The emerging legitimacy of Hizbullah: a doomsday for the Middle East

As the United States is just months away from choosing its 44th President, the world is anxiously watching. Make no mistake, our enemies are awaiting the choice as well. Both candidates talk freely of a vision in the Middle East and the threat from Al-Qaida, but neither will acknowledge that the Middle East of today is still the house of cards it was twenty years ago.

Last week, Israel reaffirmed its position on the list of countries which succumb to terrorist groups' demands. In a prisoner exchange, five Hizbullah militants - including Samir Kantar, whose release had been sought by the group since the 1985 hijacking of the Achille Lauro - were swapped for the bodies of two Israeli soldiers. Both soldiers had been dead since their capture in 2006.

Contrary to the mainstream media, the swap was a universal victory for terrorist groups. The one country that was seen as their main enemy had succumbed to their demands, releasing its most notorious Arab prisoner. Israel's actions that merely recovered two deceased soldiers have compromised the safety of one of its own. Immediately following the successful exchange, Hamas announced that "it proved Israel was no longer able to dictate terms during negotiations" and that Hamas would raise the stakes for Gilad Shalit, who is being held since his capture as well in 2006.

The ultimate dilemma Israel will face is that Lebanon is now unified by Hizbullah thanks to the inaction of the universal community. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1559, passed in 2004, called for Hizbullah's disarmament. The lack of compliance in such a situation proved fatal for Lebanon when the nation's second civil occurred. Triggered by government action banning Hizbullah's communications network (built by Iran) and the removal of the Beirut airport chief (who had allowed the group to place hidden cameras to spy on anti-Syrian politicians' travels, reportedly for assassination surveillance), the group launched its campaign. Disabling the U.S. trained army, the group forced Lebanon's parliament to negotiate before the group waged all-out war against the weak U.S.-trained Lebanese military. At the end of the "unity government" negotiations, Hizbullah walked away with Cabinet posts, an uncontested veto power, and Parliament seats.

Not a bad deal for a group that estimates over the past six months have warned is "rearming at an alarming rate." Reports suggest that the group in May had nearly 45,000 rockets, more than before the onset of the 2006 war with Israel, as well as nearly emptying villages in its southern Lebanese strongholds to send for training in Iran and Syria. The group has collected an estimated $30 billion from Iran and Syria. The group's international fundraising have been thriving in South America and have included cigarette-smuggling rings inside North Carolina. Contributing to the group's powerhouse status is that its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, is routinely celebrated as the most prominent Arab leader (over Ahmadinejad, bin Laden, Mashaal, etc.).

Hizbullah is clearly the model for international terrorism. They have successfully adapted to counter the global efforts against them, becoming an international enterprise. The group is not by any means at a weak state. Unless Israel begins to focus on its northern border, the group will continue to thrive and enjoy its hijacking of the Lebanese government, resulting in a Middle East consisting of the status quo.

Saudi Arabia's tough talk against terrorism leaves a lot to be expected

Often it is said that actions speak louder than words. Case in point - Saudi Arabia. It is universally known that members of the Saudi royal family (which estimates place around 6-7000) contribute to fronts for terrorist organizations - a report issued earlier this year declared Saudi Arabia as the top country of which terrorists obtain funds from. It is the media's favorite statistic that 15 of the 19 hijackers on September 11 were Saudi. It is no doubt that the kingdom has an eery connection with the jihadist movement.

Over this year, senior Saudi officials - ranging from King Abdullah to most recently, the muftis - have made statements denouncing aspects of terrorism, which is a significant step in the right direction. Take for instance the most recent order issued by the muftis, in which they said that "following the path of terrorism is opposed to Islam" and sanctioned "offering refuge and protection to terrorists" as "a grave sin." While this is finally something worth discussing in Saudi Arabia, the religious declarations of the muftis usually specifically cite Al-Qaida or refer to terrorism within the kingdom. Furthermore, some of the statements lend credit to the jihadist mindset of Muslims being victims of aggression. Within the same statement, the muftis declared that:

"The aggression against Muslims and the occupation of their lands cannot justify attacks and violence: obeying the dictates of the Qur'an without fomenting hatred and division is a basic principle of Islam, in accord with the precepts sanctioned by the prophet Mohammad".

Perhaps the biggest problem is that the muftis have been replaced by new pro-jihadists who have changed the role religious leaders play in combating terrorism. Within a recent MEMRI report, it is suggested that some elements within the Salafist movement have framed the mujahideen as being essential in any decisions regarding jihad, eliminating the need for approval by the muftis. The groups have exploited the role of charisma and given the mujahideen supernatural traits, such as infallibility, which were typically reserved only for the prophets. This new approach has gotten even bin Laden angered at how youth in particular, have accepted in respects a new form of Islam which ignores the traditional need for an individual understanding of the Qur'an and respect for the scholars that bin Laden's cause believes as necessary for the successful implementation of Shari'a law. The report cites that in his 2007 recording, he argues that:

"I [address] the jihad fighters [in Iraq] in order to oppose the growing [tendency] that has appeared among them, [namely the tendency] to assign great weight to the orders of its group and its commanders, to the extent that some of them have come to regard [these orders] as infallible, even though they believe, in theory, that infallibility is a virtue that only Allah's Messenger possesses. A person [who holds such a view] becomes a fanatical [follower] of his group and its commanders, instead of obeying a Koranic verse or a hadith from the Sunna of Allah's Messenger."

If bin Laden sees this as a problem that is within his own ranks, it is unlikely that the mufti hold the cure-all. Perhaps teachings from the religious elite and the royal family are not what would-be terrorists need, as bin Laden has made it a point to label the Saudi hierarchy as illegitimate and being complicit in the "siege of Islam" that Al-Qaida is battling. Words are just words, and they will not in actuality rid the kingdom of it's influence on global terrorism. The facts are indisputable, Saudi Arabia has remarkable power in controlling matters pertaining to numerous terrorist fronts. Now it's their time to show results. Arrests of terrorist group members, such as the nearly 700 detained in January, clearly show that terrorism has not left the Arabian Peninsula. Who knows what other revelations regarding terrorism remain undiscovered inside the kingdom.

The grooming of the heir apparent?

It was widely reported towards the end of last year that Osama bin Laden had designated his 16-year old son Hamza, as his successor as the sheikh of Al-Qaida. Now, Hamza is making more headlines with his "poem" than his father's last two audio recordings did. I want to clarify that I do not necessarily subscribe to the reports circulated over the past month that Osama is nearing death and in poor physical condition, but it is rather curious that his son would release his first tape as reports of his father's impending death surface.

Regardless of his father's circumstances, Hamza's tape comes as reports swirl of Al-Qaida breeding a new line of terrorists-the youth. Reports since April have come in steadily of increased recruiting of young boys, when a video tape was released of a 12-year old beheading an individual at a Taliban school in Pakistan. To further impress this growing trend, in the deadly attack on Sunday commemorating the Red Mosque siege in Islamabad, it is reported that the suicide bomber may have been 15 to 16 years old. Whether this recording is a sign of an imminent passage of command or a call to arms for the youth, it makes sense in the Al-Qaida recruitment. The Al-Qaida movement is creating forces that it is counting on to last another generation, and what better way to target the upcoming youth than by using one of its own.

Pakistan's dilemma

Yesterday's bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, could not have come at a worse time for Pakistan. The Afghans were uncomfortably quick to point the finger at militants from across the Afghan-Pakistan border, even going so far as to accuse elements of Pakistani intelligence-the ISI. Considering just statements last week, PM Gilani may suffer the demise of a new hope at the expense of an old threat.

Just look at what an Indian general said just days before the blast. On July 3, Indian Army chief General Deepak Kapoor said that he believed that 48% of militants in Kashmir were foreigners. Couple that statement with his assessment that said Pakistan's biggest challenge is "moderating its radical sections" and it sends a pretty clear message that India is aware and concerned of Pakistan's terrorist elements. All of that was just four days before India would lose key figures to the blast that would kill 40.

India's public recognition of Pakistan's militant activity came around the same time as the first admission by a Pakistani official of terrorist training camps existing in the country. Benazir Bhutto's widow, Asif Ali Zardari, for the first time stated that there were training camps that may have been responsible for his wife's assassination. Nothing new, but the forum which he choose to make the comments might not assist the situation. His words were spoken at a summit entitled "India & Pakistan-Designing a Future." He chose to specify that terrorism inside Pakistan's borders posed a threat to a peaceful resolution between the two countries, which the summit was to advance. The summit that may have promoted a peaceful cooperation between the two nations only had a week and a half to help.

In summary, Pakistan may be dooming itself as a result of its peace talks with militants. The only people that are seeing a result (and a very weak one, at that) are the Pakistanis. Has the violence in Pakistan even decreased? Consider that the capital is on an almost weekly basis raised to "high alert." Remember that Islamabad was attacked on Sunday on the anniversary of the Red Mosque incident last year and Karachi was rocked by multiple explosions the very next day. The problem with the Gilani administration is that it's domestic policies have no impact on foreign policy issues. As Afghanistan threatened military troops into the tribal areas last month, Pakistan may want to assess India's possible responses if there is any ISI connection to yesterday's blast.

The threat to Indian targets is probably not over. As I wrote on my post on July 3 (see Pakistan a key ally in the War on Terror?, see reason #5), Al-Qaida's provoking of a Pakistan-India conflict would be a winning situation for the group. It would detract Pakistan's military forces (which were built up primarily for an Indian conflict), allowing the group to act inside the country with little to no resistance. Through this, Al-Qaida would be capable of dictating the domestic situation of Pakistan through attacks. In short, Al-Qaida might be taking the reins for Pakistan's lack of a foreign policy. It's up to PM Gilani, should he decide to cooperate with Musharraf rather than isolate him.

A successful operation by all standards

I want to say that the Colombian military operation that rescued 15 hostages from the hands of FARC rebels was by all standards a brilliant exercise. To say several years ago that the military was capable of rescuing hostages without incident would most assuredly received laughter from most individuals, quite possibly President Uribe himself. Douglas Farah writes that the operation was the result of over three years of planning that required astounding coordination given recent developments in the Colombia-FARC conflict.

One has to take into consideration that the FARC was in many senses paranoid of a traditional rescue operation. The example of Sigifredo Lopez, a hostage since 2002 to present day, shows how reckless the FARC has been in its defense of hostages. Lopez, while being moved with 11 other hostages he had been taken with, became caught in the middle of a firefight with what FARC rebels believed were Colombian forces attempting a rescue. The 11 others were killed in the incident, Lopez was injured, and the perceived Colombian forces were none other than another FARC group. Friendly fire accounted for the murder of nearly an entire group of hostages.

This incident proves that the Colombians had to "think outside the box," and by all standards they did an astounding job. However, given all the years of planning, this operation could not have occurred without the recent successes the military has achieved against the FARC. If FARC's leadership was not thrown into disarray after the deaths of three commanders in the Secretariat, Manuel Marulanda-its leader of 44 years, this would probably still be a hypothetical rescue attempt. As Doug Farah writes, his successor, Raul Reyes, was killed preceding his death and the group was forced to appoint Alfonso Cano as its head. The true power the Secretariat now holds seems questionable as leaders have either surrendered or vanished as a result of the targeted killings by Colombian forces or betrayal by their bodyguards, as is the case with Ivan Rios and his March 3 killing. This lack of communication amongst leaders likely benefited the forces, as they were able to deceive the hostage-holders with orders they claimed to be from Cano.

However, as Aaron Mannes writes, the operation does have some issues that should be of concern. The Colombian use of a false NGO may lend harmful for the legitimate ones and their involvement in the region, but Mannes does suggest that the FARC uses NGOs to operate under the government's radar. As he writes, this issue is far too complicated and could take years to determine, but by all means this should not establish a precedent of government dependence to use them as a lifeline in situations.

It will be interesting to see how this rescue relates to the fate of the estimated 700 hostages still held by FARC. While this success rescued the most notable hostages, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt and the three U.S. hostages, the remainder should not be treated as less significant. As one commentator on CNN discussed the rescue, "I don't believe that 90% of America knew there were hostages in Colombia until now." One can only hope that following the joyous reaction by nearly all world leaders following the rescue, most notably Hugo Chavez, who stated that he would meet former nemesis President Uribe, whom he dubbed "a criminal" and requested the UN charge for genocide as recent as March.

This is by all means a success, but not a victory over the FARC. To think the FARC, an organization that has survived for 44 years, cannot recover is extremely ignorant. The question remains, will FARC follow its political origin or will it increase its dabblings as a criminal enterprise? Either way, it is likely the FARC will still enjoy connections with the governments of Chavez, Correa, and Noriega in either form. However, so long as the Uribe government continue its offensive against the FARC leadership and continues to isolate the group from mainstream Colombia, it is highly probable that a victory can be declared sometime in the next decade.

Terrorism a social problem? The battle to clearly counter terrorism's roots continues.

At the Annual Meeting of the Royal College of Psychiatrists in London, it seems that the roots of terrorism have been clearly defined now. Or not. Professor Scott Atran, research director in anthropology at the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris and presidential scholar in sociology at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York, told the group that terrorism was a social problem and not a mental or health issue. Is this really a significant breakthrough that gets us any closer to confronting why there are still Al-Qaida sympathizers willing to go out and kill those who oppose their supremacist Islamic views? While I have read some of Professor Atran's works and find many to be accurate and informative, this "finding" seems to only continue with the acceptance that we can not adequately describe terrorism for what it is, allowing ourselves to do a pathetic job of countering the jihadist message.

In 2007, Professor Atran presented a piece to the State Department and House of Lords entitled "Terrorism and Radicalization: What Not to Do, What to Do." In the first slide he said "If people want to kill you or your friends, and you want to stop this from happening, it helps to know why they may want to kill. So ask them if you can." I believe this is the vital concept that the U.S. and its allies have overlooked. I believe that we have allowed ourselves to be put on the defensive about our actions in the Muslim world. We have allowed our successes to be overlooked and let jihadist leaders frame the talking points, only responding when accusations are leveled against us or something goes terribly wrong.

There is no doubt the U.S has a "Midas touch" in the region, except everything we touch is turned into bad PR. Whether it's right or wrong, the campaign against the U.S. is strong on Arab TV. Just ask any Muslim in the region if they've heard of Abu Ghraib. The embarassment surrounding the violation of Muslim prisoners' rights is still a talking point muttered by many when discussing the U.S., just like Guantanamo Bay. Perceived U.S. allies like President Musharraf and the Saudis take heat in every recording from bin Laden it seems. The ideals the U.S. pushes for have been forgotten by these distractions. The U.S. needs to change the image of being a controlling hand over the region into that of being a cooperative partner pushing for the acceptance of religious ideals and freedoms. The War on Terror is not a War on Islam, but a chuckle by the President with a quick and firm "no" does nothing to counter the claim.

While the U.S. can achieve as many operational successes in Iraq and Afghanistan as it wants, military successes like the Sunni Awakening Councils in Iraq hold little value in the war of thoughts. We need to broadcast that we have partnered with religious sects to promote an environment where their religious differences are discussed, not threatened. Figures like bin Laden and Zawahiri hold little power in the Western media, but their messages in the Middle East are what possess the power of persuading one suicide bomber. The U.S. needs to quit responding to the messages and issue statements preceding their release. Intensify the PR campaign on Arab television thoroughly explaining the U.S. role in the region. Five years after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. and Iraq are at a stalemate over the Status of Forces agreement because many Iraqi leaders believe that the continued presence of U.S. troops in the country would mean the U.S. would effectively, "run the show" and mandate Iraqi affairs. This is the result of none other than the U.S. letting its foreign policy be hijacked by ideologues like bin Laden.

The War on Terror is not about operational successes, but it is structured around making partnerships in the Middle East and building bridges with not just the leadership, but the people as well. By no means does this mean sacrificing elements of our national security to make friendships, but it does mean approaching the people and discussing issues relevant to them. We should be clear that when threatened, we will be a threatening force, but our primary goal is to promote an alliance in the region that allows sovereignty of the countries. The United States could not have single-handedly won the Cold War, and it certainly can not win the War on Terror alone.

Pakistan a key ally in the War On Terror?

Well to be accurate, Pakistan has the potential to be a key ally in the war on terrorism. However, under the new Parliament and Prime Minister there, they have taken significant action to reduce the actual effective measures against terrorism. It's difficult to say why they are called a key ally now, but I can give five reasons why they should be a key ally.

1) They face a growing domestic threat of an insurgency that is linked to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It would be in their best interest to not legitimize the Taliban as the talks approved by Gilani have few if not any repercussions should the Taliban breach these peace deals.

2) The intentions of the Taliban fighters have been made clear and the Pakistani government has chickened out of taking action against any real criminals in the region. Remember how angry people were when Benazir Bhutto was shot dead in public and everyone pointed the finger at Musharraf? What about that guy Baitullah Mehsud who developed the plot?
In April a Pakistani court issued warrants for Mehsud's arrest, telling the Northwest Province Frontier Police until April 25 to arrest him. Where is he now? Five days after the warrants being issued, the government reached a peace accord with the Mehsuds. This agreement pulled all the Pakistani militant troops out and replaced it with their even more corrupt Frontier Corpsmen-the same guys that we killed in that "border clash" that Pakistan insists was friendly fire and our fault, even though several FC members have been arrested in the past for attacks on coalition forces.

3) It should be in Pakistan's best interest to promote stability in the region. They have the possibility to receive great partnerships with Afghanistan should they actively pursue stabilizing the Karzai admin. However, the idea of a secular govt. is one that is growing throughout the country, Musharraf has been ineffective in winning the minds of people that the Taliban are hardly secular.

4) Pakistan's autonomous regions are host to some of the most advanced terrorism training in the region. Any of the negotiations that they hold are not putting an end to these camps, it's only promising that they do not train for any "anti-state" activities inside Pakistan. Also, they are not establishing control over the areas, only allowing them to continue with the government's ineffectiveness.

5) Pakistan is a concern due to its nuclear program. AQ Khan (the godfather of the Pakistan nuke program) was already arrested but pardoned by Musharraf (one of his biggest mistakes) and he is only serving house arrest-which is a very loose term in the region. They know he shared information with Libya, North Korea, and several other countries. This coordination is a very, very dangerous threat to the region. Al-Qaeda has expressed an interest in using nuclear weapons, and it would only take one Pakistani weapon set off in India for a possible nuclear outbreak.

All of that said, Pakistan should be a real key ally. Instead, it has taken the choice to become a relatively lax enforcer of any terrorism laws and is not seeking to change its status at any time under its new govt. If there is anything that Karzai should do, it is to send troops into the autonomous regions (like Turkey and the PKK in Iraq), but Afghanistan does not have the proper troop amount yet to be able to face a heavy resistance there and maintain stability in its own country, thanks to the ineffective policies against the opium trade there, but that's another story.