such safeguards while ignoring what these groups portray themselves as create a conflict that encourages an atmosphere of political correctness rather than accuracy? Radical groups do exist representing an array of causes – whether they be religious, political, social, or economic. The common link that gives way to terrorism and extremist violence is that not the cause that these groups identify with, but rather the acceptance of violence as a means to lobby the public. The beginnings of those who represent such groups normally do bear similar characteristics that can aid in detecting tendencies to resort to violence. Several recent terror cases all share various aspects that should be observed and should be noted when debating whether profiling can be an accurate tool in law enforcement.