9-11-01

Wednesday, August 6, 2008

Letting the next bin Laden go

Word comes out today that Pakistan is accusing the U.S. of a “missed opportunity” to eliminate Tehrik-e-Taliban (the Pakistani wing of the Taliban) commander Baitullah Mehsud. Pakistan suggests that they passed on “actionable intelligence” that on May 24, Mehsud would be traveling via Toyota Landcruiser to his Taliban stronghold in South Waziristan. Apparently, the information was disregarded and the CIA Hellfires that could have fired missiles on the target sat idle.

This claim is almost comical, considering the timing. As reports circulate that the
ISI (Pakistan’s intelligence agency) is full of corrupt Taliban sympathizers, the country has sought to accuse the U.S. of not fighting the War On Terror for Pakistan - despite that Prime Minister Gilani said last week while in Washington that the War On Terror was his country’s “own war” and the repeated public claims that U.S. forces had no right to violate Pakistani territory. That’s right, despite the nearly $10 billion that Pakistan has received since the War’s beginning in 2001 (only topped by Israel and Egypt as the top recipient of U.S. aid), Pakistan wants the U.S. to go after it’s high value targets - such as the alleged mastermind of Benazir Bhutto’s assasination.

The intelligence that was passed on is in reality, almost laughable. The reason
Mehsud, who doesn’t sleep in the same bed each night and is virtually paranoid, would emerge on that date was for none other than a press conference. Mehsud called nearly 30 journalists to his stronghold to discuss his group’s policies publicly. It is well-known that Mehsud’s tribe is spending substantial amounts (to the tune of $45 million, the NWFP governor declared) on fleets of Toyota and Nissan trucks, which Mehsud uses for convoy travel with an estimated 2-3 dozen armed guards. To place Mehsud in a Toyota in the middle of a region that spans the size of New Jersey is worthless. Without an asset on the ground to confirm Mehsud’s presence, the credibility of such claims would be questioned.

The real question that this whole blame game raises is a very important one. Where is that money going?

Money intended for strengthening the Frontier Corps and Pakistani army troops apparently
isn’t doing anything, if they are too afraid to act independently against a terrorist wanted in their own country for the assassination of one of it’s most revered politicians. Perhaps Prime Minister Gilani should remind his ISI and its minions that Mehsud had a warrant issued for his arrest on April 17. The majority of that month was spent with Mehsud’s fighters and the government brokering ceasefires. If Pakistan wants Mehsud’s head on a platter, let U.S. forces enter the region and allow full authorization for air strikes. Otherwise, how about diverting some of those billions in aid to North African countries, who could actually use it?

Just to give you a brief idea of what
Mehsud’s organization has been responsible for in Pakistan’s policy evolution, here’s a short list:
-assassinated over 200 tribal elders in region
-abduction of over 200 Pakistani soldiers in 2007, as well as several police attacks (one of which he is charged in the warrant for)
-attempted Oct. assassination of Bhutto, successful attack in Dec.
-group has expressed links to
AQ Khan nuclear smuggling network
-has free border access to Afghanistan, where group is orchestrating attacks

Sunday, August 3, 2008

Lessons from a mujahid

"If you see your enemy modest, you must make it arrogant. You must appear weak in front of your enemy for some time to make it become arrogant."

These were the words remembered by Al-Qaida in honor of one of their great military planners, Shaykh Yousef al-Ayyirri. The commander of Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula until his death in 2003, al-Ayyirri had begun his career in the ranks of the Afghan mujahideen of the 1980s against the Soviets. Following the mujahideen's success, he began what would be a lifelong career that began in those ranks at the age of 18.

Five years after his death by Saudi security forces,
al-Ayyirri's words should caution the U.S. about the situations in Afghanistan and Iraq. As global leaders clamor in unison for a declaration of successes in Iraq, Afghanistan falls deeper into a state of turmoil.

Last week, Al-
Qaida in Iraq (AQI) was officially declared as defeated by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The number of foreign fighters entering the country plummeted from the 110 at this time last year to about 20. The factor overlooked by many, is that the number of foreign fighters moving into Afghanistan and the tribal regions of Pakistan has spiked over the past 2-3 months. New recruits who would have gone to AQI are now moving into these regions, from either their native countries or departing Iraq. Does this mean such a success in Iraq is permanent? By all means no.

Based on how many times the blame has been pinned on Iran for insurgent activity in Iraq, saying that they are responsible for a situation in Afghanistan as well seems like a played-out card. The truth is, part of the blame does lie on lax border security along the border, but Afghanistan and President Hamid
Karzai bear an equal share of blame. President Karzai has allowed his policies to be framed solely on domestic affairs, alienating the involvement of the neighbors to the east and west in particular. Karzai has not pushed through any security agreements mandating strict border enforcement and cooperation between his country and Pakistan and Iran in particular.

What does any of this have to do with
Yousef al-Ayyirri?

Based on the report this week that even
AQI commanders are fleeing Iraq for Afghanistan, the potential for the tides to change in Afghanistan and/or Iraq will remain vulnerable so long as the Iran-Afghanistan borders remain unchecked. The passage can ferry foreign fighters from either front to the other so long as there is foreign fighters to move. To declare AQI dead is by all means a baseless claim. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, the group's leader following the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, is by no means an al-Ayyirri. His experience with Al-Qaida did not begin with the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviets, but rather in 1999.

If
al-Masri has indeed fled with his commanders to Afghanistan, chances are he is no longer isolated from the Al-Qaida hierarchy consisting of experienced Soviet-era mujahideen commanders, but rather a puppet for such a group. Remember Zawahiri and bin Laden didn't favor Zarqawi for his inexperience and his conventional terror tactics. Perhaps Prime Min. Maliki should reconsider his arrogance and consider who he would rather battle - a wannabe mujahid al-Masri or an al-Ayyirri, who is worshiped as the hero for the mujahideen.