9/11: Al-Qaida's re-emergence in the Arab Spring

Eleven years ago, we all witnessed the tragedy that would define generations - landmarks of American economic and military power reduced to rubble, smoking from canyons of steel and collapsing on people who were our neighbors, friends and family.  Without a doubt, 9/11 changed American policy and created what many have declared "a war that can't be won", what was once a global war on terror structured around disrupting terrorism at its roots before it could hit U.S. targets again.  This aggressive campaign led to military posturing in areas where Al-Qaida (AQ) and its sympathizers operated with a new African command being built for U.S. operations on the continent as well as enhanced cooperation by Middle Eastern intelligence agencies.  The understanding was that terrorism was a global threat, that reduced regional stability wherever it was harbored.  

Partnerships emerged with intelligence offices in unlikely partners, Egypt and Jordan among them, increasing coordination and intelligence sharing.  It seemed as though terrorism was being disrupted in virtually every hemisphere and most assuredly, significant accomplishments were achieved with credit to be shared with these offices.  Under the present administration, the intensity of this war has continued and we have seen the campaign shift from manpower to technology with a heavy drone usage.  As Peter Bergen has written, it appears the drone is President Obama's weapon of choice, with more strikes occurring in Obama's first four years than his predecessor's two terms.  The group's leadership has been decimated, decapitated and is struggling.  However, I think we are beginning to see the new brand of AQ emerge.

Today, on this significant anniversary, in lieu of a terrorist attack we saw the U.S. embassy in Cairo and in Benghazi fall under attack by scores of "peaceful protesters."  A State Department employee appears to have been killed during the incident in Benghazi.  These two incidents seem to piggyback off of the Arab Spring uprisings, which were backed by the U.S. in both countries to overthrow both Qaddafi and Mubarak.  Simply put, AQ could have pulled off the same scale attacks it orchestrated in 1998 today, yet it would have been extremely selfish and yielded hardly any results to its cause.  Any excuse for a U.S. escalation, amidst a withdrawal in Iraq and Afghanistan, would backfire on not only AQ, but those who took to the streets to make these revolutions occur.  AQ would be the bad guy again in the Arab world.  By becoming mainstream and blending in with anti-U.S. protests, it identifies the up and coming radical sentiments in the youths that it can train a new mujahideen to replace its fallen ranks.  

The brand that makes up AQ is one that is merely in name at present, affected by the persistent U.S. campaign targeting its leadership and disrupting its fundraising and recruiting networks.  It has outsourced the terrorism to its franchises in Yemen (AQAP) and Africa (AQIM), leaving AQ central to tap into the opportune Arab Spring revolutions.  It is no coincidence that U.S. diplomatic sites were attacked in countries that the U.S. helped fuel the tide by removing support for the previous regimes.  The question is how does the U.S. respond to this escalation?

By failing to address the problems, we risk increased violence as AQ becomes a fixture in these movements.  By seemingly avoiding violence, it appears to become part of the Arab world without facing the problem of blowing up innocent civilians and losing support for killing more Muslims than Americans amongst its attacks like it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By blending in to the Arab Spring, the protests become indicative of a new strategy that takes to the cities, directly to streets rather than reclusive training camps isolated in vulnerable havens to a drone strategy.  AQ blends in amongst the youths, capable of exploiting them and instilling the anti-U.S. sentiment that first filled its ranks.  Simply put, we are seeing Al-Qaida adapt from a terrorist group to an ideology.  The risk with such an evolution puts at risk everything we have accomplished as it encourages the potential for lone-wolf or independent operations that require domestic surveillance as compared to merely looking for those people who travel to Pakistan every year.  

Make no mistake, despite what administration officials say, Al-Qaida is a component of the enemy we face but a defeat of AQ is not indicative that we are any safer.  With the group successfully transforming in the direction that Ayman al-Zawahiri seems to be steering it in, recruiting will be significantly easier.  This is a certain way to build up the ranks again, rally the troops and gain the momentum it lost after 9/11 in the Arab world.  Without responding, the U.S. opens doors for attacks on its sites abroad that will most certainly have greater bloodshed than today's incidents.  As we pause to remember the victims from those tragic events eleven years ago, let us commit that terrorism is a tactic that will not prevail or deter us from the freedoms we enjoy and the resilient spirit that our country shares.