How we lost Afghanistan

Seven years after invading Afghanistan and overthrowing the Taliban regime, the situation in Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worst. The idea that the Taliban had vanished after their 2001 retreat from Kabul was quickly gone after this year's spectacular attacks. There was the April assassination attempt on Pres. Hamid Karzai, followed by the jailbreak of nearly 1000 prisoners from the Kandahar prison in June. Both attacks brought a component that was relatively unprecedented by the group - organization. The insurgency in Afghanistan had previously appeared to be a collection of cells with no connection and means to coordinate, capable only of occasional IED attacks and mortar rounds here and there. After those two attacks, joined by the Indian embassy bombing in July, it was clear that the rosy assessments painted by diplomats on the ground was merely a fantasy lived out in their secure compounds.


In reality, the Taliban do not have the ability to establish control as a legitimate government in Afghanistan. However, their fight has been one that is emerging as a strategic threat to the reconstruction and development in the country. By the June prison break, attacks were up 40% from last year and symbols of development were increasingly being targeted.


Shortly thereafter, reports emerged of the Taliban's "shadow" government systems that supposedly exist in nearly every province. With their own courts based on Shari'a, the Taliban had infiltrated local tribes and had become an alternative to a flawed Afghan justice system vulnerable to bribes.


What happened over the last seven years is of extreme importance to winning back Afghanistan. While the U.S. and NATO declared victory, the Taliban opted to be patient with their efforts and allow the opportunity to strengthen their capabilities. Without state sponsorship any more, they needed to find a means to fund their insurgency and partnered with the international opium market as a replacement. With Afghanistan consistently being the number one supplier of the product, it was an unregulated criminal enterprise that the U.S. and NATO seldom touched.


Either out of fear of turning the impoverished locals that grew the poppies nearer to the Taliban or intervention by Hamid Karzai's opium-profiting governors, over the seven years in Afghanistan nobody has addressed and confronted the issue of poppies. With anywhere between 88-93% of the global opium supply coming from Afghanistan, the Taliban had their moneymaker. During the Taliban's rule in the country, they allowed the farmers to grow poppies until they banned it in 2000. This ban did not curb the amount of opium pouring out of the country onto nearly every street.


Last week, TIME magazine held an interesting report that alleges the Taliban have officially entered the global crime syndicate. The UN's Office on Drugs and Crime announced that over the last three years, anywhere between 6,000 and 8,000 tons of opium have vanished from the global market. Consider that annually, the world consumes around 4,500 tons of the drug. Nearly two years worth of the drug, which retails for around $464,000 a ton, has just disappeared off the market.


The UN Office has not made any official assessments, but theories are circulating as to where such a large stash may have ended up. Officials are skeptical that this was a mere instance of the stockpile being lost in the black market and not appearing, basing their opinion on the global market. With opium being a fairly consistent $70 per kg, such a significant portion of the crop would have lowered prices. That simply hasn't happened.


The concern now is that the Taliban may have spent up to 3 years collecting the crop, and now have a bundle worth anywhere between $2.8 and 3 billion in their possession. Needless to say, with that kind of potential income, the Taliban's tactics and weaponry should continue to increase at the expense of the U.S. and President Karzai's blind eye to the crop. With market manipulation and the Taliban's control on the safety of opium exports, they hold the potential to spike the price and reach record profits all due to their patience. Unfortunately, there is little the coalition can do to prevent this besides stumbling across the stash which could already be on the streets of Europe and the U.S..


Simply put, the U.S., NATO, and Hamid Karzai all made a doomsday mistake by not controlling the poppy situation. We have opted to see the issue as a black and white one, rather than offering an alternative to the farmers. The London-based think tank Senlis Council has advised that the coalition and the Karzai government allow the growth of poppies, however instead of flooding the black market and paying for the bombs that kill our troops, have them sold to pharmaceutical companies worldwide. Then, the hope is that the money will collectively go to the tribes in the area and help pay for the rebuilding of the infrastructure.


It is my hope that President-elect Obama and his administration focus on this problem before the Taliban are able to control it even more. However, only once during the whole presidential campaign season did a candidate mention "opium" and "Afghanistan" collectively. With such a massive supply coming from Afghanistan, not every gram of opium has to end up in the hands of an addict in the UK. By promoting a legal alternative that is internationally acceptable, we can utilize international companies and agencies involvement to win the hearts and minds of the people. By allowing farmers to provide funding for local projects such as their schools and roads, it will be the people of Afghanistan making up the infrastructure and not just international aid. With that type of invested interest, the Taliban can hopefully be seen as the obstacle towards peace in the country and their monopoly on the Afghan poppies can end.